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This thesis contends that Chinese ontological security seeking is an overlooked aspect 
in China-Europe relations, but that several political actions are difficult to explain 
without accounting for this factor. Whilst the role of the identity factor in Chinese 
foreign policies towards other great powers has been thoroughly analysed, the 
literature has yet to address how it shapes China’s policies towards Europe. This 
omission is puzzling, given that Europe was a key actor shaping the identity crisis of 
the Chinese polity after the fall of the Qing dynasty. In addressing this scholarly gap, 
this thesis has thus sought to answer the question of ‘how does Europe matter for 
Chinese identity, and how does identity matter for China’s current-day policies 
towards Europe?’  
 
This question has been approached through a two-pronged research strategy, 
combining a section of historical diachronic analysis with a section of contemporary 
synchronic analysis. The diachronic section investigates the Chinese view of Europe 
from the Opium Wars onwards, through a discourse analysis of political textual 
monuments from four key eras of ontological security seeking: The efforts at 
reforming the empire during the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1872); the Early 
Republic Era (1910–1915), with its attempts to realize a new republican state; the early 
days of the Chinese Communist Party’s New China (1945–1955); and the time around 
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (1975–1990). The analysis demonstrates how the Chinese 
idea of Europe was intimately connected to these fundamental changes in China’s 
political identity, as Europe moved from being regarded as barbaric, to a political 
lodestar, to a battleground for Communism, and finally to a role as a fundamentally 
separate civilization in a multipolar world.  
 
The synchronic section proceeds to investigate the degree to which this Chinese view 
of Europe has been a factor in contemporary Sino-European relations, centring on 
three cases: the political crisis regarding EU’s embargo on arms sales (2003–2006); the 
fallout with China’s European partners following incidents in 2007 and 2008; and the 
diplomatic boycotts of the UK and Norway (2010–2016). Analysing these cases 
through a three-layered approach based on ontological security theory, the empirical 
argument of this thesis is that the Chinese discourses of Europe, emphasizing 
ritualized civilizational recognition, shaped a particular range of Chinese policy 
choices, that cannot be explained through models based on economic or geopolitical 
rationality. The thesis also argues that the case of China is salient for exploring aspects 
of ontological security that until now have been under-theorized.  By expanding the 
theoretical framework to include key Chinese concepts, the analysis contributes both 
to ontological security theory building, and a better understanding of the identity 
factor in Chinese foreign policies in general. 
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Note on Transliteration and Translation 
 
The timespan of this thesis’ research project entailed the implementation of a wide 
range of sources in different languages, and with varying transliteration practices. 
Most notably, the source material includes texts written with both traditional and 
simplified Chinese characters. Furthermore, the secondary sources comprise texts 
utilising the older Wade-Giles Romanization system to transliterate Chinese words, in 
addition to the now standard Pinyin system.  
 
In order to better simplify the reading experience, and facilitate comprehension and 
comparison of the long lines in Chinese conceptual developments, I have opted for a 
single standard for the entire thesis. Thus, I have consistently transcribed traditional 
Chinese characters into simplified characters where these appear in the text, following 
the norms of standard mainland Mandarin. Similarly, I have Romanized all material 
using modern-day Pinyin, without diacritical marks. There are two notable 
exceptions. One is for certain names where it is the common norm to write them using 
an alternative form of transliteration. Thus, the text refers to Sun Yat-sen, not Sun 
Zhongshan. For a full list over the names this applies to, see the author’s instruction 
of the China Quarterly. The other exception regards directly quoted sources in the 
text, in which cases I have provided the Pinyin form in square brackets.  
 
Translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated. As Mandarin is a language 
that differs substantially from English in terms of grammar and syntax, this 
exacerbates the eternal translator’s dilemma of metaphrasing vs paraphrasing. Given 
this thesis’ focus on analysing Chinese-language discourses, I have chosen to hew 
more closely to literal translations, prioritising a more direct rendition of the content, 
at the cost of the language flow in English. Chinese names are written according to the 
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1.1 Defining the Research Project 
 
The sweeping restructuring of China’s international role creates challenges both for 
other actors on the international stage and for China itself, as the Chinese leadership 
strive to obtain security for the current political regime and the continuation of the 
Chinese rejuvenation project. As a result, scholarship on the motivations of China’s 
foreign policies has proliferated, given Beijing’s new significance in defining the 
global security environment.1 However, this thesis contends that there is a range of 
questions which remains largely unexplored regarding one of the most important 
nexuses in Chinese foreign policy: the rapidly developing Sino-European relationship. 
In particular, this thesis will argue that the current literature has yet to address the 
degree to which the Chinese pursuit of ontological security—securing a stable 
legitimate identity at home and abroad—is a significant factor shaping China’s 
policies towards Europe. Whilst the role of the identity factor in Chinese foreign 
policies towards other major international actors, such as the US, Russia, and Japan, 
has long been a field of scholarly enquiry, 2  this is a perspective that has been 
overlooked in China-Europe relations. This omission is all the more puzzling, as 
Europe was the single most important actor shaping the identity crisis of the Chinese 
polity after the fall of the Qing dynasty. This thesis thus argues that Chinese 
                                                 
1 Amongst the number of works on this, that will be related to later in this thesis, see 
e.g. Y. Deng and Wang 2004; R. Li 2008; Rozman 2012 
2 See R. Li 2008; Rozman 2012; Jian Yang 2010; Rozman 2013a; Larson and 
Shevchenko 2010a; Callahan 2005b; Sinkkonen 2014; Callahan 2004a 
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ontological security seeking is an overlooked aspect in China-Europe relations, and 
that several contemporary political actions are difficult to explain without accounting 
for this factor. In addressing this issue, this thesis will thus investigate the research 
question of ‘how does Europe matter for Chinese identity, and how does identity 
matter for China’s current-day policies towards Europe?’  
 
The fact that literature on China-EU relations omits the identity factor, whilst 
literature on identity in international relations fails to engage with the case of China 
and Europe, has both empirical and theoretical consequences. In empirical terms, the 
absence of identity dynamics, hampers the explanatory power of a volatile 
relationship between two of the world’s foremost power centres. Scholarly 
approaches have traditionally regarded Sino-European relations from primarily 
economic perspective, a perspective which is insufficient to explain a range of 
discrepancies in the relationship. As the following chapters demonstrate, the 
contemporary China-Europe relationship has seen considerable volatility over a short 
period of time, from being touted as a potential new great power axis, to being riven 
by instances of political boycotts and diplomatic freeze. These instances of political 
crisis, and the moves taken to defuse them, from the apology diplomacy surrounding 
the Dalai Lama to the Chinese insistence on an extraordinary audience with Queen 
Elizabeth II as a key point of the normalization of ties, are difficult to reconcile with 
geopolitical or economic drivers alone.  
  
Whereas such key developments over recent decades are difficult to explain fully 
through mainstream positivist approaches, they are compatible with an ontological 
security theory-driven identity analysis. The greatest challenges in China-Europe 
relations have arguably arisen when political decisions in Europe challenged 
fundamental tenets of China’s identity narrative. Seemingly contrary actions like 
Dalai Lama-related boycotts towards important trade partners, when simultaneously 
seeking these same countries’ acquiescence in creating a more multipolar world order, 
15 
 
can be more saliently understood through analysing them as based on a broad Chinese 
understanding of ‘identity security,’ and the importance of maintaining a sustainable 
legitimate identity both at home and abroad. To discount identity concerns from an 
analysis of China – Europe relations thus entails overlooking one of the most salient 
variables of the political dynamic. 
 
In theoretical terms, another puzzle motivating this thesis is how implementing the 
case of China’s relations with Europe into the identity literature can contribute to 
developing ontological security theory, in addition to contributing to the 
understanding of Chinese foreign policy motivations. A consequence of this case’s 
absence from the current body of works, is the continued overrepresentation of 
established Western nation-states in the case universe. This bias weakens our 
conceptual apparatus for analysing non-Western states, at precisely the moment in 
time when these countries global influence is more important than ever. Furthermore, 
this skewed case selection results in a tendency to overlook the role in national 
identity-building that is shaped by the historical legacies of the forced entry into 
modernity during the age of colonialism. Particularly in the case of China, this is a key 
point. The violent inclusion of China into the Western world order during the 
colonialist era demarcated a breaking point where China’s image of itself, China’s 
image of the world, and for that matter the world’s image of China, were all 
fundamentally ruptured. Arguably, this separation has yet to be mended, and 
consecutive Chinese governments have sought through different strategies to re-
obtain a stable representation of China on the world stage. As pointed out by Yong 
Deng, the end of the Cold War brought forth yet another fundamental status crisis for 
China. As a result of this, the necessity to shape a new identity for domestic and 
foreign consumption became apparent to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that 
oversaw a development to an identity based on a form of great power nationalism.3 
                                                 
3 Y. Deng 2008 
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This has led to a greater Chinese drive for status recognition internationally, and for 
the CCP to be regarded domestically as the guardians of this rejuvenation. Thus, to 
quote Callahan, “the heart of Chinese foreign policy is thus not a security dilemma, 
but an identity dilemma.”4 As this thesis will conclude, this identity dilemma matters. 
Also for China’s policies towards Europe.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, this doctoral research project has proceeded to analyse the 
research question through the lens of ontological security theory. Furthermore, I have 
sought not only to investigate how ontological security can contribute to our 
understanding of China-Europe relations, but also to explore how the case of China’s 
Europe policies can contribute to the development of ontological security theory. 
Empirically, the research has combined a diachronic, historical, and a synchronic, 
contemporary, research strand. The diachronic investigation focuses on the role of 
Europe in the Chinese efforts to re-establish a stable political identity narrative after 
the challenges of the Opium Wars. It thus provides a necessary deep conceptual 
understanding for studying Chinese ontological security seeking in current-day 
foreign policies. The synchronic strand, focusing on the present era, centres on three 
cases of political crisis in the China-Europe relationship over the last two decades, in 
order to ascertain the degree to which Chinese ontological security seeking played a 
role in shaping its relations with Europe in these defining moments of the China-
Europe relationship. Over the course of this chapter, this thesis’ position within the 




                                                 
4 Callahan 2009, 192 
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1.2 Background and Academic Context 
 
This thesis has been motivated by the extent to which the literature on China-Europe 
relations has neglected to address certain central issues and developments in the 
relationship over the last decades. These omissions are arguably due to the overlap of 
four gaps in the current literature, that this research project seeks to address. This 
work thus contributes to the academic debate at the intersection of four interrelated 
literatures: the general literature on China-EU relations, scholarship on identity as a 
factor in China’s relations with Europe, the study of Chinese identity processes, and 
ontological security theory building. Firstly, the foreign policy dyad between China 
and Europe is a generally underexplored field compared to the extensive studies of 
Chinese relations with other major global actors. Secondly, within the literature 
addressing China-Europe, or China-EU, relations, investigations into the role played 
by identity is lacking to an extent one does not see in the scholarship on China’s other 
key relationships. Thirdly, whereas ontological security literature has rapidly grown 
to include a range of salient analyses of various countries’ foreign policies, only to a 
small extent has this approach been applied to China. Finally, and related, there is an 
absence of ontological security theory development based on exploring Chinese cases. 
It is at the intersection of these four issues of the extant scholarship, two of them 
empirical, and two of them theoretical, that this thesis aims its contribution.  
 
With regards to the first of the empirical issues presented above, the field of China-
EU studies is still strangely underexplored. This stands in sharp contrast to e.g. the 
relationship between the USA and China, or China and Japan, that have, 
understandably enough, given rise to a large and growing body of works, drawing 
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upon and contributing to both empirical policies and theoretical debates. 5  The 
literature regarding relations between two of the world’s three largest economic 
actors, the EU and China, is on the other hand relatively meagre. Scholarship on Sino-
European relations has its main strengths in research on the importance of economic 
imperatives.6 In particular the literature has focused on Chinese efforts at playing 
different European actors against each other in order to achieve better economic terms 
and compliance with what Beijing regards as sensitive political issues.7  
 
The scholarship on Europe and China does, however, share a general trait of still 
underdeveloped research fields, in that the dominant body of literature is 
overwhelmingly one of edited volumes.8 In addition to a number of journal articles on 
the topic, as well as a rich and rapidly growing selection of policy papers. 9 The edited 
volumes are in most cases excellent examples of the academic salience of addressing 
a topic through a kaleidoscopic collection of authors addressing  different aspects of 
the China-EU relationship in short and succinct summarizing chapters. There is also 
                                                 
5 For a selection of important works on China-US relations, utilising empirical 
studies for broader theoretical insights, see e.g. Allison 2017; Z. Wang 2012; 
Friedberg 2011; Kissinger 2012; Lampton 2001; Hugh White 2013; For a similar 
introduction to the field of China-Japan studies, see e.g. Holslag 2015; Gries et al. 
2009; Dent 2010; P. J. Smith 2009; Christensen 1999; Whereas on the topic of Sino-
Russion relations, a good intro can be found in e.g. Bekkevold and Lo 2018; 
Bellacqua 2010; Eder 2013; Wishnick 2017; Kaczmarski 2015 
6 See e.g. Bräuner 2014; Christiansen, Kirchner, and Murray 2013; Parello-Plesner 
2013; Fox and Godement 2009; Shambaugh, Sandschneider, and Hong 2007; Men 
and Balducci 2010; E. J. Kirchner, Christiansen, and Dorussen 2016, 1–3; Geeraerts 
and Huang 2016, 189–90 
7 Fox and Godement 2009 
8 For a number of good examples of this genre, see Fei and Kerr 2008; Brown 2014; 
Shambaugh, Sandschneider, and Zhou 2007a; Ross, Tunsjø, and Tuosheng 2011; 
Austermann, Wang, and Vangeli 2014; Wiessala, Wilson, and Taneja 2009a; H. Zhou 
2016; Z. Pan 2012a 




a small number of excellent monographs, but these tend to be focused on narrow and 
often economy-related aspects of the relationship, such as Farnell and Crookes 
overview of the political economy drivers in EU-China relations.10 However, I will 
argue that the field of Europe-China studies deserves to significantly strengthen this 
strand of in-depth, theory-driven monographs. A key argument of this thesis is thus 
that such a focus has overlooked the degree to which economic imperatives in China-
Europe relations are locked into a relationship with perceptions of Chinese identity. 
This important aspect of Sino-European relations is being touched upon briefly by 
Callahan, who emphasizes how China’s relations with the EU are important, in that 
“it helps the PRC to construct a view of China as a non-hegemonic superpower”.11 
This thesis will stress that such aspect holds all the more importance in current 
Chinese foreign relations, as the repercussions of China’s rapid economic and political 
rise make the question of China’s ontological security even more important, as a tool 
to deescalate potential security dilemmas both regionally and globally.12 As Steele has 
successfully demonstrated that ontological security can at times take prevalence over 
even physical security, it is pertinent to explore whether in the case of China and 
Europe, ontological security may also trump economic security. 
 
This brings up the second empirical point about the current literature. In addition to 
the fact that too few have yet followed in the footsteps of those scholars that have 
pioneered research in the field, the extant scholarship is concentrated along a rather 
slim range of approaches, that leaves certain topical gaps open for exploration. The 
role played by identity in China’s policies towards Europe is amongst those areas that 
have been notably absent from the range of academic literature on the topic. Within 
                                                 
10 Farnell and Crookes 2016 
11 Callahan 2008b, 131 




the general literature on Chinese foreign policies, a rapidly growing literature has 
investigated the role of identity, historical grievances, and nationalism.13 These salient 
approaches have, however, been conspicuously absent from China-Europe studies. In 
terms of the long-term developments in Europe as a factor in Chinese political identity 
development, there is a certain literature within the history discipline that provide a 
wealth of empirical information, but this has so far mainly been a strand of scholarship 
separate from International Relations-theorization. 14  There is to the best of my 
knowledge no extant genealogy, or history of ideas of the Chinese concept of Europe. 
Regarding contemporary Chinese policies towards Europe, and the role of identity as 
a factor in these, relevant literature is also rather lacking. Few articles and chapters 
exist, and those who do are mostly bereft of a deeper historical grounding. The current 
literature on EU-China relations is thus missing out on what is arguably a key 
explanatory factor.  
 
The extant literature’s mainstay of articles and edited journals is thus often, as 
incentivized by their format, limited in terms of their theoretical depth and empirical 
scope, although providing keen insights within their area of focus.15 The absence of 
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more detail in the historical chapters, see Svarverud 2007a; Lackner, Amelung, and 
Kurtz 2001; Huangfu 2012; Miller 2013; Y. C. Wang 1966; Meissner 2006; S. Kirchner 
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Chaban and Holland 2008; Wiessala, Wilson, and Taneja 2009b; Vogt 2012; Hong 




comprehensive studies of identity as a factor in China-Europe relations leaves the field 
of possible theoretical approaches to the topic quite open. As one of the main edited 
volumes on China-EU concludes by listing the main variables of the relationship, 
identity is notable by its absence. 16  The recently published monograph from 
Christiansen et.al. provides a welcome contribution to the field, and it does indeed 
refer to ontological security as an important factor in understanding Chinese foreign 
policy motivations; “Historical narratives about foreign bullying and invasion have 
been instrumental in securing the Communist Party’s domestic legitimacy after the 
collapse of the socialism and have nourished scepticism about the Western liberal 
order.” 17  However, as is natural for a book whose intended scope is an all-
encompassing treatise on the relationship, this factor is only allotted two pages.18 In 
Casarini’s earlier monograph, a pathbreaking read still almost alone of its kind, the 
wide scope of including the role of US and East-Asia as actors in the EU-China 
relationship, similarly points towards further potential research projects being 
undertaken on the specifics of China’s identity in its EU relations.19  
 
Edited tomes such as Zhongqi Pan’s excellent take at the role of conceptual differences 
in China-EU relations broach the identity issue in a constructive manner,20 and a few 
chapters on Chinese security policies briefly explore the basis on which Chinese and 
European threat perceptions differ.21  However, treatises on these conceptual gaps 
often regard these concepts and values as immanent aspects of these two political 
                                                 
Leonard 2005; Zhao Chen 2015; Möller 2002a; Men 2011; Yongjin Zhang 2014; Men 
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entities, thus not engaging thoroughly enough with the contingent identity 
constitution processes. This is another gap sought covered by this thesis, and a key 
contribution that the ontological security literature can make to the understanding of 
China-EU relations. The Sino-European relationship also holds particular interest 
with regards to Chinese ontological security-seeking in general. The relationship is in 
many ways distinct from the ties China has developed with the other major power 
centres of the world, due to the absence of a strong military aspect. This arguably gives 
Beijing added room for manoeuvre, utilizing Europe as a testing ground for their 
redefinition of China’s new identity as an international actor. China is currently in the 
middle of an enormous transition, both its identity on the international stage and 
towards its domestic public is in a state of flux, and the consequences of a 
misconstruction of Chinese identity carry potentially damaging consequences for the 
security of the Chinese party-state. 22  "China, however, provides one of the most 
striking examples of a state's deliberate attempt to change its self-identity and its 
relationships of identification to other states.”23 Chinese policy white papers highlight 
Beijing’s very real concern regarding these questions, also with regards to Europe.24  
 
In terms of the theoretical scholarship motivating this thesis project, the first main 
point regards how the study of China-Europe relations in particular, and Chinese 
foreign policies in general, would benefit from being further included in the case 
universe of ontological security theory. The role played by identity in foreign policy 
is a question explored by a number of related theoretical approaches. Although the 
role of identity tends to be absent in neo-liberal and neo-realist works on international 
politics, and by extension also of their analyses of Chinese foreign policies, identity as 
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a factor to be considered alongside more ‘hard’ aspects such as geography and power 
capabilities is still present in numerous studies within the classical and neo-classical 
realist traditions, although often related to through the prism of the role of nationalism 
or national strategic culture. 25  Thus, in Yahuda’s seminal work on international 
politics in the Asia Pacific, he underlines the importance of geography and territorial 
security as drivers of the foreign policies of the countries of the regions, but also points 
to the important role played by cultural, ethnic and historical issues.26 In particular, he 
notes how issues of identity carries especially large weight in analysing Chinese 
foreign policies over the last half-century. 27  Among the relevant aspects of state 
identity for international politics, an increasing body of scholarship has furthermore 
pointed out how perceptions of threat are dependent upon interpretation of 
identities, 28  your identity on the international arena thus matters for the security 
milieu that circumscribes your policies. Based on such implications, constructivists 
such as Wendt have named identity security one of a state’s four basic interests,29 
while related scholarship in the liberal vein has utilized Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ 
to further analyse the effects of identity as a means of power in world politics.30  
 
The problem demonstrated by the literatures above is, however, that they tend to 
define identity as a given variable. The growing literature on ontological security, to 
                                                 
25 For leading thinkers within this literature, see eg. Mearsheimer 2018; Walt 2019; 
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the contrary, emphasizes in the postatructuralist vein how a country’s identity is a 
precondition for its policy preferences and motivations, but without discounting the 
role of material factors per se. To establish and uphold a stable, legitimate identity, 
internally and externally, is thus a real and valid matter of security for any state actor 
on the world stage.31 Behaviour in order to affirm the state’s sense of self-identity may, 
moreover, be at odds with the rationality derived from a narrow definition of security-
seeking.32 In the case of China, a state which is currently undergoing a major transition 
in its role on the world stage, the concept of ontological security takes on added 
importance, and it does so also in the case of Chinese relations with Europe. 
Scholarship on Chinese foreign policy has repeatedly and saliently addressed the 
questions of Chinese identity as a factor in Beijing’s relationship with actors such as 
the US and Japan.33 There is also a considerable body of literature addressing the 
effects of the rising Chinese nationalist movements from the early 1990s onwards that 
draws attention to the identity and emotions in Chinese statecraft. However, Yong 
Deng’s prescient book on Chinese status-seeking, is as an example quite typical in that 
it only allocates a couple of pages to a mention of China-Europe, highlighting the 
extent to which there is a double gap in the literature, where EU-China books do not 
engage with identity, and identity literature on China does not engage with China’s 
relations with Europe.34 However, since the painful Chinese transition to modernity 
from the 19th century onwards, Europe, as the imperial centre of the new Westphalian 
world order, has been a central arena for China’s quest to establish and explore a new 
                                                 
31 For key theory-developing texts, see Steele 2008a; Zarakol 2010; Zarakol 2016; 
Mitzen 2006a; Skey 2010; Rumelili 2014; Ejdus 2018; Gustafsson 2014a; Subotić 2016; 
S. Kay 2012; Steele 2005a; Mitzen 2006b; Krolikowski 2008 
32 Steele 2005b 
33 See e.g. R. Li 2008; Z. Wang 2012; Rozman 2012; Jian Yang 2010; Nathan and 
Scobell 2012; Rozman 2013a; Qiu 2006; Larson and Shevchenko 2010a; Callahan 
2005b; Sinkkonen 2014; Callahan 2004a 




stable identity. This thesis thus contends that such an approach is all the more relevant 
also in the case of China’s Europe policies.  
 
For China in general, the efforts to project a legitimate identity have been given added 
urgency in recent years as the repercussions of China’s rapid economic and political 
rise made the question of China’s ontological security even more important.35 In order 
for the Chinese authorities to achieve security for the continuation of their regime, and 
the continued rise of China through a challenging reform period, two necessary 
conditions need to be met, both being intimately tied to the question of ontological 
security: Domestically, the regime needs to constitute itself as the legitimate 
representative of a rejuvenated Chinese civilization, and internationally they need to 
constitute China as a peacefully rising power.36 What is more, these goals are both 
intimately intertwined, as international status seeking is inevitably entangled with 
domestic legitimation games.37 Beijing’s top concern is the preservation of its political 
system, a goal closely related to economic growth.38 Economic growth is linked to 
internal stability and international perceptions of China; at the same time, 
international acceptance and approval are major sources of domestic legitimacy for 
the CCP.39  
 
At present, as difficult and long overdue economic and political reform processes are 
being set in motion, this transformation puts China in a position of extra vulnerability 
concerning its ontological security, a development that further explicates the utility of 
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ontological security theory in research on Beijing’s foreign policy motivators. 40 
Furthermore, there have also been a number of calls for a more theoretically informed 
discussion to the topics of Chinese identity politics and nationalism overall. Notably, 
in their landmark investigation into Chinese identity seeking, Dittmer and Kim sketch 
out a number of broad principles for future research programs asking for a more 
theoretically stringent approach.41 Similarly, in his contribution, Hunt asks that “this 
notion of a constructed identity may deserve to be taken a step farther” in terms of 
their co-constitutiveness within political and economic networks of meaning.42 The 
argument imbued in this thesis is that ontological security expands upon, and answers 
to precisely these issues. The application of ontological security as a theoretical lens 
is, as will be detailed in the next chapter, based on the analytical salience it can lend 
to the analysis of the identity factor in China-Europe relations, by enabling it to bridge 
historical and contemporary dynamics though a clearly articulated framework. 
 
As regards the second theoretical point to which this thesis seeks to contribute, this 
thesis will address an equally important area deserving further scholarship; namely 
exploring the processes of ontological security in a large non-Western political entity. 
Whilst the extant literature on the role of identity in Chinese foreign policies has 
predominantly been addressed through identity theories that differ from the more 
rigorous framework of ontological security approaches, 43  so has the literature on 
ontological security traditionally been distinguished through a certain overemphasis 
in focus on relatively homogenous nation-states in the Western hemisphere. 44  By 
addressing this double gap in the literature, this project’s focus on the case of China 
seeks to enrich the scope and applicability of ontological security by testing this 
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theoretical approach on a complex and consequential key actor that historically has 
had its identity violently challenged by the European Westphalian paradigm, rather 
than reified by it. As much as the analysis of Chinese foreign policies towards Europe 
can be enriched by applying the theoretical optic of ontological security, so can 
ontological security theory itself be enriched by the inclusion of an in-depth analysis 
of the Chinese case, in particular with regards to diversifying the traditionally 
Western-centred set of case studies that have informed broad swaths of the literature 
on identity and politics.  
 
Precisely the ability of the ontological security framework to “[offer] a way to compare 
systems across time and space,”45 makes it a versatile and analytically solid tool for 
undertaking this thesis’ research ambition of combining a broad historical spectrum 
with a spatial focus on an understudied non-Western case study. This combination of 
analytical flexibility within clearly defined fundamental parameters, also has the 
added strength of being disposed for further theoretical development. In Chapter 2 I 
will thus further substantiate my call for a more robust theoretical lens, based on a 
broader spectre of geographically, temporally, and culturally diverse cases, arguing 
for why this is of general value to the field of ontological security, in addition to 
providing analytical strength to this thesis’ investigation of the role of identity in 
China-Europe relations. Following from this theoretical debate, the thesis engages 
with the empirical material collected on China’s relations to Europe, through the 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis is made up of three parts in addition to the conclusion. In this first part, the 
research project is introduced, along with its main analytical concepts. Following from 
this, the ontological security approach and the investigation’s research methodology 
and methods will be presented. Then, in keeping with the dual focus of the proposed 
project, the second part of the thesis consists of the diachronic analysis of China’s idea 
of Europe, and how this related to the Chinese efforts to redefine itself in the modern 
world. Seeking to discern the roots of the current Chinese endeavour to achieve 
ontological security, the investigation focuses on a set of historical junctures that carry 
particular significance for the Chinese effort to achieve ontological security after the 
European influx starting with the Opium War marked the traumatic beginning of 
China’s modern era. 46  Having contextualized Chinese ontological security in 
historical terms, the third constituent part will analyse the synchronic aspect; to what 
degree the latest chapter of the Chinese efforts to achieve ontological security 
manifests itself in present-day foreign policy. For this section, the scope is broadened 
both spatially and conceptually, in order to undertake a synchronic case study of the 
importance of Chinese perceptions of identity and security in shaping its current 
Europe policies. Finally, the conclusion will review the research findings, and 
summarize the analytical conclusions.  
 
Following from this three-part structure, after the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 
2 will address the research question raised in the first sections of this thesis through 
arguing in detail for the salience of addressing the identity factor in China-EU 
relations through the framework of ontological security. Chapter 3 then explicates 
further on the epistemological basis for this research project, by detailing the derived 
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methodology and research methods. The second part, namely the diachronic section, 
traces and analyses the role of Europe in the foundational narratives upon which 
various Chinese polities have been sought established, following the ontological 
security crisis surrounding the fall of the Qing dynasty. Chapter 4 introduces the 
section, and goes on to give a historical background of how the continent of Europe 
gradually became introduced to the Chinese scholarly corpus of texts from the days 
of the Roman Empire onwards. Chapter 5 builds from the historical background to 
give a diachronic analysis that traces the Chinese concept of Europe through the early 
modern era, and how this concept related to Chinese ontological security seeking as 
political entrepreneurs strived to re-establish a foundational narrative for the Chinese 
polity. This analysis focuses on two on the key moments of Chinese ontological 
security crises, namely the Self-Strengthening Movement in the aftermath of the 
Opium Wars, and secondly the political and philosophical movements leading up to 
the foundation of the Republic of China. Chapter 6 traces this analysis further into the 
post-WWII era, through looking at the development of China’s view of Europe in two 
other key moments of the history of the Chinese polity, namely the foundation of the 
People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong, and the fundamental reform of this 
People’s Republic by Deng Xiaoping some three decades later.  
 
The third part consists of the synchronic analysis. The section follows on from the 
tracing of the long-term foundational narratives of the Chinese state in part one, but 
focusing on a considerably narrower temporal timeframe allows this section to 
proceed to a more detailed analytical level. Thus, it includes the tracing of the 
foundational narratives into a three-layered analytical approach: First, it seeks to 
verify and trace the fundamental narratives forming the base of Chinese ontological 
security, establishing that these were indeed framing Beijing’s Europe policies of these 
years. Second, these chapters strive to detail the more specific main discourses derived 
from the fundamental narratives, at the level of the concrete contemporary political 
and diplomatic issues of the time. Third, it seeks to explore the political repercussions 
30 
 
of these discourses and how the identity factor may have served as a salient element 
in the key political issues of the contemporary era of Sino-European relations. This 
research method is applied to three key cases of political and diplomatic importance 
in the relationship between Europe and China over the last two decades. Firstly, 
Chapter 7 introduces the synchronic section before moving on to an analysis of the 
relations between China and the EU in 2003-2006, as the predictions of the two parties 
consolidating a new power axis in world politics was cut short by disagreements over 
the EU arms embargo policy. Chapter 8 analyses the symbolic status implications 
relevant to the diplomatic tensions between Beijing, Berlin, and Paris in the years 2007-
2010, as a number of issues of little practical relevance but with considerable 
ontological security implications for China caused a substantial rupture in Europe-
China relations. Chapter 9 brings the analysis closer to the current date, and includes 
Xi Jinping’s ascendancy to power and the discursive changes that entailed. These 
changes are further analysed through studying the cases of Beijing’s boycotts of the 
UK and Oslo in the years 2010 to 2016, and the extent to which both the reasons for 
the boycott, and the rationale behind the diplomatic solutions to these issues were 
heavily informed by identity dynamics.  
 
Finally, the concluding chapter 10 will summarize the findings of the preceding 
empirical chapters and consolidate their theoretical implications. In sum, the thesis 
concludes that Europe has indeed been a major constitutive factor in the political and 
ideological contests of Chinese ontological security seeking. Particularly in the early 
decades of the last century, the European influence was integral to the Chinese efforts 
at re-establishing a stable national identity. Even though the relative influence of 
Europe in this was substantially reduced following the Second World War, it was still 
notable enough to effect Chinese policies towards the continent. In terms of the second 
constituent part of this thesis’ research question, the conclusion is that Chinese 
motivations based on matters of identity and ontological security has had a substantial 
impact in some of the key moments defining current China-Europe relations. In sum, 
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this thesis contends that one of the more salient factors in the China-Europe 
relationship through decades of political power-shifts and diplomatic vagaries, is 






Chapter 2: On Ontological Security 
 
 
2.1 What Ontological Security Can Do for China 
 
In analysing identity as a factor in China-Europe relations, this thesis has opted for 
engaging the issue through the framework of ontological security, an approach that 
focuses on the need for actors in the international system to obtain a stable sense of 
who they are as a polity. Over the following sections I will briefly outline the argument 
for why the ontological security approach is a salient lens through which to analyse 
Chinese Europe policies. The chapter then reviews the literature on ontological 
security, situating the chosen theoretical construct within a range of intra-paradigm 
debates. Third, based on these arguments, I develop my approach to ontological 
security theory more in detail, and discuss what the case of China-Europe relations 
can contribute to develop ontological security theories further. 
 
In essence, there are two contributions that ontological security can make to the 
analysis of China-Europe relations: First, it allows for the systematic analysis of the 
identity factor in Chinese foreign policy, by engaging with the issue through a 
theoretically stringent framework that has already demonstrated its salience. 
Amongst the strengths of the ontological security theory when engaging with the 
issue of identity processes, is not only the systematized linking between identity 
drivers and security interests, but also the antifoundational view of the Self, that 
allows for a deeper analysis of the formation of common identities whilst avoiding the 
pitfalls of reifying the state.47 Given that the Chinese polity has experienced a century 
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of experimentation with very different political types of statehood, following from a 
very different trajectory into modernity from the European one, this thesis argues that 
a this is a particularly important factor in the case of China. This approach also allows 
for a more dynamic inclusion of the literature on Chinese identity and nationalism, as 
it provides a conceptual framework that allows for more easily bridging the 
scholarships focusing on respectively the state-led, and the society-led aspects of 
modern Chinese nationalism.48 Following from this point, I will argue that one of the 
main strengths of ontological security theory is in the approach’s conceptual openness 
in analysing through which societal structures and social processes ontological 
security is sought achieved.49 To quote Zarakol: “The concept of ontological security 
may offer one of the rare bridges of commensurability for societies along temporal 
and spatial lines.” 50  In the Chinese case this conceptualisation is also helpful in 
analysing the overlapping dynamics of state security and the regime security of the 
CCP. A similar set of concerns also underpins this thesis’s utilization of the term 
                                                 
48 Scholarship on Chinese nationalism have evolved into a considerably body of 
knowledge, following the flourishing of nationalist discourses in post-Cold War 
China. For one of the earliest and best surveys of the literature, see S. Zhao 2004; A 
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“polity” instead of more common concepts such as state or nation, when describing 
the processes of Chinese ontological security seeking over the last centuries. The 
broader purview of this term allows for a more precise analysis of differing modalities 
of identity, institutionalization, hierarchy and authority across cases.51 The second 
main point on which ontological security may contribute to the study of China more 
broadly, is the ability of the framework to incorporate locally relevant dynamics 
within the purview of its epistemological approach, which makes it a preferred vehicle 
for bringing certain concepts found in the Chinese area studies literature more fully 
into the canon of international relations theory, and thus also bringing IR theory more 
coherently into the study of Chinese internal and external political drivers. As such, 
this thesis will contend that the case of China-Europe relations is a salient case to 




2.2 Defining and Debating Ontological Security  
 
In the quest to analyse the interactions and processes of the large-scale social 
structures shaping global-level politics, ontological security focuses on what creates 
and sustains the identities of state actors on the international arena, enabling 
concerted efforts and complex large-scale social structures. These are questions 
fundamental to social science already at the field’s birth, Plato famously likened 
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politics to the weaver’s craft; a matter of ensuring cohesiveness of the polity. 52 A 
fundamental task for any polity is thus the ability to provide its members with a sense 
of identity, in other words a meaningful co-existence as a part of that polity. The 
creation of large-scale societies beyond the primary groups and bands of the early 
man, is owed to the human ability to create, in Anderson’s words, imagined 
communities covering thousands or indeed millions of persons an individual would 
never even meet.53 Built on Gidden’s sociological work on identity and modernity,54 
the concept of ontological security was introduced into international relations theory 
in the late 90’s,55  and has over the last two decades been systematized and developed  
by authors such as Mitzen, Steele, Kinnvall, Zarakol, and others into a concept 
denoting the need for these imagined communities in the international system to 
obtain a stable sense of who they are.56  
 
Ontological security-seeking is defined as the need to “minimize hard uncertainty by 
imposing cognitive order on the environment”,57 underscoring the importance for a 
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Kinnvall 2004a; Steele 2005a; Kinnvall 2007; Steele 2008a; Zarakol 2010; Zarakol 2011; 
Guzzini 2012b; Gustafsson 2014a; Rumelili 2014; Subotić 2016; Zarakol 2016; 
Kinnvall 2018; Innes and Steele 2013; Lupovici 2012; Croft and Vaughan-Williams 
2017; G. He 2014; S. Kay 2012 




state to uphold a stable cognitive understanding of its identity as a source of domestic 
legitimacy. As Steele points out, ontological security-seeking behaviour in order to 
affirm the state’s sense of self-identity, may at times even lead to strategic choices 
incommensurate with rational interest seeking in a narrow sense.58 As he persuasively 
argues through cases such as the Belgian decision to face almost certain physical 
defeat in order to save their self-identity and honour, when deciding to fight Germany 
in 1914, this demonstrates how the conventional concept of survival in the sense of 
physical security fails to explain a range of foreign policy actions.59 Thus, as Steele 
argues,  "self-identity, rather than survival, becomes an operative analytical concept 
around which future security research could be centred." 60  As summarized by 
Kinnvall and Mitzen, the ontological security literature is thus at the core a project that 
is; “fundamentally focused on attempting to articulate the relationship between 
identity and security, and between identity and important political outcomes in world 
politics, with the premise that political subjectivity is socially constituted in ways that 
have reverberating effects at many levels.”61  
 
In addressing these issues, ontological security does, as the name entails, bring the 
concept of identity into the field of security, and the concept of security into the field 
of identity, in an effort to operationalize and analyse the role played by identity 
configurations in international relations, and in particular the identities of a specific 
kind of social unit, namely the modern nation-state. Identity and security, as two of 
the core concepts of the field of IR, are both contested and far from clearly defined 
analytical categories; as such it follows that a combination of these two concepts into 
the relatively speaking young theoretical framework of ontological security, leaves a 
range of questions subject to theoretical debate. The most prescient fault-lines in the 
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current debates are first, the aggregation issue, namely how and on what basis one 
may apply individual-level theories on to society level; secondly, the debate regarding 
the role of the Other for the sense of the Self, and to which degree the Self is sustained 
through self-reflexion or relational interaction; and thirdly, which role is played by 
narratives, namely the need to (re)create a stable identity of a group in temporal terms. 
In the following sections these three debates are introduced, defining the standpoint 
of this thesis in the ongoing scholarly exchange. 
 
2.2.1 Aggregation Dilemmas 
Ontological security was imported into international relations theory from the realm 
of psychology.62 Thus, when Laing first introduced the term, it was done in the context 
of analysing schizophrenia in individuals,63 and in Gidden’s development of the term 
in the field of sociology, the individual’s need for a routinized self-identity in late 
modernity was the focal point. 64  As such, one of the key conceptual leaps of the 
ontological security concept, and simultaneously also the most contentious, is the 
adoption of a sociological theory for analysing individuals, for the purpose of 
analysing the practices of states.65 This transferral of a theoretical framework from the 
level of analysis of the individual to that of the state, entailed epistemological and 
analytical challenges, the main issue being the degree of anthropomorphising of the 
state. In Mitzen’s pioneering transfer of Gidden’s concept to the state level, she argues 
that "like the state's need for physical security, the need for ontological security is 
extrapolated from the individual level. Ontological security refers to the need to 
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experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time (…) in order to realize a sense 
of agency.”66  I will argue her main theoretical rationale is the justification "that society 
must be cognitively stable in order to secure the identities of individuals, and as such 
individuals will become attached to these stable group identities.”67 The risk with this 
approach is that it may easily transform into anthropomorphising the state, leading to  
a simplified analytical lens reifying the state as an unitary actor.68  
 
In one of the most eloquent critiques of the ontological security approach, Richard 
Ned Lebow points precisely to this predicament, as the first of three counterarguments 
to the ontological security literature, all of which deserve consideration: “Ontological 
security rests on the premise that states have, or can have, something resembling a 
singular and consistent identity. This is no more possible for political units as it is for 
individuals.”69 Second, he notes that ontological may be epiphenomenal, in the sense 
that policies at odds with national identifications rarely lead to electoral punishment, 
instead it has been seen to alter these national identifications. Third, following from 
this, he points out that establishing cause and effect of identity when identity itself is 
co-constitutive is impossible, a point exemplified by Stefano Guzzini’s elegant 
summary of the problematique; “if identity is heterogenous – and it usually is – then 
almost anything goes.”70 Lebow’s critique serves well to illustrate this thesis’ decision 
to approach the research project from a more poststructuralist angle, much due to how 
this tradition more saliently engages with the issues Lebow points out. Firstly, in that 
no reified monolithic identity is ever assumed, instead it is precisely the co-
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constitutive nature of an identity as a necessary ever-ongoing co-constitutive identity 
construction.71 To the second point, this is also in line with the poststructuralist view 
of the political contestation project, relating to how discourses are not fully given, but 
develops through political contestation, as reflected in Foucault’s idea of the 
power/knowledge nexus. 72  Regarding the third point, the linguistic turn has long 
argued precisely that a clear ‘Unity-of Science’ based definition of causality is a moot 
point within the social sciences, but that less rigid forms of causal implications may 
be possible. 73  Thus, with regards to the question of whether the identities and 
discourses of China and Europe that are presented by the Chinese policymakers and 
intellectuals is really just epiphenomenal, secondary notions serving instrumentally 
to legitimise policies and interests the actors would have followed in any case,74 this 
thesis postulates that these concepts do indeed have constitutive effects on the policies 
that Chinese policymakers have enacted. The epistemological details of this approach 
will be treated more at length in Chapter 3, but in sum I argue that engaging more 
actively with postructuralists’ understanding of identity formation, brings to bear to 
the topic a theoretical tradition and the methodological toolbox that can saliently 
contribute to the key areas in which Lebow finds ontological security, as formulated 
by Mitzen, wanting.75  
 
Mitzen’s conceptualization of state-level ontological security has been criticized for 
giving undue importance to the state level overall, 76 by for example Krolikowski, 
using Chinese foreign policy as a case to argue that Chinese ontological insecurity is 
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something only found on the individual level. 77  This critique in my view 
underestimates the importance of an ontological group-level self in order to sustain a 
large-scale polity in the first place, and secondly overestimates the level of 
homogeneity needed within a state for that entity still to be considered a salient 
analytical category. Krolikowski’s point that as different groups in the population 
have different understandings and motives that simply do not line up to a coherent 
identity,78 underlines the dangers of reification of the state, but also underestimates 
how this is precisely what is to be expected, and that this is why the state-level 
ontological security of a polity is a matter of constant reiteration and construction.79 
“All states are marked by an inherent tension between the various domains that need 
to be aligned for an imagined community to come into being. States are never finished 
entities, states are in permanent need of reproduction, always in a process of 
becoming.”80 The narrative approach to the question of identity formation, that will 
be detailed later in this chapter, thus also is an approach that addresses these issues 
raised, and reduces the risk of reductionist definitions of reifying cultures and political 
units, and that it explicitly recognizes and analyses the non-essentialized, and co-
constitutive nature of identity formation. 
 
One result of the view that polities also need a sense of ontological security for them 
to exist as an intersubjective reality amongst its individuals, is my stand that 
ontological security is a concern deeply emmeshed with the polities as emergent 
actors. Unlike Gidden’s concept where ontological security is linked as a result of 
modernity, I follow Zarakol and others in arguing that ontological security is integral 
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to the creation of polities, also before the modern era,81 although arguably the rapidly 
accelerated pace of social change brought forth by the scientific and industrial 
revolutions and late-modern globalization have certainly aggregated the ontological 
security challenges faced by modern states.82 Intimately related to these debates on the 
ontological security dilemmas of large-scale polities, is thus the conceptualizations 
and crisis a state’s identity may face.  
 
As Ejdus argues in his erudite treatment of this aspect of ontological security theory, 
the tradition’s omissions on clearly defining ontological crises, results in the absence 
of a viable conceptual distinction between ontological security and ontological 
insecurity. 83  Steele’s contribution to ontological security theory also included 
pioneering systematic reflection on ontological security crises, defining them as 
unpredictable events disrupting the self-identities of a polity, and thus being of 
particular interest to scholars investigating the construction of these identities.84 Key 
to this definition is regarding critical situations not as objective facts, but as part and 
parcel of social construction, as such I find this a more convincing line of argument as 
opposed to authors such as e.g. Dittmer and Kim, who arguably overemphasizes the 
role of objective economic indicators as the criteria for when an identity crisis does 
arise.85 As Ejdus explains: 
The key feature of critical situations is the inability of collective 
actors to bracket out the above-described fundamental questions 
about the unreliability of international order, the finitude of polities, 
the impermanence of relationships and the inconsistency of 
collective autobiographies. They are usually created by 
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unpredictable events that break established routines and prompt 
polities to seek, more or less skilfully, answers to fundamental 
questions at the level of discursive consciousness.86  
 
Regarding these situations of crisis as key nodal points of the social construction of 
collective identities is thus precisely the reason for this thesis’ focus on these episodes 
as the key cases for the diachronic section’s analysis of the development of the role of 
Europe in China’s ontological security seeking since the Opium Wars. Overall, this 
thesis will thus be based on an approach to the aggregation question that relates to the 
states in question as a distinct kind of polity, whose identifications are politically co-
constituted, fluid and multiple in nature, but still constituted ontologically through 
constructed distinctions defining and delineating the polity as an entity separate from 
others and with a politically salient raison d’etre. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Self and The Others 
This thesis’ focus on the construction of a stable Chinese Self, necessitates analysis on 
the modes of Othering. The question of how the process of creating ontological 
security is mainly endogenously driven by internal and reflexive, or exogenously 
driven through external and relational processes, is a central debate in the ontological 
security literature, reflecting the broader theoretical agent/structure debates. 87  A 
number of IR scholars have emphasized the relational aspect of ontological security, 
namely inter-subjective processes of creating a stable self-identity mainly through 
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routinizing the polity’s relationship with others.88 However, scholars such as Steele 
and Subotic differ on the extent to which the relationships with the Other is the main 
motivation in ontological security seeking, pointing to that there exists an internal 
drive for a polity to conform to the expectations it has of itself.89 And that, as such, 
“the identities of states emerge from their own project of the self."90 In line with the 
standpoint argued by e.g. Kinnvall and Zarakol, I agree with both parties to an extent, 
and will argue for the complementarity of these two factors, as the constitution of a 
stable identity of the self is a process in which both the Other and the Self play a part.91  
An entity’s project of the self is thus circumscribed and given directions by the broader 
social environment, whilst one’s processes of Othering is co-constituted with the 
project of defining oneself as a self-same entity throughout time. In particular this 
middle-ground perspective is all the more relevant for the analyses of cases such as 
the Chinese one. As Zarakol points out in her comments to Steele’s endogenous 
approach:  
However, all his examples (e.g. the United States, Belgium) are 
Western states, which may be leading him to overgeneralize how 
such narratives about the ‘possible self’ are autonomously and 
endogenously generated. Since the nineteenth century, the ‘possible 
selves’ of many states around the world have been bracketed by 
comparisons to the West and fears about relative backwardness, and 
this preoccupation makes it very difficult to articulate aspirations 
about the state ‘self’ in a non-reactive manner.92 
                                                 
88 See, in particular, Mitzen 2006d; Mitzen 2006c; Rumelili 2015a; Katzenstein 1996; 
Kinnvall and Mitzen 2017 
89 Steele 2008b; Subotić 2016; Delehanty and Steele 2009 
90 Steele 2008b, 49; This view has garnered some support in the psychological field 
based on research of small-group dynamics, that points to in-group identification 
being prior to out-group identification. See Allport 1979; Lebow 2012, 85–88 
91 Zarakol 2010; Kinnvall 2004a 





These identity drivers are also acutely relevant for the Chinese experience from the 
late Qing dynasty onwards. As Wæver points out in the case of Europe, in a theoretical 
move that also serves to further transcend the dichotomy between in-group reflexivity 
and external Othering; one may also define one’s identity based not on an external 
other, but against a former iteration of oneself as the constitutive Other. I will argue 
that this ‘temporal Othering’, in Gustafsson’s words, 93  is a particularly relevant 
approach in the case of China, with its long historiographical tradition.  
 
A second aspect of the theoretization of the Self and Othering, closely related to the 
first debate is the query of whether and what type of Other is necessary to constitute 
the Self. Addressing the question of modes of Othering, the core process of this 
creation process of collective identification is the inclusion of the “we”-group through 
its delineation from the out-groups perceived as different.94 Providing a most useful 
tool for such an analysis is Hansen’s methodology of identifying the signs and terms 
that articulate the construction of identity. 95  Challenging the conception that the 
creation of the self necessarily entails the construction of one radically different 
other,96 she argues in line with a number of other authors that it allows also for a set 
of degrees of difference and otherness. 97  The unpacking of the Other category to 
include a wide range of qualitatively different relations, opens for a more diversified 
and salient conceptualization of the Othering process as a web of graduated actors 
towards which one is defining oneself with, towards or against other actors as a 
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Radical Other, as is e.g. Campbell’s main focus,98 to various degrees of non-radical 
otherness, friendship, and sameness.99 As authors such as Rumelili, Berenskoetter, and 
Mattern has emphasized, friends and special relationships can be as fundamental to 
ontological security as enemies. 100  As Zarakol argues, drawing on the classic 
sociological study by Norbert Elias, finding one’s place as a group furthermore often 
entails engaging with a hierarchy of Others, some whom you Other as inferior, and 
some of which you may define as your superiors, and to which group you aspire to 
belong.101 As the empirical sections of this thesis will demonstrate, the post-Opium 
War Chinese ontological security seeking was similarly a deeply interrelated exercise 
of re-formulating a biographical narrative, a central co-constitutive feature of which 
was the definition of which of the various geographical and temporal others should 
be defined as what kind of an Other. 
 
2.2.3 Regarding Narrative 
Narrative was regarded by Giddens as one of the foundational features of his 
definition of the ontological security concept: “A person’s identity is not to be found 
in behaviour, nor – important though this is – in the reactions of others, but in the 
capacity to keep a particular narrative going.”102 The definition of a narrative utilized in 
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this thesis follows established practice, by regarding it as a form of discourse 
constituted through four main features; the constellation of relationality, embedded 
in time and space, through a process of selection constituted by causal emplotment.103 
Narratives do not simply list events, they tie them together and order them into a 
story, endowing the events with meaning as they are being identified as parts of an 
integrated whole.104 Nietzsche’s philosophical knowledge claim that “only something 
which has no history can be defined,”105 is thus summarised by Jackson as deeply 
imbued by narrative: “From the ongoing flow of experience we select different lessons 
to learn by narrating that experience back to ourselves in terms of the language that 
we have inherited by being born into particular societies and social groups; that 
language, itself a product of previous attempts to summarize experience 
purposefully.”106 One of Steele’s most important contributions to ontological security 
theory, is how he included, systematized, and operationalized this narrative aspect of 
identity that Giddens referred to, and applied it also to the level of states.107  
 
Steele’s approach focuses on how narrative is the locus from which researchers can 
investigate the enabling and constraining role of self-identity, through discourse 
analysis of the biographical narratives polities tell about themselves, and how 
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different tellings of these narrative open up different venues for action, an approach 
that constitutes a central basis of this thesis.108 “The reason states have an ontological 
security is because they have a historical account of themselves that has been "built 
up" through the narrative of agents of the past, present, and the future."109 This sense 
of narrative is then, by extension, a key underlying driver of the dynamics of 
international politics. As Coker points out, in summarising how strategic narratives 
are fundamental to understanding China-US great power competition, “The human 
race is a species of story-tellers (…) It is the stories that states and societies tell 
themselves and others that lead to conflict, or which allow a different, more peaceful 
part to be pursued.”110 This narrated sense of a self in the world is, as Heidegger points 
out, always incomplete, contested, and evolving, 111  and to this ongoing identity 
formation project, as is a key insight of the Foucauldian tradition, power is co-
constitutively embedded in the act of how "we construct worlds we know in a world 
we do not."112  
 
In shaping the identity of the self, and thereby the distinction to the other and the 
outlook on the wider world, then, the shaping of the self’s history stands pivotal. As 
Campbell points out, to this renegotiations of the past, narrative is central, as events 
acquire a status as real as they are remembered assuming a place in the context of a 
narrative, a process occurring relatively independent of the occurrence of the event 
itself.113  
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History is a collection of experiences and memory is the conduit 
through which we recall those experiences, but traumatic 
experiences disrupt the ability to channel certain events into a 
coherent narrative. Edkins (2003) notes how traumatic experiences 
"destabilize" linear time, thus requiring the latter to be "reinstalled" 
through narration - which is itself a political act.114  
 
As the past holds power over politicians, however, politicians also hold power over 
the past. “[A]ctors will reconstruct the past as they debate the future, and as they act 
towards the future they are likely to (re)remember the past.”115 The narrative deciding 
what we as a society remembers and forgets, and which meaning to bestow on the 
events is thus a battlefield into which a variety of actors invests large amounts of 
power and skill to advance their view.116 As any student of modern Chinese politics is 
acutely aware of, an integral part of the CCP’s current political project is the process 
of selective remembrance and forgetting. For the purpose of strengthening the 
regime’s legitimacy, enormous resources are spent on policing the forgetting of the 
excesses of the Cultural Revolution, or the Tiananmen massacre, as well as utilising a 
wide mnemonic toolbox to emphasise a historic retelling of the party’s exploits.117  
 
Approaching the Chinese identity discourses through the narrative framework, then, 
allows for a more succinct analysis of the temporality of fundamental identity 
discourses, as political entrepreneurs always sought to anchor their idea of China in a 
particular reading of the past, and a particular vision of the future. The historical 
background chapter of this thesis thus also serves to give the reader an understanding 
                                                 
114 Steele 2008b, 72 
115 M. Barnett 1999, 14 
116 Müller 2002; Bell 2006 
117 See eg. Callahan 2012a; Mitter 2003; Z. Wang 2008a; Duara 1996; Chong 2014; D. 
Wang 2005b; Economy 2017; Bjornar Sverdrup-Thygeson 2017; Moore 2010 
49 
 
of the historical context the various iterations of a modern Chinese polity arose from, 
and which historical events they were forced to re-represent in order to create a 
renewed foundational narrative for the Chinese polity. “Politics can then be 
understood as explaining who people are in order to shape and re-represent the acting 
collective. Such processes involve making a stream of diverse and surely internally 
contradictory events appear as ordered and relatively neutral—that is, to re-represent 
them in a way that aligns them to the stories that constitute the Self in question.”118 A 
key point of this thesis is then the analysis of how Chinese politicians has taken on the 
task of making new coherent Chinese histories of who they are, and Europe’s place in 
this. The inclusion of Europe as a focal point is important both because Europe played 
a particular role (from Chinese viewpoint) and, arguably, also salient because this still 
is a factor in China’s policies towards Europe.  
 
There are two further aspect of the ontological security theory’s utilization of 
narratives that merits further detailing given their relevance for the empirical analysis 
ahead, namely the role of narrative emplotment, and the key importance of 
foundational narratives as part of layered discourses. Working from the two standard 
assumptions of narratives as an emplotted linguistic constitutive of social life, it 
follows that the scholarly community should pay more attention to the dynamics of 
these emplotment structures. These structures provide actors with differing ranges of 
pre-existing tropes and plots shaping their opportunities to tell a certain types of 
stories in certain ways,119 and making sense of the world through certain established 
structures, one of the most fundamental of which is the Aristotelian narrative arc of 
beginning, middle, and end.120 Building on this basic trait of narrative, however, is a 
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wide and varied field of narrative emplotment modalities and tropes that serves to 
shape the basic narratives various societies have told in order to make sense of 
themselves, inevitably tied to the rhetorical and literary modes of presentation found 
present in society.121 As such, one should be careful to assume the homogeneity of 
these social constructs. Lebow analyses, for example, the role of the Golden Age-
narrative, an emplotment based on the idea of long-term civilizational and cultural 
decay, as an important mode of political narrative in pre-modern times.122 This is an 
emplotment of a political narrative that differs quite substantially from the nationalist 
and modernist narratives that became a dominant mode of political narrative 
emplotment in the expanding post-Enlightenment international order, structured 
around linear development universal history, the plot-line of progress, and the 
ideational tropes constituting nationalism.  
 
As such, the emplotment of the foundational narratives sustaining the various polities, 
does not only vary in terms of its temporal plot-lines, but also with regards to which 
tropes are included in the narrative.123 With regards to the  narrative entrepreneurs 
seeking to reshape the Chinese polity from the late Qing-dynasty onwards, it should 
thus be kept in mind that they not only sought to reframe the ontological narratives 
of the Chinese polity, they also sought to do so as a direct result of the ideas of 
modernity, that propelled into global prominence a distinct and very different type of 
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narrative emplotment as the dominant mode. As Qin relates this to the Chinese post-
Opium War identity crisis: “This is a century puzzle, a fundamental problem of 
identity. In the 2000-year Tributary System, China did not have such a problem, for 
the Chinese worldview contained nothing like sovereignty, nationalism, and 
internationalism.”124 Chief amongst these new emplotments relevant for the creating 
of a new and externally recognized polity, were the tropes of the linkages of state, 
ethnicity and nation embedded in nationalism.125 Indeed, as the empirical chapters of 
this thesis demonstrate, a key challenge preoccupying China’s political reformers was 
precisely how to, in Sun Yat-sen’s words, create a nation out of loose sand. This 
challenge rose as the Chinese foundational narrative of the imperial dynasties, based 
on a trope of culturalism, crumbled under the pressure of modernization and new 
international norms prescribing that the legitimate identity of a polity should instead 
be based on the emplotted structures of nationalism.126 
 
The second point to be detailed further, and one of the main theoretical moves this 
thesis employs, regards the operationalization of the assumption that narratives are 
not created equal. A key point in this is how discourses are nested, as more 
foundational discourses establish the framework within which more particular 
discourses are being grafted. In this logic, the narrative mode is also embedded, as 
demonstrated for example in Krebs’ analyses of the interplay between the dominant 
narratives and their derived sub-narratives, and how they drive US foreign policy; 
"New narratives of national security must demonstrate fidelity to more stable, still-
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accepted foundational identity narratives."127 Krebs convincingly argues that political 
arguments are based on dominant narratives, that contrary to what’s commonly 
assumed, is strengthened rather than altered in times of crisis.128 However, he also 
briefly acknowledges, albeit without addressing the suggestion in detail, that these 
narratives must be based on a ‘foundational narrative’, that one would assume is more 
intimately connected to the idea of ontological security. As such, this thesis focuses 
rather on the more fundamental political narratives, the foundational narrative, of a 
polity’s identity. As Berenskoetter summarizes it: “The political potency of a national 
biography lies in its function to provide a community with a basic discourse, or master 
narrative, which guides and legitimizes courses of action and provides ontological 
security.”129  
 
However, precisely by being fundamental, these foundational narratives necessarily 
open up for a wide range of potentially quite differing discourses to be constructed on 
a similar basis. This realization of the layered nature of discourses, is a key analytical 
move, however, it should be noted that the approach that some discourses and 
narratives are more fundamental than others does not entail any notion that they are 
‘deeper’ or more profound, rather, to quote Wæver; “it refers to degrees of 
sedimentation: the deeper structures are more solidly sedimented and more difficult 
to politicise and change, but change is always in principle possible since all these 
structures are socially constituted. When a pressure is building up in a system – when 
the discourse does not easily handle a problem anymore – it is possible at first to make 
‘surface changes’ which keep all the deeper levels intact, but (…) at some point a 
deeper change might be carried out”130 Following up on this body of works, this 
project thus applies the concept of a foundational identity narrative as a key focal 
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2.3 What China Can Do for Ontological Security 
 
This thesis’ expansion of the empirical base of ontological security theory through the 
analysis of China, also entails certain salient theoretical ramifications. I argue that as 
ontological security theory has proved valuable for exploring the case of China-
Europe relations, the inclusion of this case does also offer salient contributions to the 
field of ontological security theory, and a number of the ongoing debates presented 
above. To the question of what the inclusion of this Chinese case can do for the 
development of ontological security theory, this thesis argues that it contributes to the 
theory development through two distinct avenues. Firstly, it is a good case for 
exploring certain extant concepts within the ontological security literature that 
although widespread, are yet underexplored in the theoretical debate. This relates in 
particular to the concepts of ontological security seeking and narrative entrepreneurs, 
and to the further the discussion of the role of the past and mnemonic structures in 
identity narratives.  
 
Secondly, the case of China also demonstrates the importance of a number of case-
specific concepts derived from the local context. These new concepts arguably do not 
only serve to strengthen the explanatory power of ontological security theory in the 
Chinese case, but by expanding the selection of relevant concepts and ontological 
security modalities, they also broaden the horizons of the geographically rather 
narrow  case universe of the current literature on ontological security, and introduces 
a set of new concepts that although derived from the Chinese context should be 
relevant also for a number of other cases. I present three suggested contributions to 
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the ontological security literature, namely: universalism versus particularism as a 
basis for foundational narratives; the relevance of face and external recognition; and 
the extent to which materiality informs the ontological security status by engaging 
with economic functionality as one possible mode of ontological security seeking. 
Over the following five sub-sections I will present and expand upon these two 
concepts worthy of further exploring, and the three concepts constituting a conceptual 
expansion, respectively.  
 
By raising this argument, this project thus enters into a broader debate about ‘Global 
IR’,131 as Chinese foreign policy has emerged as a pivotal case for the discussion of the 
degree of universality implied in Western-derived theoretical constructs.132 As with IR 
theory in general, the extant literature on identity has proved to possess a fairly 
pronounced tendency of focusing on a relatively homogenous group of cases, namely 
Western Westphalian nation-states.133 Two of the most pronounced positions in this 
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broader debate can in short be described as one school of thought contending that the 
historical and political traits of China does not differ significantly from the general 
traits of states.134 At the other end of the spectrum, a school of thought argues the case 
of China is too unique to be an applicable area for Western-derived generalized 
theories.135 In essence, this thesis defines itself along the middle ground of this debate, 
but also strives to contribute to another dimension of this epistemological discussion 
of parochiality or universality, namely by arguing that whilst universalized theories 
may be saliently applied to the Chinese case, Chinese cases may also be generalizable 
to non-Chinese contexts. 136  In this, the thesis is echoing Kang and others’ aim at 
strengthening theory-building based on the global political megatrend that is China’s 
rise.,137 however, I will also echo Kang’s timely caveats not only to inadvertently turn 
to Orientalist essentialization.138  
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This added value has a particular importance for developing a model of ontological 
security that can better explain China, but how the Chinese case can also contribute to 
strengthening the analytical application of ontological security theory overall. It has 
already been pointed out by Krolikowski how the case of China seems to diverge from 
the expectations based on Mitzen’s conceptualization of ontological security.139  In 
essence, in analysing the Chinese political models, I argue that universal models may 
be fruitfully applied, but one should also count in the factor that in explaining the 
actions of the Chinese Communist Party, one should not overlook the fact that it is, 
precisely, the Chinese Communist Party, with particular historical, cultural, and 
political residues making it something different from just a communist party, even 
though the latter is of course also a key analytical point.140 Of course, however, it is 
important to distinguish between what are the specifics of the ontological security 
seeking modalities of China per se, what are rather general specifics of authoritarian 
one-party states; what are typical traits of states of the global south that modernized 
under conditions of empire and Western colonialization, and what are specifics of 
large, conglomerate “civilizational states.” 141  Arguably, the Chinese case serves to 
enlighten the literature along all of these analytically distinct lines, and more 
importantly through analysing the particularities of the Chinese ‘venn-diagram’, as 
all of these traits overlap into a combined political profile that in sum is quite unique 
to China. 
 
2.3.1 Ontological Security Seeking and Narrative Entrepreneurs 
Some of the key traits of the case of China, that makes it particularly suitable for 
analysing certain underexplored issues in ontological security theory, prime amongst 
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which is the dynamic of ontological security seeking and the often-overlooked role of 
political entrepreneurs in times of identity crises. This thesis argues that China’s 
ontological rupture and its aftermaths form a most suitable venue for addressing the 
critique raised against ontological security theory for being too preoccupied by stasis 
and stability over change and ontological ”self-help.”142 All the more so, as China, as 
a non-Western polity with a long tradition of centralized government, whose forced 
entry into the modern world of nation-states caused a fundamental ontological 
security crisis, in effect sought to address this through a wide range of attempted new 
political organization forms. As such, one of the main concepts utilized throughout 
this thesis will be that of ontological security seeking, as a signifier of the dynamic 
properties of the Chinese political entrepreneurs’ efforts at addressing the ontological 
challenges encountered after the European encroachment added to the existing strains 
on the late Qing dynasty. As such, this relates to a core tenet of the ontological security 
literature’s assumptions that states seek socially stable relationships with other state 
actors in order to secure their own sense of self. This thesis argues that an 
underexplored field of ontological security studies is the issue of states seeking quite 
the opposite; namely to fundamentally change their regularized relationships with 
other actors, and adapt the foundational narratives of the polity, in order to achieve 
legitimacy for the political project upon which the polity is constructed, internally and 
reflexively as well as internationally and socially.143  
 
As discussed earlier, Steele builds on McSweeney and Laing in approaching the 
aggregation dilemma of the ontological security approach through focusing on the 
political leaders that operate as the representatives of the state.144 I find this to be a 
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salient approach to the cases Steele treats in his books, that is to say relatively 
established Western nation-states. However, in the case of China’s efforts at 
establishing a modern national identity after the colonial era, the societal ruptures 
were so wide-ranging that a further scope is necessary. In Steele’s cases, established 
nation-states sought to harmonise their foreign policy to the national identity 
narrative, whereas in the case of China much of the modern era was spent seeking to 
formulate and implement various versions of such an identity narrative in the first 
place.  Thus, the focus should be widened to include the role of political head figures 
not only as leaders, but also as national narrative entrepreneurs seeking to construct 
within the available parameters a foundational narrative for the polity that can garner 
sufficient internal and external legitimacy to allow for an ontologically stable state to 
emerge and consolidate.145  
  
As Lebow very succinctly summarizes the extent to which state-building is an exercise 
in narrative-building, and something in which actors can engage in strategically: “In 
the modern era, states cannot survive or compete successfully unless they can 
command the loyalty of their citizens and build solidarity among them. The principal 
means of doing this is through autobiographical narratives of the state and its 
people.”.146 For any individual, her identity self-biography is merely one out of a 
number that can potentially be told, this contingency is even more prevalent in social 
aggregates.147 In line with the ontological approach adhered to in this thesis, though, 
the text will contend as a key point about this political contestation, that the 
underlying ontological security challenges can potentially be addressed through a 
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number of narrative strategies.148 “Although (…) political entrepreneurs can certainly 
manipulate identity narratives to mobilize populations for material gains, these 
narratives’ resonance oftentimes depends on their ability to appeal to many people’s 
sincerely felt understandings of self.”149 As Subotić elegantly summarizes the process 
in her investigation of Serbian politicians’ handling of the territorial loss of Kosovo 
through a readjustment of the national narrative: 
 
State narratives are constructed through an active and elaborate 
process that involves multiple political and cultural agents. Over 
time and with infinite iteration by narrative “entrepreneurs”—
political leaders, elite intellectuals, education establishment, popular 
culture, the media—and everyday social practice, a particular state 
narrative template (of past events, or of the general place of the state 
in the international system) fixes the meaning of the past and limits 
the opportunity for further political contestation. A constructed 
narrative reaches a tipping point threshold when a critical mass of 
social actors accepts and buys into it as a social fact.150  
 
Constituting or readjusting these foundational narratives through a politically 
mediated process, takes on all the more importance in the times where the extant 
narratives have been forcefully challenged, resulting in an ontological security crisis. 
This realization entails that cases of ontological crises, and the ontological security-
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seeking political behaviours that tends to follow, are amongst the key subjects of study 
for scholars of ontological security. 151  The breakdown of a given foundational 
narrative through various forms of societal trauma, causes a radical break in the 
routinized identity structures on which ontological security is based, and thus opens 
the field for potential contestation of these.152 One of the key focal points of this thesis 
is then the analysis of the changes in the Chinese identity narratives that resulted from 
the political contestation at those key points in modern Chinese history that 
constitutes the four main cases of the diachronic section. 
 
 
2.3.2 Modalities of Modernity and the Importance of the Past 
The other opportunity the case of China offers to further expand on an existing 
conceptual discussion within ontological security theory, relates to how it contributes 
to a small, but growing, body of scholarship on the particularities of ontological 
insecurity in those traditional major centres of non-Western civilizations with a 
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traumatic entrance into the periphery of the Westphalian state system.153 As argued 
by Zarakol in her account of the particularities of the ontological crises brought forth 
by the stigmatized position of non-Western Empires in the modern era: 
 
They had a different experience because they had to recreate 
themselves as “modern” states against a backdrop of an emerging 
international society of states that had already made the transition 
organically. (…) perhaps for the first time in world history, 
(autonomous) emulation of competitors took on a deeper meaning – 
in embracing the Western European state models, these agrarian 
empires were also enveloped in a certain new worldview, one that 
is specific to and the essence of modernity.154 
 
This thesis finds that in China’s case as well as in the cases of Turkey, Japan, and 
Russia, not only did the ontological security crisis challenge the extant foundational 
narrative of the current ruling dynasty, it coincided with the rise of modernity that 
would challenge the emplotment structure of the agrarian empire’s Mandate of 
Heaven. 
 
As related to in the section on narratives, the past is a key constituent feature of a 
foundational narrative, as narrative entrepreneurs seek through a number of 
mnemonic practices to anchor the present to a particular view of the past. 155 The 
argument raised is that the experience of being relegated to an excluded periphery of 
the new international “family of nations” creates a particular form of memory that 
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often tends to shape the narratives of those polities having gone through it in 
particular ways.156 It would seem that China shares some of the traits of these other 
non-Western empire with memories of colonial trauma, in that they are more 
concerned with their identity narratives being intersubjectively acknowledged by 
foreign actors,  as described in the cases of Japan and Turkey; “Both countries joined 
European international society in the nineteenth century as stigmatized outsiders. The 
insecurities created by that inter-national environment have been built into the 
national identities of both states.” 157  This aspect of Chinese ontological security 
seeking can also be particularly salient for a broader set of cases, as a number of works 
points to similar issues of insecurity of identity being a notable feature amongst other 
countries who went from being imperial power centres to a peripheral role at the onset 
of the global Western-lead systems.158 
 
As Neumann points out, in order for a narrative to be able to provide group cohesion 
and identity it needs, in some way or other, to resonate with the cultural context 
within which it is situated narrative itself is intimately tied to not only pre-existing 
narratives, but also to the rhetorical and literary modes of presentation found present 
in society.159 One is not given a tabula rasa in crafting national narratives. 
  
The making of selves is a narrative process of identification whereby a number of identities that 
have been negotiated in specific contexts are strung together into one overarching story (…) 
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The forging of selves, then, is a path-dependent process, since it has to cram in a number of 
previously negotiated identities in order to be credible.160 
 
Historical narratives are thus shaped from the semantic structures available to us, in 
order to bestow meaning and direction upon the past, constituting a conceptual tool 
to grasp a reality of which we can never successfully conceive. Hansen emphasises the 
three fundamental aspects of identity; spatial, temporal , and ethical.161 However, as 
she goes on to argue, the idea of the spatial delineation has historically been structured 
around the focused on the organising structure of the nation state.162 Thus it leaves the 
question open as to how to best analyse the political entities in the non-West where 
the organising principle of the nation state emerged considerably later, and in a 
different configuration of historical circumstances, and were indeed the historically 
dominant modality of thinking about political spatiality was not the emplotments 
related to the modern nation state, but centred around different modalities of 
narrating political legitimacy, such as the Chinese dynastic system’s focus on the 
Mandate of Heaven, Tianxia and other structures of meaning. 
 
I thus concur with Berenskoetter’s critique of much of the extant literature on national 
narratives as too often overlooking the temporal arc of a narrative linking past and 
future, in favour of the narrative as an event rooted in the here and now.163 As Erik 
Ringmar poignantly pointed out in describing the temporally interlinked nature of 
identity; “We can be someone today since we were someone yesterday and since we 
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will be someone tomorrow.” 164  Without shared stories of the past, anything but 
fleeting group identities would thus be very difficultly attainable. “The possession of 
an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide.”165 How people 
experience the past is intrinsic to their perception of the present, as such history is 
central to the construction of a society.166 These historical narratives provide the stories 
necessary to connect the individual to the collective and the collective to the past.167  
How people experience the past is intrinsic to their perception of the present, as such 
history is central to the construction of a society,168 as the narrative arc is necessarily 
leading from a particular retelling of the past, through a particular perception of the 
present, and on towards a distinct vision for the future. 169  As He underlines, 
additionally, the arc of ontological security is also based on a stable vision of which 
future to reach for.170 The co-constitutive ties between a polity’s ontological security, 
historiography, and narrative takes on added importance in the case of China, where 
the mnemonic literature is informed by a historiographic tradition, and records 
stretching uninterruptedly back to 841 BCE.171   
 
The Chinese case is then, again, a salient one to explore these theoretical implications 
further, not the least as the historical experience of the shaping of the horizons of 
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experience is arguably fundamentally different in the case of the Sinic polities as 
opposed to the European ones. As well summarized by Zhang: 
 
At the root of the fierce contest between Imperial China and the 
European society of states was mutual rejection of each other’s 
institutional arrangements and underlying assumptions about how 
a world order should be organized. In this violent contest, the 
metavalue complex that informed the constitutional structure of the 
Chinese world order disintegrated. Imperial China was thus 
confronted by a dual challenge at the turn of the twentieth century. 
One was how to build down the empire into a state. And the other 
was how to build up China (from its largely local and provincial 
basis) into a nation and a state as conceptualized by the invading 
Europeans so as to prevent China from becoming ‘a mere geographic 
expression’172 
 
The European influx at the end of the Qing dynasty then, however, entailed a radical 
expansion of the horizons of possibility that was suddenly forced upon an ailing 
dynasty. As Qin has summarized the conundrum this entailed for the coming 
attempts at re-founding the Chinese polity: “In the 140 years from 1840 to 1980, China 
had always faced the problem of its relationship with the international system, but 
never had an appropriate solution to it. In fact, during those 140 years, China had been 
an outsider, trying, hesitating, and staring into a strange and sometimes hostile 
universe. The Qing Dynasty failed to solve it; neither the later Chinese 
governments.”173  
 
This Chinese modality of a broader phenomenon in international relations, will be 
further analysed through the proceeding thesis, with a focus on three strands, firstly 
the role of external recognition dynamics. Secondly, the potent role the memories of 
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colonial subjugation for the various political narratives constructed in the aftermath 
of these events, a topic that already has seen a wide array of eminent scholarship, as 
studies on China’s “new nationalism” are saliently addressing the role of the 
discourses on Chinas “Century of humiliation.”174 Finally, a third way in which this 
general ontological security problematique has been addressed by narrative 
entrepreneurs in China is the role played by the ti/yong discourse as a tool for 
transcending the experience of functional scientific and industrial backwardness, a 
discourse that is both quite particular for the Chinese case and arguably still relevant 
today. However, as it is still generally underexplored, I will be addressing this issue 
separately below, amongst the three new concepts I suggest including into the 
ontological security approach based on the specifics of the Chinese case.  
 
2.3.3 Ti/Yong, Minben, and Functionality 
Having presented these two extant ontological security concepts for which I argue the 
case of China is particularly well suited to explore further, I will here go on to detail 
three concepts derived from the particular Chinese local context, and contend that 
these new concepts allow to analyse the case of Chinese ontological security seeking 
with more salience. The first such conceptual expansion, that has till date been given 
little attention in the ontological security theory, seeks to address the, theoretically 
tricky, issue of the role of material success, economic performance, and perceived 
competence.175 From the very outset, the ontological security crisis of imperial China 
was to a substantial extent driven by the fact that the supreme civilizational authority 
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of the Celestial Court was challenged by a materially and technologically superior 
outsider.176  
 
As detailed in later chapters, one of the main responses to this ontological security 
crisis was to bifurcate the idea of supremacy into two separate categories, claiming 
that the Qing dynasty could, and should, use (yong) the barbarian technology, whilst 
still asserting the supremacy of the imperial social and political values, regarded as 
the civilizational essence (ti). In other words, as the idea was summarized, taking 
“Chinese studies as essence, and Western studies as function (中学为体西学为用)”.177 
The ti/yong formula came immediately after its conception under heavy critique, in 
particular from the ranks of the Chinese reformers, that argued for the conception to 
be a contradiction in terms, an argument that has dominated also the historiography 
around the subject in posteriority 178  In Levenson’s magnum opus on Chinese 
intellectual history, the concept is dismissed as a fallacy.179 However, as Hughes has 
eloquently summarized it, focusing on the ti/yong concept’s internal inconsistencies 
from the vantage point of Aristotelian logic, is tangential to the main purpose of this 
idea, which instead “needs to be understood as a political act that goes back to the 
attempt by Qing Dynasty officials to mobilize the population by making tradition 
capable of harnessing the forces of nationalism as they entered China in the late 
nineteenth century. (…) In the process, the concept of Chinese national essence is 
reduced from Confucian universalism to become a malleable object of political loyalty 
for the nation.”180 However, the fact that the ti and the yong dimension was intimately 
related in the industrial era was a point it became ever harder to escape after a number 
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of humiliating military defeats, and as such the new Westernizing reform movements 
argued increasingly persistent that the only way of achieving progress in the yong 
dimension was to also alter the ti-dimension.181  
 
Of course, in analysing the ontological security dimension of Chinese foreign policy, 
it is the “ti” (体)-dimension, a polity’s definition of what constitutes its character, that 
is the object of analysis, as indeed the character is a constituent part of the Chinese 
word for ontological security, 本体性安全. However, this thesis argues that a key trait 
of Chinese ontological security seeking is closely tied up with economic and 
technological performance, and as such a brief look at also the concept of ‘yong’ is 
necessitated. Material and technological progress became intimately connected with 
the ontological security of the Chinese state, as indeed one of the main impetuses 
behind Deng Xiaoping’s reform programme was him witnessing the higher living 
standards amongst Chinese living in Hong Kong and Singapore, indeed during his 
famous Southern Tour, he explicitly relegated the question of capitalism versus 
communism as secondary to the main issue if which of them could provide higher 
living standards. 182  In Zhang Weiwei’s influential polemic on the CCP’s political 
system’s edge over Western democracies, one of the core lessons he summarizes as 
essential to the long-standing Chinese tradition of tying the heavenly mandate to the 
welfare of the populace. “Historically, the concept of the mandate of heaven was 
essentially about minben, or to what extent, the government could meet the pressing 
needs of the people. If the government failed to do so, then the foundation of the state 
would be shaken, and the emperor would lose his mandate of heaven.”183 This concept 
of minben was also, as will be detailed later, at the heart of Sun Yat-sen’s political 
program of reforming the Chinese polity.184 
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This idea about performance, in material terms, is something that is not generally 
covered in the identity literature. Hansen notably analyses the temporal, spatial and 
ethical dimensions of identity construction, whereas Max Weber already at the outset 
of modern studies of what bestows legitimacy on a polity’s ruling class did not include 
performance as one of his three ideal-types. 185  However, as pointed out in the 
literature on Communist regimes, these three ideal types leave out one important 
source of legitimacy of particular importance for the Chinese Communist Party, 
namely that of socioeconomic performance. 186  “For communist and other 
authoritarian systems, socioeconomic or “performance” grounds of this kind have 
typically been seen as the single most important basis upon which they may seek 
legitimation.”187 In China, furthermore, there is a long tradition of the ruling class’ 
ability to deliver wealth and welfare to be closely connected to the ‘Mandate of 
Heaven’ from whose authority the emperors’ legitimacy was derived.188 The inclusion 
of this aspect, and the striving to seem successful in material terms as an added 
element of ontological security could be a useful addition to analysing non-Western 
cases, in reflecting on how the fundamentally changed condition of modernity has 
taken on a very particular ontological meaning for China and other countries of the 
global South given the way it was brought to the countries courtesy of imperialism. 
Economic success can thus be regarded as a potent tool, particularly as countries 
increasingly found a niche in asserting superiority though commercial rather than 
military means, such as in the case of Japan: “The new state identity delivered 
ontological security by allowing the Japanese people to hold onto their hierarchical 
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worldview and their view of Japan’s right to a high stature without utilizing military 
strategies.”189 
 
This strive to ‘catch up’ with the west technologically and economically, and 
struggling with the degree of political and value-changes that may or may not entail, 
is indeed a running thread of Chinese modern history, from the foundries of the Self-
Strengthening Movement to the backyard furnaces of Mao’s catastrophic ‘Great Leap 
Forward’. “For almost two centuries before 1978, other leaders of China, like Deng, 
had been trying to find a way to make China rich and powerful. The imperial system, 
which had been established at roughly the same time as the Roman Empire, had been 
extraordinarily successful.”190 As a very notable example, the largest challenge that the 
CCP has been met with after Mao, was the Tiananmen protests in 1989, following a 
period of runaway inflation, and sharply reduced popular belief in the CCP’s 
economic competence and performance.191 Xi Jinping, in his symbolically important 
first official sojourn as party leader, visited the Chinese National Museum’s grand 
exhibition on the Road to Rejuvenation together with the rest of the Politburo’s 
Standing Committee. This exhibit showcases a clear narrative, very much focused on 
legitimization based on economic performance, that ends on a triumphant note on 
display cases full of high tech, space equipment, and mobile phones stacked to 
demonstrate wealth increase amongst the population. As such, one cannot avoid 
noting the centrality of economic performance in the CCP’s main showpiece of their 
national narrative.  
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2.3.4 Guanxi, Relationality, and Universality 
The Chinese concept of guanxi, has been treated in a number of literatures other than 
IR, from sociology to business studies. 192  This thesis argues that it is a concept that 
can be a useful lens to take into consideration with regards to the mode of how 
relationships and recognition are brought to bear on Chinese ontological security. In 
particular this is relevant given that, as demonstrated in the synchronic section of this 
thesis, arguably the key point of identity conflict between the EU and China in the last 
decades have been intimately tied to situations in which European countries have 
applied their universal understandings, most notably of human rights, impact on their 
bilateral relationship with China. Guanxi, (关系) has been described as a “fundamental 
web of interpersonal relations permeating Chinese societies.” 193  The term literally 
translates into ‘relations’ or ‘relationships’, however, the rationale for implementing 
the concept as a separate analytical category reflects the extent to which the term 
denotes in its narrow sense, the consciously maintained “particularistic ties” based on 
ritualistic cultivation of reciprocal, hierarchically organized obligation.194 This sets the 
phenomenon apart from other forms of social network concepts such as Bourdieu’s 
social capital.195 Thus, “the crucial difference is that these norms of reciprocity are 
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much more socially situated than they are in the Western context. This reciprocity is 
not one of universalistic exchange between autonomous actors but one of socially 
situated obligations.”196 Despite the term guanxi (关系) being constituent part of the 
Chinese term for international relations (guoji guanxi 国际关系), only very recently has 
this concept been treated within the IR canon, and scholarship linking the Chinese 
guanxi concept with ontological security studies is still wanting. However, the overlap 
between the Chinese entry as a great power on the world stage, and the ‘relational 
turn’ in IR theory pioneered by Jackson & Nexon in 1999,197 have given rise to an 
increasing number of treatises on the issue, including from a number of Chinese 
authors who regard this approach as a key starting point for implementing traditional 
Chinese concepts into the IR canon.198 
 
In terms of potential additions to ontological security theory this thesis argues can be 
saliently drawn from the concept, is that of the difference between polities whose 
ontological security is founded with a more pronounced focus on seeking recognition 
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from others based on a universalist view of the polity’s fundamental values, versus a 
polity that seeks ontological status recognition more based on parochial relationality, 
of which this thesis will define modern China as the latter type. In other words, the 
empirical material suggests that the Chinese diplomatic tradition is focused 
extensively on the importance of coupling as the modus operandi of relations. Rather 
than seeking ontological security through the identification of universal rules, the 
former is sought through stabilising bilateral relationships. This analysis corresponds 
with the patterns detailed in the works of e.g. Chih-yu Shih: 
 
By contrast, we will argue that Chineseness depends on social 
recognition. (…) US foreign policy concerns about relationship are 
assessed and manoeuvred to suit the purpose of certain general 
principles embedded either in liberalism or hegemonic stability. (…) 
For example, the approach of Chinese strategists in handling border 
disputes with India, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, Myanmar, and 
North Korea without subscribing to any particular standard is 
notable.199 
 
This corresponds with Ruggie’s definition of bilateralism as founded on specific 
reciprocity, that compartmentalises relations into separate dyads. 200  Of course, all 
polities will to an extent be basing their conception of ontological security on a 
combination of universalist and relationship-specific principles, but the analysis of 
this thesis is corroborating the idea that Chinese ontological security to a larger extent 
is based on recognition of particular roles in bilateral relationship than the more 
general rules-based principles on which Western countries, such as in Europe, tends 
to be based on, a trait that is closely related to the dynamics of guanxi, and its 
diversified relationality. As argued by Qin Yaqin; “The Confucian worldview differs 
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from that of Western societies in that it sees the world as one of relations rather than 
atomistic and discrete entities. (…) As rationality is the most characteristic concept of 
Western societies, relationality provides the foundation of the Chinese social 
world.”201 
 
This relational dyadic approach, as Rozman’s constructivist analysis terms it,202 is 
arguably reflected in a number of Chinese foreign policy practices. 203  China’s 
behaviour in multilateral for a tends to focus on the non-interference and sovereignty 
issues rather than seeking any broad universal application for what the CCP defines 
as Chinese values, China traditionally being the Security Council’s top abstention 
country.204 Even the high-profile Chinese-led multilateral organizations, such as the 
FOCAC, China’s BRI initiative, or the 16+1 forum with East- and Central European 
countries, diverge from the American-created Bretton Woods institutions by being 
mainly platforms for bilateral relations between China and the relevant member 
countries rather than creating a common architecture.205 
 
Depending on the social circumstances, an actor can be 
accommodative and generous (as China seems to be in its 
interactions with East European or African countries, for instance) 
and assertive and vengeful (as China seems to act in the South China 
Sea) all at the same time. The role-centric framing of guanxi 
underpins not only its malleability (i.e., that it can be used for 
multiple and diverse purposes), but its potential to engender 
resilient connections in the context of recognizing and influencing 
emergent opportunities.206 
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As the case of Norway’s Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, treated in a later chapter, 
demonstrates, China’s protests were overwhelmingly related to the bilateral 
relationship between China and Norway, whereas Chinese protests in cases where the 
Peace Prize was awarded to political dissidents of countries other than China have 
been absent.  
 
In the literature written, from both the postcolonial Western, as well as the Chinese 
academic circles, it is however striking to note that in all of the debates about 
diversified relationality as an argued key cultural Chinese trait, the literature exists in 
almost complete isolation from the well-established body of works on how this form 
of particularistic ties is a defining trait of an empire.207 As defined in Nexon and 
Wright’s empire ideal type, distinguishing it from nation-states and other polities 
based on homogenous relations between centre and periphery: “Empires, in contrast, 
involve heterogenous contracting: cores develop distinctive bargains with each 
periphery under their control.”208 As such, it may rather be a reflection of long imperial 
traditions, followed by authoritarian rule with only a very short democratic 
intermezzo. However, referring to the ongoing debate on the topic this investigation 
argues that whether particularistic sociological traits or universal imperialist heritage 
is the main background, the modus operandi is particular enough to deserve special 
attention. A potentially broader utility for this concept, beyond Chinese foreign policy, 
is thus all the more reason to explore and implement this concept into this thesis’ 
broader framework. 
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2.3.5 Mianzi, Recognition, and Status 
Finally, a concept that relates strongly to this preference for bilateralist differentiated 
relationality, is the Chinese concept of face (面子 mianzi). 209  A staple of business books 
and vernacular psychology, this concept is nevertheless one that, as Buzan argues, 
deserves to be subject of serious theoretical attention: “The E[nglish] S[chool] has not 
thought about ‘face’. Yet, ‘face’ might count as a primary institution of international 
society in East Asia. And in a world in which China is one of the most powerful states, 
‘face’ will almost certainly be an important aspect of diplomacy more generally.”210 
Sociologist David Yau-fai Ho defines face (mianzi) as:  
 
The respectability and/or deference which a person can claim for 
himself from others, by virtue of the relative position he occupies in 
his social net- work and the degree to which he is judged to have 
functioned adequately in that position as well as acceptably in his 
general conduct (…) In terms of two interacting parties, face is the 
reciprocated compliance, respect, and/or deference that each party 
expects from, and extends to, the other party.211  
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As Ho was keen to emphasize, this idea of face is, when defined at a high level of 
generality, a universally human concept, 212  however, he goes on to argue that in 
Chinese society the concept takes on a more dominant role, that is meaningfully 
different from the concept’s role in the Western world, by the particular emphasis 
given to the relational reciprocity rather than the focus on the individual that 
dominates in Western societies. 213  “Chinese face is tightly linked with vertical 
relationships and close others. Its operation follows a compelling principle of 
reciprocity. In contrast, Western face emphasizes the separateness of an individual.”214  
 
The utilization of the key Chinese term of face here, then, is that it denotes a particular 
kind of ontological security seeking, based on a particular set of social structures that 
differs meaningfully from the Western honour concept, 215  to deserve recognition and 
analytical attention in its own right. As Ho notes in his analysis of the concept, 
different standards of behaviour, in a very different sociocultural context, are applied 
to judge face as opposed to honour.216 Thus, with regards to ontological security, the 
proposed way of answering to Buzan’s call to better include face as a concept into 
international relations theories, is arguably to recognize it as a particular mode of 
external recognition seeking, by the way of focus on ritualized ontological security 
through bilateral role relations rather than universal rules.  
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As observed empirically in the analysis of contemporary Europe-China relations, 
there are two distinct features of Chinese foreign policy for which the utilization of 
face as an analytical concept is particularly salient. Firstly, the dominant presence of 
apology diplomacy as an onus of Chinese foreign relations, and secondly, the role of 
ritualized recognition. The presence of apologies as a mainstay in Chinese foreign 
relations can hardly have been left unnoticed by any China-hand, as long-winded 
negotiations over the precise wording of apologetic declarations have taken centre-
stage in a number of high-profile foreign policy crises.217 However, as argued there are 
traits implied in the face concept that goes beyond being simply a translation of the 
English concept of prestige. The face concept entails a different approach to 
hierarchical relationality that results in political disputes surrounding these issues 
take on a particular dynamic. As summarized by Gries;  
 
The form an apology takes depends critically upon the relative status 
of the parties involved. The kind of apology necessary to rectify an 
offense an inferior commits against a superior is greater than that 
required of an offense committed between equals. (…) An apology 
may not be possible, therefore, if there is disagreement over the 
relative status of the parties involved. If both parties claim to be the 
superior in a hierarchical relationship with each other, there can be 
no agreement on the extent of the apology necessary to rectify the 
offense.218 
 
This interlinking of diplomatic apologies with bilateralist differentiated relationality, 
thus opens for a dynamic that instead of emphasizing universal remorse towards 
individualized principles, puts the onus on the respective bilateral relationship, so 
that entwined with an apology is in effect also a statement on the relevant relational 
hierarchy between China and the state in question, an issue that seems to have 
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exacerbated tensions at multiple points over the later years, as will be demonstrated 
in the empirical chapters. 
 
The role of apology diplomacy as entwined with issues of status hierarchy and face 
thus ties directly to the interrelated issue of ritualized recognition as a salient factor in 
analysing Chinese foreign policy.  
 
Representations of the 2001 U.S. spy-plane collision over the South 
China Sea are a case in point. To Beijing, it was much more than 
simple violation of Chinese sovereignty: It was seen as a moral 
problem, another in a long line of humiliations that China has 
suffered since the Opium War. Resolving this problem did not 
involve military retaliation or economic reparation so much as 
symbolic recognition: China demanded a public apology from the 
United States.219 
 
Drawing upon Ringmar’s account of the importance of public recognition as a key 
factor of the process of continuously producing relational identities, this approach 
utilises the insight that, much like persons, polities also “ask our audiences to recognize 
us as the kind of persons that our stories identify.”220 In line with Zarakol’s argument 
presented earlier, China’s case, like that of Turkey and Japan, thus also demonstrates 
a particular need for exogenous recognition.221 The history of the modern Chinese 
polity have been deeply emmeshed with recognition-seeking efforts, both with 
regards achieving the formal-legal recognition as a state in the first place, and later 
through seeking recognition for its various socio-political registers amongst a foreign 
public.222  It could be argued that in the case of China, this request for recognition is 
even more politically salient, based on the cultural traditions of ‘face’, and not the least 
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how this cultural trait works in tandem with the particular Chinese identity narrative 
that has been constructed as deeply emmeshed in the idea of redressing the past 
wrongs that imperial China suffered through. As Wang Zheng has summarized it in 
his treatise on Chinese nationalism and China-US relations: 
When an incident is perceived as an act of bullying and humiliation, 
because the central myth and the legitimacy of the government are 
highly dependent upon maintaining China’s “national face” it 
becomes natural and understandable that the government needs to 
be tough. (…) The Chinese political elites are responsible for 
maintaining China’s national mianzi (face) in its dealings with other 
nations. Because the CCP has built its legitimacy on a reputation as 




Directly related to this question of external recognition, is the growing literature on 
status concerns in Chinese foreign policy,224 that ties into a broader focus on status 
concerns in international relations.225 One key insight derived from the developments 
in this literature, with particular application in the Chinese case, is Freedman’s 
argument that status insecurity is not only found with regards to one’s social peer 
group, but may just as potently be derived from temporal forms of self-evaluation.226 
Pye does in his work on the topic even claim that “The Chinese sense of greatness is 
of a different order and magnitude from that of all other cultural traditions.”227 This 
tenuous sense of status, or as Coker, phrases it “the juxtaposition of pride and 
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patriotism on one hand, and the Party’s deep insecurities on the other,”228 remains a 
key driver in the identity dilemma of modern Chinese politics, and has proved 
susceptible to developing into grievance-nationalism, on the basis of a historical 
narrative dwelling on resentment.229 Arguably the status insecurity here quoted is 
deeply related to the Chinese ontological security crisis, driven by perceived 
deficiencies along both the social and temporal scale. 
 
 This results, amongst other things, in a particular Chinese emphasis on the 
importance of being given face through ritualized modes of recognition as a large 
power. As exemplified at various points throughout this thesis these recognition 
rituals, can take the form of the long-standing Chinese efforts at policing international 
press reports about the country, as the CCP has long demonstrated to have thin skin 
for media coverage from abroad, even from countries a fraction of their size. 230 
Furthermore, it results in a strong drive for seeking ontological security through being 
given face by being properly recognized according to their perceived status with 
regards to the rituals of established, Western-derived, diplomatic protocol, such as 
giving large emphasis on the dates of a country’s recognition of China, and giving 
particular value to official visits or other established practices through which status 
recognition is being communicated in the international society.231 
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In sum, an investigation of the identity factor in China-Europe relations necessitates 
the application of a salient, stringent, and dynamic theoretical framework. As this 
chapter has detailed, I contend that the rapidly growing literature on ontological 
security provides precisely that. This is based in equal parts on the approach’s 
conceptual clarity in exploring the political effects of identity struggles, and its 
flexibility in implementing conceptual contributions within the framework. As such, 
I seek to engage with ontological security through drawing on the theory’s strength 
in analysing China-Europe relations, but the thesis will also argue that the case of 
China in itself can contribute to the development of ontological relations. Amongst 
the contributions that can be garnered from this effort at analysing Chinese Europe-
policies through the framework of ontological security, is the belief that there are a 
number of things that ontological security as an approach can do for China. One of 
the main strengths of the approach is that it allows for a theoretically coherent avenue 
for engaging with salient analytical concepts from the area studies literature on 
Chinese nationalism and foreign policy. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis also argues that the China-Europe case as analysed in this 
thesis is particularly suited for contributing to ontological security theory, both 
because it is a particularly good case for exploring certain existing concepts in the 
theoretical approach, that although widespread remains somewhat underexplored. 
These two extant concepts, namely that of the role of narrative identity entrepreneurs, 
and the impact of mnemonic policies and modalities of modernity introduction, are 
universally derived concepts of immediate relevance, in particular for countries 
outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, and carries also a particular relevance for the 
Chinese case that makes this thesis’ focus particularly well suited for further exploring 
these issues. Furthermore, this case is also contributing to the development of 
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ontological security theory through expanding the universe of ontological security-
relevant concepts, through drawing from the Chinese particular context three key 
concepts reflecting important and distinctive modalities of Chinese ontological 
security seeking, namely the effects of basing a polity’s foundational narrative on 
universalism or particularism,  the relevance of external recognition and face, and the 
extent to which materiality informs the ontological security status by engaging with 
economic functionality as one possible mode of ontological security seeking. When 
designing a doctoral research project around the theoretical approach of ontological 
security, it is imperative to reflect upon the epistemological basis for this school of 
theory, and how it impacts of the chosen set of methods. The following chapter will 
thus detail and discuss the epistemology inherent to ontological security, and how this 
thesis’ derived methodology and methods have been designed within this paradigm 
in order to allow for a solid and salient analysis of ontological security as a factor in 





Chapter 3: Epistemology and Methods 
 
 
3.1 Epistemological and Theoretical Discussion 
 
Having detailed the ontological security approach, and the contribution it can make 
to studies on China-Europe relations, the following chapter delves into the 
epistemological details of this thesis’ analysis through addressing two deeply related 
key questions; on which basis does the ontological security approach base its 
knowledge claims, and how will this investigation proceed in practical terms in order 
to establish such knowledge. Engaging in social science is a process aiming at 
systematically producing empirical knowledge about a certain set of social 
arrangements. Key to this process is a conscious and reflexive approach to the 
epistemological assumptions on which basis the scientific claims about the social 
world will be grounded.  
 
As such, having presented the main tenets of this thesis’ research project, and the 
ontological security approach, this chapter’s aim is twofold: Firstly, to clarify in more 
detail the fundamental ontological and epistemological position of this thesis. As 
Jackson points out, regarding the knower and the known as co-constitutive does raise 
a particular set of questions with regards to the process of knowledge production.232 
Secondly, in the main section of this chapter, the focus will be on the 
operationalization of these theoretical assumptions, and on how the ontological 
security analysis is undertaken in order to address in a systematic manner the 
epistemological opportunities and challenges that arises from the chosen theoretical 
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approach, discussing the matters of analytical operationalization, case selection, and 
source selection. Laying out the practical rationale of the investigation, this section 
will be detailing and summarising the research design of the project, the methods 
utilized, and the methodology the following empirical chapters of this thesis will be 
predicated upon. Engaging with the experienced reality with the intent of producing 
valid knowledge, necessitates that claims to validity must be founded upon an 
account of the fundamental ontological ‘wagers’ which the claims are based upon. 233  
As this thesis presents an analysis of Chinese discourses on identity and the 
ontological security of the self vis-a-vis Europe, the core of this conceptual discussion 
will be on the epistemological theory and practice of discourse analysis. In particular, 
the following sections discuss and contextualize some of the challenges facing a thesis 
utilising discourse analysis as part of an analyticist research project.  
 
3.1.1 Analyticism and Discourse 
When asked by his disciple Zi Lu what his first priority would be as ruler of a country, 
Confucius replied that the foremost duty at hand would be to “rectify names”234, going 
on to explain that “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the 
truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot 
be carried on to success.” 235  Exemplifying thus how our words are pervaded by 
politics, Confucius’ reply draws attention to two fundamental epistemological 
axioms, one of which I will argue for, and another I will argue against; Firstly, he 
recognizes how language and power are related entities in the world of politics. This 
focus on proper rituals and ways of ordering the world through incorporating the 
human experience in a set of rites and prescriptions for correct handling of the human 
                                                 
233 Jackson 2010, 22–23 
234 Dainian Zhang and Ryden 2002, 461 
235 Confucius 1893, 263–64 
86 
 
experience, is thus symbolic of the Confucian motivation to bring order into the 
political world through bringing order to the narration of the world. 
 
The second and more fundamental issue Confucius’ quote draws attention to is the 
relationship between human experience, as expressed through language, and ‘the 
truth of things.’ In the following section I expand and contend the argument that the 
relationship between experienced reality and language is not just descriptive, but co-
constitutive. This is a defining epistemological orientation of the poststructuralist 
ontology, that is to say a view on the nature of reality that rejects that there is a reality 
autonomous of discourse: “The key word here is autonomous: it is not that nothing 
exists outside of discourse, but that in order to exist for us, phenomena have to be 
grasped through discourse.”236 A such, language, filtering our perception of reality, is 
not so much about the relationship between a concept and its reference, as the 
relationship between various socially produced concepts.237 Bartelson, amongst others, 
explores and demonstrates, using the concepts of ‘fire’ and ‘sovereignty’, how there is 
no eternal essence to these phenomena, and as such the inquiring gaze should be 
directed at how the concepts are produced socially.238 Consequentially, this thesis will 
focus not trying to hunt down what ‘eternal essence’ the word Europe is, but on how 
the concept of Europe has been constructed and related to in various Chinese 
discourses. As such, in Jackson’s terms, this thesis is built on the analyticist 
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methodological approach, defined by a phenomenalist, monist understanding of 
ontology.239 Thus, this thesis joins with a quite extensive scholarship on world politics 
that, in Jackson’s words, “proceeds not by proposing falsifiable hypotheses or 
transcendentally specifying indispensable elements of social and political life, but 
instead by postulating an ideal-typical account of a process or setting and then 
utilizing that ideal-type to organize empirical observations into systematic facts.”240 
 
In terms of the social constitution of the world, however, one point to bear in mind is 
that the concepts, or representations, through which we bestow meaning to reality, 
are not created equal. A key to the co-constitutive understanding of the human 
perception of reality is that it is not, as some of the cruder critiques may claim, a 
relativist position for which material realities are inconsequential. “There are a 
number of biological and social traits that line the boundary between the sexes […] 
Few can be counted as unchangeable. However, some are more difficult to alter than 
others. It is easier to neutralize the gender-specific aspect of the sign “unremunerated 
domestic labor” than “childbirth”.”241 Arguing that everything in principle is fluid is 
thus not equivalent to saying that everything is fluid to the same degree, or to 
disregard the materiality altogether. 242  Thus, as Hansen argues, the onus of the 
poststructuralist approach “is not to disregard material facts but to study how these 
are produced and prioritized.”243 As such perceptions were explored and developed 
in Europe through the post-structuralist movement of the 20th century, an increasing 
body of scholarship has contributed to our understanding of the nexus between 
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language and the constitution of reality, one of the most fundamental analytical tools 
being the concept of discourse.  
 
Foucault, the key figure in the development of poststructuralist theory, would in his 
works define, although in a rather loose manner244, a discourse as system for the 
production of truth.245 In this is implied the core features of how a discourse enables 
and limits what statements we may make, thus constituting our perceptions of reality. 
246 “It constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is 
thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation.” 247  As the social and 
material aspects of the world are thus constituted through discourse, the reverberation 
of a change in the discursive frameworks through which our perceptions are being 
negotiated carries potent impact on to the political arena. I will throughout my thesis 
adhere to the definition of discourse as articulated by Jennifer Milliken, designating it 
as “an ordering of terms, meanings and practices that forms the background 
presuppositions and taken-for-granted understandings that enable people’s actions 
and interpretations” 248 . Thus, this thesis will be in concurrence with Derrida’s 
statement that there is nothing outside of text. 249  This ontological position, that 
delimits poststructuralist research from that of Critical Discourse Analysis, entails that 
practice is an inherently intertwined part of the discursive. “As long as people act in 
accordance with established practices, they confirm a given discourse.”250 Thus, for 
this thesis, practices such as the reorganization of the Chinese bureaucratic routines 
for receiving foreign envoys in the late 1800s, is an integral aspect of the discursive 
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changes of this era.251 The mainstay of my methodological approach will however 
consist of analyses of written material, given that states, being the main objects of my 
analysis, as Hansen points out, are very verbal entities. “States communicate widely, 
both domestically and internationally, leaving very little foreign policy action that is 
entirely non-verbal.”252  
 
From the assumption that discourses are pivotal in mediating our perceptions of the 
world follows that discourses are imbued with societal power, constraining how 
people categorize and think about the world, and as such providing preconditions for 
action.253 Public language matters immensely, because as language is not a neutral 
instrument, different vocabularies allow for different kinds of activity.254 The defining 
traits of discursive frameworks are how they define which subjects are authorized to 
speak and act, the relations in which the actors see themselves and others, and the 
terms of how they handle an issue area.255 How we define us against the other, entails 
weighty ramifications for our actions against them.  The cliché that one man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter, is relevant because the definition of an entity as 
either of these two alternatives entails a very different bandwidth of legitimate foreign 
policy actions. 256  Behaviour becomes meaningful, and intentions and motives are 
ascribed to foreign entities in accordance with what discursive identity-structure they 
are inscribed in, as our perceptions of reality is based on our social information.257 As 
such, Campbell points out, when realising how discourses shape and constrain policy 
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choices, this entails that political research should embrace the study of how certain 
representations of reality became the dominant discourses in a political society.258 In 
short, given that the core of my investigation can be formulated as a range of ‘how’-
style research questions, I argue the discourse analysis approach provides for insights 
that are hard to achieve using a different set of research methods. As argued by Dunn 
and Neumann, discourse analysis is a research strategy that ought to be applied to a 
suitable type of research questions in order to be a salient approach.  “Both ‘what’ and 
‘why’ type research questions are ill-suited for discourse analysis because they either 
ignore the discursive realm or take it as an unproblematic given. In contrast, discourse 
analysis is exceptionally well-suited for answering ‘how’ or ‘how possible’ 
questions.”259 
 
3.1.2 Epistemological Clarifications and Limitations 
The method of discourse analysis is thus inherently related to a particular ontological 
and epistemological view that regards social reality as co-constituted through 
language, and as such it necessarily differs from positivist research projects on certain 
key issues of systematic enquiry, such as validity and predictability. Over the next 
paragraphs, some core features of scientific enquiry, and how they relate to the 
epistemology of this thesis, will be discussed. To utilize Jackson’s conceptual 
vocabulary on the philosophy of science, one may distinguish between four research 
methodologies, neo-positivism, critical realism, analyticism, and reflexivity, based on 
your postulations with regards to two fundamental “wagers” of philosophical 
ontology; on the relationship between the knower and the known, and on the 
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relationship between knowledge and observation.260 This dissertation is built on the 
analyticist methodological approach, defined by a phenomenalist, monist 
understanding of ontology.261 In other words the ontological wager, underpinning the 
research is firstly; the postulate that as the mind remains constitutively intertwined 
with the world, so the researcher is embedded in the social world they study, and the 
production of knowledge is constitutive of the world, and secondly; that knowledge 
claims should be based on systematic empirical observation.262  Thus, in Jackson’s 
words, this thesis joins with a quite extensive scholarship from differing ‘schools’ of 
IR theory, together with a number of other approaches to world politics “that proceeds 
not by proposing falsifiable hypotheses or transcendentally specifying indispensable 
elements of social and political life, but instead by postulating an ideal-typical account 
of a process or setting and then utilizing that ideal-type to organize empirical 
observations into systematic facts.”263 
 
Given the analyticist orientation inherent to this thesis’ discursive methodology, then, 
researchers belonging to more positivist strands that contest the ontological 
importance of social construction, may be likely to point out limitations regarding the 
validity, and even more so the reliability and replicability of such investigations.264 
However, it would likewise be in the nature of the discursive methodology to refute 
these exogenous claims, on the grounds that such allegations are missing out on the 
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very nature of what is to be researched.265 It deserves emphasis that although the 
discursive methodology differ from for example neo-positivist orientations in terms 
of the philosophical postulates about ontology, this does not in any way entail that 
“anything goes”, rather to again quote Jackson it is equally important that based on 
the philosophical postulates identified “our conclusions follow rigorously from the 
evidence and logical argumentation that we provide.”266 Rather, the value of rigorous, 
systematic research procedures are arguably all the more important in the case of 
ongoing recursive social processes that often appear as more difficult to operationalize 
than does positivist research designs for causal relationships between distinct material 
variables.267 As Dunn and Neumann emphasizes: 
Of course, the reliability of any discourse analysis should stand up 
to external empirical checks. Here, we are making a distinction 
between empiricism as a method (skills of verification, close textual 
attention, proper sourcing, referencing, and so on) and as a 
philosophy of knowledge (the illusion of delivering fact, truth, and 
a knowable reality). While we personally reject the latter, we greatly 
value the former.268  
 
 
In terms of the criteria for good qualitative analysis, the concept of “trustworthiness”, 
coined by Lincoln & Guba, provides a consistent framework for a wide range of 
qualitative approaches, that is also relevant for discourse analysis.269 They base their 
argument from the axiom that the traditional framework utilised, Popperian 
falsification etc., is predicated on a “naïve realism” that does not fully account for the 
socially constructed aspects of reality. Thus, the criteria of validity, reliability and 
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objectivity are epistemologically moot. However, the underlying issues remain, 
namely the necessity of establishing a systematic paradigm to ensure the truth value, 
the applicability, the consistency, and the neutrality of a research project. In the 
positivist tradition, these methodological challenges are sought met through the 
criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity, respectively.   
 
The suggested “naturalistic” research paradigm addresses these issues through 
detailing what has become a widely accepted “parallel” paradigm where the goal of 
“trustworthiness” is established through systematic attempts at ensuring the 
credibility (in place of internal validity), transferability (rather than external validity), 
dependability (roughly paralleling reliability), and confirmability (in lieu of 
objectivity), of a qualitative enquiry.270 Adhering to these rules of how to undertake a 
‘trustworthy’ qualitative analysis, I have strived to ensure the trustworthiness of this 
thesis’ research project through seeking to ensure credibility by drawing my material 
of analysis from a wide and coherent selection of relevant texts.271 In addition, my 
experience as a student in and of China has provided me a certain cultural competence 
necessary for a more precise interpretation of the material.272 This latter point is all the 
more important in designing an analyticist research project, where a key concern is 
the realization of the researcher’s social situatedness, and the potential effects of this 
on the analysis.273 In terms of dependability and confirmability, I follow the standards 
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of open research, and provide extensive direct quoting from my sources, leaving the 
readers to cross-check my discursive conclusions.274  
 
As the fundamental assumption of the analyticist framework of my discourse analysis 
is that it is impossible to study a social phenomenon outside of the meaning it is given 
in discourse, measuring positivist generalisable causality thus becomes a moot 
point. 275  Instead, by postulating an ideal-typical account based on a thorough 
interpretivist reading of the specific case, the observations can be analysed to allow 
the researcher to distinguish between the adequate, the coincidental and the incidental 
factors that lays behind the outcome of this single case. 276  The goal of discourse 
analysis is instead to investigate the processes of creating meaning, the meaning that 
is one of the preconditions for action to take place.277 As excellently summarized by 
Ole Wæver: 
In a specific political culture there are certain basic concepts, figures, 
narratives and codes, and only on the basis of these codes are 
interests constructed and transformed into policies. Basing a study 
on this level rests on three assumptions: 1) these codes put relatively 
narrow limits on possible policies; 2) the codes are sufficiently inert 
so that they can be seen as ‘causal’ factors in relation to policies 
(together with other causes) and so that one can study the way they 
are transformed as an effect of changing political constellations; and 
3) it is possible to locate the most important discursive space in 
which the actor in question is operating.278 
 
It is important to note that one cannot from a certain discursive reality make 
predictions about a specific policy to be undertaken, given that the room for actions 
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and reinterpretations usually is large enough to allow for a wide range of options, 
however discourses define the framework and structure the political space within 
which policies are undertaken.279 However, as Dunn and Neumann point out, one of 
the key contributions of discourse analysis is to demonstrate the continuity of 
structures of thought over time, which entails that  
As a given representation establishes itself in the discourse, one 
should go back to find “pioneer texts” that foreshadow it. This 
allows us to make a prediction: if a new main representation of 
Europe surfaces in Russian discourse during the next years, more 
likely than not it will be churned out of material that is already 
present in the discourse.280  
 
Discourse analysis may thus be used to point forward to likely changes in the 
conditions for political action in the future.281 However, “discourse cannot determine 
action completely. There will always be more than one possible outcome. Importantly, 
discourse analysis aims at specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes.” 282 A 
discourse analysis thus may say something about the conditions present for 




3.2 Methods and Research Design 
 
Based on the epistemological assumptions described above, this section details the 
derived research design and the analytical choices made in order to investigate the 
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project’s research questions. This thesis’ two-pronged approach of combining a broad 
and fundamental diachronic analysis with a more narrow and detailed synchronic 
analysis, implies that a wider range of methodological approaches will be utilized, 
although undertaken within a common theoretical framework.  
 
3.2.1 Analytical Approach 
The task of a discourse analysis is in essence to “work with what has actually been 
said or written, exploring patterns in and across the statements and identifying the 
social consequences of different discursive representations of reality”284 The discourse 
analysis methodology utilized in this project draws heavily upon the common three-
step method, as detailed by e.g. Dunn & Neumann. This entails, in broad terms, firstly; 
delimiting the sources on which the analysis will be based. Secondly, reading the 
source material, and identifying the main representations in the relevant texts. 
Additionally, in order to further analyse the main representations found in the 
discourse, I have utilized Hansen’s methodology of investigating the implicit linking 
of representations into various relations of sameness and difference, a method that is 
particularly well suited for analysing the development of a political entity’s discourses 
delimiting a Self from an Other, a key point of my research project on Chinese 
ontological security. Hansen advocates a methodology of identifying the signs, terms, 
that articulates the construction of identity.285 In the classic example of a European 
Balkans-discourse, this approach is demonstrated through showing how the 
construction of the Balkans is made through linking it to signs like “violent, irrational, 
underdeveloped” etc. while differentiating it from the “controlled, rational, 
developed” etc. identity of Europe.286 Thirdly; taking the main representations, one 
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then seeks to uncover how these are layered, and how changes have occurred at 
various layers of the representations forming a given discourse.287  
 
In practical terms, the main analytical steps of this project have been firstly to delineate 
the relevant cases, before moving on to defining the relevant range of texts. Both of 
these two methodological moves are treated in more detail in the following sections. 
After having delimited the cases and the relevant texts and textual monuments, in 
accordance with the framework drawn up by Neumann & Dunn and Hansen, as 
detailed earlier, there are two further main analytical steps I have undertaken, namely; 
mapping the representations in the discourse, and identifying the layering of 
discourses. In mapping the representations, I go through the relevant textual material, 
in chronological order. For larger subsections of the corpus of texts, since there is an 
immense amount of writing from Mao’s hand not directly relevant for Europe, I 
employ an initial relevance screening method, data searches or contents overviews,288 
to narrow the textual selection further. In addition, I draw upon secondary sources to 
identify the key general texts that provide the important ideational background for 
the Europe-specific texts. From there I go through the texts mapping and analysing 
the utterances, specifically looking for statements that ties specific signifiers to the 
nodal points of “China”, “Europe” etc, and how these signifiers reflect the process of 
linking and differentiation, as detailed by Hansen, that defines degrees of Otherness, 
and links the Self of the past to the Self of the future. In order to analyse the continuities, 
changes and ruptures,289 in Chinese discourses on Europe, then, I have sought to map 
out and categorise the representations of Europe, and how these relate, positively or 
negatively, to the developing representations of Chinese identity.  
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Inventorying these representations over time helps contribute to a 
“map” of the discourses being analysed, as discussed below. The 
more such things may be specified empirically, the better the 
analysis. The ideal is to include as many representations and their 
variations as possible, and to specify where they are to be found in 
as high a degree as possible.290  
 
To this mapping is also implied noting the specifics of these utterances, the actors 
giving voice to them, and the wider social context the discourse is embedded in. This 
inventory of representations then forms the basis for the next analytical step. 
 
The last of the analytical stages concerns the layering of the discourses, in other words 
to analyse which representations are more fundamental, and to detect and 
demonstrate changes in these. “Not all representations within a discourse are equally 
lasting. They differ in historical depth, in variation, and in degree of 
dominance/marginalization in the discourse. A final task for the discourse analyst is 
to demonstrate this.”291 As the preceding section have demonstrated this thesis holds 
that no discourse emerges from a vacuum, 292  and as such the basic underlying 
discourses are of importance, and particularly so in investigating narrative crises such 
as in the historical case of China. As summarized by Hansen: 
Basic discourses are identified through readings of texts, but it 
should be stressed that ‘basic discourses’ is an analytical distinction 
of an ideal-type kind. (…) The analytical value of basic discourses is 
rather that they provide a lens through which a multitude of 
different representations and policies can be seen as systematically 
connected and that they identify the key points of structuring 
disagreement.293 
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As such, based on the inventories from the earlier analytical step, I aim at identifying 
the dominating discourses, distinguishing them from alternative and less important 
ones. Following on from this theoretical foundation, this thesis will at its core be 
preoccupied with identifying and analysing Chinese discourses, based on a three-
layered model, distinguishing between foundational narratives, the main discourses 
derived from these, and the policy-related impetuses derived from these main 
discourses.  
 
This three-level discourse analytical model will for the diachronic section be focused 
on tracing the long lines of the development of Europe’s role in the most basic of the 
discursive levels analysed, namely what is termed the foundational narrative. As 
detailed in the theory chapter, by taking the foundational narrative as the most basic 
discourse, this analytical category forms the basis of the identity discourses of a 
Chinese polity. These foundational narratives are defined and distinguished through 
their basic articulation of key identity representations, that sets out a particular idea 
of what a Chinese polity should be. This entails that the narratives construct the basic 
parameters of their vision of whet the polity should be based upon, in terms of spatial, 
temporal, and ethical identity. This also includes the inclusion of different Others with 
different degrees of radical difference as co-constitutive of the identity narrative of the 
nation. 294  It should be pointed out that the analytical goal of the mapping and 
analysing the shifting Chinese narratives through the diachronic and synchronic parts 
of this thesis, is not to claim the sole existence of only one foundational narrative in 
the contemporary discourse.295 Rather, the goal is to analyse the dominant narrative 
addressing Chinese ontological insecurity at key points of the country’s political 
history, thus to allow for tracing the continuities and changes in these.296 
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A key analytical question of this thesis is thus to investigate which role Europe played 
in the various Chinese foundational narratives that shaped the political arena of China 
in the years after the Opium Wars. I will thus in this thesis’ diachronic section look at 
how the Chinese polity, through being ontologically challenged at a level beyond the 
American experience in Krebs’ works,297 was forced to engage in introspection and 
reformulation of even its foundational narrative. This analysis focuses on four key 
events of Chinese state-building after the Opium Wars, tracing and analysing the 
changes to this foundational narrative in the key political and philosophical texts of 
these eras. Drawing on the works of Neumann and Wæver, 298  this thesis does, 
however, also seek to answer the challenge raised by e.g. Subotic to further explore 
the working of narratives in ontological security seeking, and detailing how a number 
of different discourses with starkly diverging policy implications could rise from what 
was essentially the same foundational narrative.299 This diachronic analysis, being a 
novel contribution to the literature, furthermore provides the necessary conceptual 
understanding and analytical depth for the following synchronic section. 
Summarising the research design of this thesis through paraphrasing Hansen’s words; 
it is important when analysing the basic discourses structuring a country’s foreign 
policy, that one also utilises secondary literature to engage with the conceptual history 
of the key signifiers in the current day debate.300 In the case of this thesis, however, 
such a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese concept of Europe had yet to be written, 
and as such one of the goals of this project was to write one, in order to then be able 
to analyse the contemporary Chinese discourses with more depth. 
 
                                                 
297 Krebs 2015 
298 I. B. Neumann 2013; Wæver 2003; See also Forsby 2015 
299 Subotić 2016, 624 
300 Hansen 2006, 47 
101 
 
As such, the synchronic section will in addition to the level of foundational narratives, 
also expand the analysis to the next discursive layer, namely investigating which main 
discourses were based on the foundational narrative at any given time. “Every new 
layer adds specifications and variations on the deeper one, but one cannot take a 
gradual change at, for instance, the third layer and say that it starts to weigh heavier 
than the second one; either one is still inside the frame set by the prior ‘choice’ at the 
first and second level.” 301  Thus, through investigating China’s Europe policies as 
expressed within the narrow timeframe of current-day relations, with few 
fundamental changes to the foundational narrative, these sections seek to investigate 
the dynamics of the main discourses predicated on the specific foundational narrative 
of Chinese identity that became predominant in the post-Cold War era, how these 
drew on the foundational identity narrative in more dynamic and interchanging ways.  
 
These main discourses then, build on the fundament of the foundational narrative, 
and are defined by the identification of key subject positions in the Chinese political 
discourses of Europe, that are less fundamental and thus more plastic. As such, the 
changing main discourses of EU as a common rising power pole, or Europe as a threat 
to socialist values, are both predicated on the same foundational narrative of China as 
a radically separate civilization from Europe. As a third analytical layer, this section 
also analyses the political repercussions of these main discourses on concrete political 
events. As the Chinese perception of ontological security is based on the foundational 
narrative, and the foundational narrative forms the predicate for the derived Chinese 
main discourses of Europe, so the conduit of ontological security concerns into 
political actions lays in how these main discourses shape the political landscape. As 
further discussed in the theoretical chapter, these more volatile main discourses do in 
their turn shape particular avenues for political action, and have through the last 
decades provided differing policy impetuses for the development of Europe-China 
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relations. This impact of the identity factor in the formulation and implementation of 
China’s policies towards Europe over the last two decades, is then the main focal point 
of this thesis’ synchronic section. 
 
As a general point, given the ambition to analyse the Chinese discourse related to a 
concept as dynamic and changing as that of ‘Europe’, in particular over such a long 
timespan, it is necessary to clarify what exactly is the analytical category I will be 
assessing. The definition of Europe is contentious today, even geographically, 
exemplified by the number of Eastern European countries arguing over on which 
territory the midpoint of Europe is situated - and it was no less so two hundred, or 
two thousand, years ago. Utilising Koselleck’s methodological strategy, my 
investigation analyses the development of the discourses on Europe both 
semasiologically and onomasiologically.302 In other words I will be analysing not only 
the representations related to the Chinese words for ‘Europe’ (歐羅巴洲, 欧洲，etc) , 
but also be including the semasiological perspective through engaging with the range 
of other terms that through the years have been utilized to relate to polities situated 
on the European continent, broadly defined. 303 This entails both alternative concepts 
used for the region as a whole (e.g. 大秦), and more importantly also the various states 
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in this area, be that the modern term of the Netherlands (荷兰), or the imperial era 
references to the Red Haired Foreigners ( 紅毛番).  
 
Similarly, I will be utilising the equivalent approach in my definition of the other main 
subject position treated, namely that of “China”, defined in current geographical 
terms, although in order to balance this heuristic utilization with an appreciation of 
the differences between imperial and nation-state type of polities, I will be referring 
to the various reigning dynasties as such, in keeping with the common 
historiographical tradition. 304  Whereas the Chinese heartland has a deeply rooted 
tradition for centralized rule that sets it apart from Europe in terms of defining it as a 
polity, there is nevertheless  historiographical debate surrounding the cultural, spatial, 
and temporal delineation of what through different times should be defined as 
constituting China. This debate is particularly prevalent, as is natural, in the cases of 
the “non-Han conquest dynasties” of the Yuan and the Qing, and with regards to the 
peripheral parts of the empire, notably Tibet and Xinjiang.305 As will be treated in 
subsequent chapters this debate was present from the beginning, as part of the early 
efforts at building a nation-state on the basis of the Chinese empire, and as such is 
particularly relevant with regards to the Qing dynasty, that became the last heirs of 
the dynastic tradition after the revolts following the Opium Wars.306  
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One further important clarification to be made with regard to my discursive research 
is that, in line with the differentiation between signifier and signified treated above, 
my analysis has as its subject the discourse itself, and does not aim to explain the 
motivations of the actors, whether they themselves believe their statements, or to 
judge the truth-claims of statements made.307 My concern is the discursive structures 
made and propagated, and how these serve to frame and constitute present policy 
issues. The locus of discourse analysis is to investigate the discursive conditions 
allowing certain policies to be formulated. 308  “What interests us is neither what 
individual decision makers really believe, nor what are shared beliefs among a 
population (although the latter comes closer), but which codes are used when actors 
relate to each other.”309  In effect, the Chinese discursive structures are in the last 
instance properties neither of the Chinese people, nor of the Chinese politicians, but 
of the Chinese political arena.310  
 
3.2.1.1 Quantitative Triangulation 
The synchronic section of the thesis will also introduce a supplementary level of 
analysis, namely by corroborating some of the key conclusions of the discursive 
readings with a quantitative content analysis. 311 Having secured a database of over 
30 000 documents from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on China’s relations 
with the EU and singular European countries, the contents of these have been 
analysed quantitatively as a means of triangulating the conclusions of the main, 
qualitative, analyses. Given the contingency of words and their social context, and the 
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fact that frequency of use does not necessarily entail discursive importance, 312 this 
thesis does not base its research on this methodology. Rather this layer of analysis is 
treated as a heuristic device to help triangulate and corroborate the qualitative 
analysis conclusions regarding the discursive changes identified. 313  As such, the 
method is only applied to the diachronic section, where the timeframe is narrow 
enough that that meaning of a term can be ascertained as relatively stable, thus 
avoiding the mistake of tracing the use of a term over a longer time period during 
which its social meaning and discursive context may have changed substantially. 
Furthermore, the Chinese political language is arguably particularly suited for this 
content-analysis method, given the extent to which the party-system signals policy 
changes and political priorities through the employment of a number of rhetorical 
signifiers (tifa) on all levels of the official rhetoric.314  
 
MFPRC.gov, EU and all European Countries, 
Subdirectories: 
No. of Documents: 
发言人有关谈话 (Related Remarks from the Spokesperson) 263 
外交掠影 (Diplomacy Media Review) 536 
相关新闻 (Related News) 5949 
重要文件 (Important Documents) 252 
重要讲话 (Important Speeches) 128 
驻外报道 (Reports from the Diplomatic Stations) 23284 
Total Sum: 30412 
Figure 1: FMPRC documents on Europe, 2000-2018 
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In practical terms, this method of quantitative triangulation entails identifying 
through the discourse analysis of the speeches and texts, a number of key signifiers, 
words, tifa’s, or similar, that have become key representations of certain political ideas. 
These key signifiers are then run through the database of collected key documents, 
speeches, and diplomatic dispatches, using the resulting data to triangulate and 
illustrate longitudinal changes in discourses. 315 This entails using Tablau Desktop to 
analyse the documents in the database, and establishing the document frequency of 
the relevant terms, namely counting the number of documents that contains at least 
one mention of the term. The results are presented as a percentage denoting the share 
of documents containing the term, out of the total corpus of documents in the 
database.316 This percentage serves to reflect the pervasiveness of a concept relative to 
the size of the corpus. In order to better illustrate visually the changes in the 
discourses, the analysis is presented graphically through a dichotomous approach 
that illustrates the discursive trends by showing the positive or negative relationship 
between two related key terms, presented as line graphs tracing the occurrences of 
these terms over time. In the figures are also included markers denoting the date of 
Hu and Xi’s ascension as General Secretaries of the CCP. 
 
The database in question consists of 30 412 documents, accessed openly through the 
Chinese MFA, pertaining to the PRC’s relations to the various European countries 
covered in the case studies, as well as to the EU as a whole, for the years 2000 to 2018.317 
(See fig. 1) This includes whitepapers, diplomatic communiques, speeches from the 
Chinese leadership as well as from the relevant ambassadors, public transcripts of 
summit meetings and relevant press conferences. In total this body of data provides a 
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quite complete overview of the publicly available texts from the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry on the country’s European relations. As illustrated in fig. 1,  a majority of the 
documents falls within the category of reporting on the public diplomatic activities of 
the relevant Chinese embassies and consulates. This entails that the main body of texts 
analysed consists of public speeches, media, and notes from political and diplomatic 
meetings. Thus, the database provides a good overview of the pervasiveness of a 
certain term’s use within the Chinese diplomatic corpse’s communications with 
European partners.  
 
3.2.2 Case Selection 
In terms of delimiting the range of material for the discourse analysis, a key decision 
in investigating such a broad topic as that of Chinese representations of Europe 
through the modern era, is the case selection; which periods to select as the main focus 
for the research. To this point should be made the clarification that the aim of this 
thesis is not to produce yet another historical survey of China, but to focus on a 
number of key historical events in order to draw analytical conclusions about the 
development of Chinese identity discourses vis-a-vis Europe. Through concentrating 
the investigation on these historical intersections of political, economic, and societal 
rupture, a more in-depth view of the developments relevant to Chinese ontological 
security is made possible. 
 
An added challenge in regard to identifying the key cases to analyse, is the thesis’ goal 
of seeking to understand the role of ontological security in China’s Europe policies, 
through combining synchronic analysis with diachronic analysis. The terminology 
being based on de Saussure’s conceptual apparatus for linguistics, diachronic refers 
to the development of concepts over time, whilst synchronic analysis is a cross-section 
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of the concept and its utilization at a given point in time.318  As discussed, the thesis 
will contend that drawing upon such a combined temporal range allows for a more 
in-depth understanding of the concepts, as how they evolved, remain relevant for how 
they are embedded in the political discourse today.319 The focal points of the analysis 
are distinguished by being the moments where the importance of articulating a stable 
identity became particularly pivotal, as core political actors sought to formulate the 
justification for political state- and nation-building projects.320 It could be argued that 
this logic of case selection opens for the “doctor’s dilemma”-critique that the focus on 
cases of crisis and disruption, instead of on periods of political and discursive stability, 
biases the overall analysis. However, although this is a worthy venue for future 
research on the topic, as is solidly established in the literature, it is the moments of 
disruption that are the most salient in terms of analysing the identity of a polity. 
“These moments of crisis engendered discussion, debate, directives, and other forms 
of discourse that provide a source of “data” from which to examine the 
representational practices that attempt to reaffirm or reconstruct identities.”321  In such 
cases the struggle over formulation and reformulation, continuity and change in 
national identity discourses becomes particularly consequential, precisely by being in 
flux. These are key moments when ontological security seeking constitutes both 
causes and effects of the attempts at constructing and/or reconstructing the Chinese 
state. 
 
This research will thus be centred on a discourse analysis of Chinese policy documents 
relevant to Sino-European relations. With regards to the diachronic mapping of key 
periods through which to analyse the continuities and changes in Chinese discourses 
on Europe, my four main focal points are: The first phase of the Self-Strengthening 
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Movement taking place ca. 1861–1872 as Chinese reformists sought to integrate 
European technology and knowledge in order to defend against the imperialist 
powers. Secondly, the Early Republic Era (ca. 1910-1915), when a new Chinese state, 
and national identity, was articulated and sought realized, in particular through the 
writings of Sun Yat-sen. Then, as the third main case, the early days of CCP’s New 
China (ca. 1945-1955), when the Chinese Communist Party, with Mao at the helm, 
built and articulated the current party-state after their victory in the civil war in 1949. 
Finally, the years of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (ca. 1975-1990), when the Chinese 
society underwent a monumental transformation and opening up to the outside world. 
I thus seek to map out and categorise the representations of Europe, and how these 
relate, positively or negatively, to the developing representations of Chinese identity.  
 
Moving from this basis on to the synchronic strand of this thesis, the study will further 
delimit the research to three case studies; the first being the crucial phase in the China-
EU relationship starting with the relationship agreement to in 2003, and investigating 
the political process around the still ongoing EU embargo of arms sales to China, with 
particular attention to the high-profile negotiations to bring it to an end in the early 
2000s. Second, the fallout between China and its European partners following a 
number of incidents in 2007 and 2008, cases of key political nodes of contention 
include the Dalai Lama’s visits to France and Germany and the aftermaths of these 
events, that ended with a diplomatic crisis and the cancellation of the 2008 China-EU 
Summit. The third case is an analysis the case of Chinese policies towards the UK after 
their receival of the Dalai Lama, and Norway in relation to the Nobel Committee’s 
award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, and the following 
boycott lasting from 2010 to 2016, as well as tracing the discursive changes resulting 
from the change of the Chinese leadership and the rise of Xi Jinping to power.  
 
These cases are selected based on two main criteria, aimed at contending the case for 
respectively the existence, and the political relevance of the ontological security factor 
110 
 
in China-Europe relations. Firstly, as thesis can be defined as a plausibility probe, the 
cases are selected based on general secondary literature and knowledge of the political 
context as “crucial cases” for probing the existence of an ontological security driven 
“identity factor” in China’s Europe policies. 322  Secondly, in order to ensure this 
research’s claim to political relevance, the cases selected are key political events in 
China-Europe relations these last 20 years. As such, they are also “hard cases” in the 
sense that if the identity factor is present in the discourses and practices of these key 
political cases, it should indeed hold as an argument for its overall relevance as a factor 
in China-Europe relations.323 
 
3.2.3 Source Selection 
Following on the historical and geographical delimitations above, at the core of every 
discourse analysis research design is the selection of texts within the given focal point. 
Given that it would be a hopeless undertaking to read everything related to the issue, 
a certain set of guidelines of text selection has been followed in order to enable the 
fullest possible degree of saturation. Disregarding Foucault’s rhetorical point that a 
researcher should “read and study everything”,324 the mechanisms of intertextuality 
and the “diminishing returns” inherent in discourse analysis entails that it is possible 
to conclude that one has read enough.325 Milliken offers a good tool for assessing such 
saturation in defining that a useful analysis can be said to be complete when one in 
adding new texts finds that these fit into the theoretical categories already generated. 
“This is also a partial response to the issue of reliability of discourse analyses, i.e., that 
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the interpretation offered has been checked and reworked until it fits with and 
explains consistently texts that were not originally part of its empirical base”.326  
 
Tying into this methodological reasoning, is the assumption that not all texts are 
equally important. No piece of writing is imbued with meaning only by and of itself, 
meaning is constituted as a text explicitly or implicitly builds upon other texts and 
implicit understandings of culture and codification. As all texts are woven together in 
a web of other writings, sharing a textual space referencing other texts, what 
Kristeva327 defines as “intertextuality”, there are certain texts that forms the central 
nodes in this web. 328  These canonical textual “monuments,” 329  that are frequently 
quoted and functions as points of reference in the intertextual debates, will need to be 
given appropriate attention as keys to the discursive formation. Identifying and 
analysing these key texts are thus a core part of my research effort. “Elements can be 
considered major if they are new - not having previously appeared in print - since any 
new element, even one made at the extreme margin of the debate, may at some later 
stage move towards its centre. (...) Similarly, an element is major if it is already 
occupying a central place and is thus part of a frame of reference which is widely 
shared.” 330  
 
As Said would argue, “Foucault believes that in general the individual text or author 
counts for very little; empirically, in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere 
else) I find this not to be so”331 This is emblematic of the importance of identifying 
these key texts, that constitute the nodal points of a discourse. As such, when a 
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politician is delivering a keynote speech, no matter which issue is addressed, concepts 
cannot be fully conjured up from thin air. The rhetoric will necessarily be dependent 
on pre-existing representations within the existing discourses. As such the main 
contribution of this thesis will be found not in the originality of the sources treated, 
but in the systematic rereading of these key sources within an original framework of 
understanding. 
 
Based on this epistemological framework, this thesis will in terms of practical 
implementation take as its vantage point the methodological approach of Hansen,332 
according to whom there is a set of main decisions to clarify in order to design a 
discourse analysis. Firstly, one needs to decide whether to define as your object of 
study only the official foreign policy discourse, or if the scope should be expanded 
further to include political opposition, the media and marginal discourses. Thereafter 
one needs to make choices along three additional dimensions: “first, whether one or 
multiple Selves are examined; second, whether one makes a study of one particular 
moment or a longer historical development; and third, whether the analysis is based 
on one event or multiple events.”333 In the following sections I will go through how 
my thesis is structured according to this framework of research design. 
 
For my thesis the main objective is to research on how Europe is represented in terms 
of ontological security in the rhetoric of the Chinese government, and Chinese political 
entrepreneurs, and as such my focus will be delimited to what Hansen designates the 
model 1 of textual selection. 334  To this is implied that my discourse analysis will 
mainly be based on official foreign policy discourse, focusing on political leaders with 
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official authority to sanction foreign policy, those central in executing these policies, 
and the authoritative and semi-authoritative news outlets through which the official 
discourse is being communicated to a broader public.335 The narrow focus on policy 
makers does constitute a limitation of this investigation, and including analyses of the 
broader public discourses, including interviews with policymakers and diplomats, 
would indeed constitute a welcome complement to this study.336 Nevertheless, such a 
broad analysis lays outside the scope of this thesis, and may instead be the subject of 
further study. To this point is also related the theoretical ad methodological choice of 
utilising written sources, and not including interviews, surveys, or focus groups as 
part of my research. In the established tradition of discursive research, interviews are 
rarely included, with the sole focus being on the interpretation of texts.337 In the case 
of an analysis of China within the framework of a model 1 analysis, this approach is 
arguably particularly salient. This thesis focuses on Chinese official foreign policy 
discourses, for which official Chinese texts is the best source. Given the constraints of 
the Chinese party-state system, interviews with officials tend to replicate official 
statements decided centrally. 338  The elite-level focus of this investigation is thus, 
furthermore, particularly salient in the Chinese case, given that throughout most of 
China’s modern history, the country has been distinguished by particularly 
centralized top-down rule. 339 “In other words, at the end of the day it is China’s 
political leadership that narrates Chinese state identity and formulates China’s grand 
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strategy.” 340  Furthermore, within the CCP’s political system, the particularly 
document-based culture of governance, increases the relative importance of analysis 
of elite-level textual material.341 
 
What concerns the number of Selves to be analysed, namely the choice of how many 
states or other foreign policy subject one wishes to examine, the study is designed as 
a single case analysis of the Chinese Self, how Chinese representations of Europe are 
constituted in relations to this Self, and how this is projected internally and externally 
as part of Chinese policies towards Europe. In terms of the second and third additional 
dimension, the ambition of this research is to combine an analysis of current political 
relations with Europe, with a basis in an in-depth understanding of the historical 
development of Chinese identities. As such the two constituent parts of the thesis is 
analysed along two different and complimenting approaches to the temporal 
dimension and the event dimension.  
 
For the diachronic analysis, guided by the rationale of investigating fundamental level 
narratives and discourses of Europe in China’s identity formation, the approach is 
akin to a history of ideas-mode of analysis where the temporal dimension is a broad 
timespan, ranging from the mid-1800s Opium Wars until the 1990s. To this is also 
added a historical background survey of the main Chinese discourses on Europe from 
the early days until the late Qing dynasty, but the main focus remains on the post 
Opium War era. This time period is accessed and analysed through four key events in 
Chinese history, the rationale for the selection of these four events is given in more 
detail later. For the synchronic section, the temporal dimension is delineated to the 
years from 1996 till today. Given the limited timescale of this part of the investigation 
these cases are analysed as a whole, without subdividing them into discreet event-
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based subchapters, although the discourse analysis will be presented in the context of 
the main economic, political and social events of the era. 
 
The designation of my thesis to focus on discursive frameworks propagated by 
political actors, delimit the relevant texts to those with the most potential to define 
such structures, namely leading political actors.342 Hansen posits three further criteria, 
namely that texts should be selected based on them being “characterized by the clear 
articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they 
have the formal authority to define a political position.”343 Ole Wæver argues the texts 
selected for discourse analysis should be public texts, as this is what makes them 
relevant to the political arena,344 this notion is all the more true in my case, where the 
focal area is precisely on the disseminating of narratives towards a the wider public, 
both foreign and domestic. 
 
The latter point also emphasizes a related challenge in discourse analysis research, 
how to identify discourses that are less manifest? To efficiently and saliently be able 
to identify “submerged” discursive structures one will need to go back in time, 
reading into a comprehensive body of texts, and be keenly aware of that the most 
fundamental structures can also be amongst the most anonymous. 345  Repeated 
statements of similar representations are, however, also methodologically important, 
in this case it takes on a particularly important hue as a central modality of modern 
Chinese political discourse is the repetition of slogans as a matter of political 
positioning. 346  Nevertheless, given that repetitive quotes do not make for a well-
structured thesis text, as a rule I provide examples in-text of these key representations, 
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whilst listing in the footnotes where key repetitions of such discourses can be found. 
Such particularities of a given discourse in a given language, such as Mandarin, are of 
course a wider issue to take into consideration.  
 
Realising the importance of language naturally entails the realization that different 
languages, and the communication of concepts within and between them, matters.347 
As such, whilst doing discourse analysis of Chinese sources it is important to account 
for, and be aware of, the inherent particularities of the language. This entails, for 
example, the structure of the ideographically based Mandarin written language, 
whose grammar patterns necessitates that particular attention be paid to context, 
especially with regards to the classical texts analysed in the diachronic sections of this 
thesis. Equally so, one should posit the cultural competence to be able to decode 
general traits of Chinese discourse and argumentation, such as the tendency to have a 
text proceed from the general to the specific. Given that the main body of texts 
analysed for the contemporary sections of the project will be official statements, it is 
also necessary to relate to the particular vocabulary and language structure of Chinese 
government lingo.348 Whilst this is a relevant concern for any analysis of government 
discourse, Chinese government language in particular have developed from ancient 
court Chinese to a stylized iteration of Communist Party power, the key feature of 
which is the repetitions of, often purposely vague, slogans known as 提法 (tifa), that 
serves as signposts for political direction and demarcates official positions on key 
questions, and as such take on extra importance in a discourse analysis.349  
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A related methodological concern which applies to this research is related to the 
degree to which the political power implicit to language takes on a particular hue in 
the Chinese case, where the Communist party explicitly regulates public discourse to 
a far larger degree than in more pluralist societies, and given that censorship and other 
obstacles to free speech to various degrees was present in most of the historical and 
current cases I seek to analyse. 350  For example, the approach of investigating a 
country’s discourse through the analysis of parliamentary debates, that has been 
successfully undertaken in a number of treatises,351 is not a salient approach in the case 
of the PRC’s rubberstamp and only intermittently congregating, People’s Congress. 
However, given that the focus of the proposed research is precisely on the Chinese 
authorities’ efforts at underpinning their legitimacy through ontological security-
seeking, this factor is not a major hindrance for the analysis, although it contributes to 
a political arena where discourses emerges and circulates in particular ways. 
Furthermore, as the official discourse, like all other discourses, is situated within a 
wider intertextual web of references, it will of course be necessary to move beyond a 
too narrow focus on official policy statements in order to obtain a proper 
understanding of them. “[W]hile an organizational starting point in official discourse 
might seem rather conservative, it is simultaneously pointing to the inclusion of a 
multitude of texts and genres.”352 This also entails drawing on the range of secondary 
writing on the topic of China’s troubled path to modernity, utilizing this rich literature 
to compliment this thesis’s narrower focus on the identity-security nexus in Chinese 
political discourse. 
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I will thus undertake a discourse analysis of the relevant textual material; policy 
documents, political books and pamphlets, political manifests, think tank reports and 
speeches by high ranking officials, seeking to discern the dominant discourses and 
narratives, interpreting the Chinese representational processes in order to trace 
changes in the co-constitutive process of identity-formation. 353  Regarding the first 
section of the thesis, the diachronic approach entails reading predominantly Chinese-
language texts, written both in classical and modern Chinese. In the case of the, 
synchronic, second main section, the reading will entail both analysing Chinese texts 
projected towards a European public, as well as materials which mainly are a part of 
the domestic Chinese discourse of Chinese relations towards the relevant actors. Thus, 
in practical terms, for the early historical background section the key textual 
monuments were identified through the reading of English and Chinese secondary 
sources on the topic. The main source of Chinese views of Europe in the period up to 
the Ming dynasty, were the various Chinese dynastic histories, imposing works of 
historiography that forms the backbone of historical research on sources from these 
eras.  
 
The main diachronic sections consist of analyses of a far larger body of texts, these 
analyses are as laid out in the theory section, concentrated around textual monuments, 
with particular focus on the body of works of the key intellectual and political leaders 
of the era. This reflects this thesis’ focus on the interconnected nature of narrative 
shaping and political practices, in an era of disruptive reformation efforts of various 
Chinese polities. English and Chinese secondary texts have been used to triangulate 
and to hone in on primary textual monuments. In the case of the Mao and the Deng 
eras, the works of both of these CCP leaders has long been readily available, both in 
book form and in digital formats. These anthologies can be roughly subdivided into 
two main categories; those of the wenxuan or selected works, that are (particularly in 
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Maos’s case) volumes of the key texts and speeches setting forth the key strands of 
their ideologies and policies. Secondly, the nianpu’s, that are collections in a “diary” 
format, that details the comings, goings conversations and speeches of Mao Zedong 
and Deng Xiaoping throughout their political careers, resulting in an extensive body 
of day-to-day routines and, for my case particularly interesting, diplomatic 
interactions with foreign officials. With regards to the wenxuan volumes, all the 
relevant pieces were considered as monumental, and for the nianpu books, I undertook 
a computer assisted search after terms like 欧洲 (Europe), 欧盟 (EU), 德国 (Germany), 
etc., in order to read those sections where e.g. Mao or Deng had mentioned these 
European polities, or were meeting and conversing with any representatives of these.  
 
For the synchronic section, the range of available literature within the parameters of a 
Hansen model-1 style discourse analysis, was even broader than for the preceding 
chapter, as a result of both the increased information flow from the Chinese leadership 
in general, and the fact that this section specifically sought to trace discourses at a 
more fine-grained level. In line with the analytical framework outlined earlier, there 
are two main categories of textual material that is analysed. First, there is the key 
Chinese documents on their relations with their European partners, the key bilateral 
documents, easily available at FMPRC.gov.cn, together with the EU-China Summit 
Joint Statements that provides a fascinating longitudinal overview of the vagaries of 
the relationship. Second is the large corpus of relevant speeches, both on the Chinese 
ontological narrative in general, and with regards to Chinese foreign policies, and 
policies towards Europe and European countries. Of these there are three main 
sources, namely for the general context, the relevant top leader’s wenxuan, key 
leadership speeches in relevant bilateral fora, and other relevant speeches, found at 
FMPRC.gov.cn, the official and very comprehensive webpage of the Chinese Ministry 







In sum, this thesis argues that Europe is one of the arenas where China seeks to 
constitute a new international identity, and that this quest for ontological security is 
an under-researched factor shaping Beijing’s policies towards Europe. Based on the 
epistemological framework and the methodological strategies described here, my 
thesis will apply ontological security as the main analytical framework for addressing 
the research question. As such, this chapter has detailed the research design utilized 
in order to saliently apply this theoretical lens to the case of China-Europe relations, 
based on the fundamental epistemological and ontological assumptions this 
theoretical framework is predicated upon. In order to saliently illuminate the research 
question of this thesis, a discourse analysis approach was chosen because of this 
methods’ usefulness in analysing how Chinese identity vis-a-vis Europe has been 
constructed in China after the Opium Wars of the mid-19th Century, and how these 
ideational structures are framing current policy approaches in Sino-Europe relations. 
In the case of Europe’s role in Chinese ontological security seeking, this thesis thus 
argues for the relevance and importance of enquiring into how the relationship 
between China and Europe, both entities co-constituted in a socially mediated 
framework of understanding, is constructed in the evolving Chinese discourses of the 
Chinese national Self, and the particular Other that Europe represents. Through 
understanding the development of the Chinese discursive structuring of Europe, one 
also analyses the background for the Chinese construction of ontological security, and 
how this in turn shaped China’s interests and actions in its relations with Europe. 
 
For this purpose, the analytical framework detailed above will be applied to the case 
of China-Europe relations over the following two main parts of the thesis. The 
diachronic section will, as described, focus on Chinese ontological security seeking by 
analysing how narrative entrepreneurs sought to reconstitute a foundational narrative 
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for the Chinese polity at key political moments throughout the last two centuries. This 
provides the necessary conceptual depth for a more salient analysis of contemporary 
discursive changes, as it traces the development of the Chinese idea of Europe, and 
how it related to the evolving Chinese foundational narratives of themselves. The 
following synchronic section, then, follows on from the tracing of the long-term 
foundational narratives of the Chinese state, but focusing on a considerably narrower 
temporal timeframe allows this section to proceed to a more detailed analytical level. 
Thus, it includes the tracing of the foundational narratives into a three-layered 
analytical approach: First, it seeks to verify and trace the fundamental narratives 
forming the base of Chinese ontological security, establishing that these were indeed 
framing the debates of the era. Second, these chapters strive to detail the more specific 
main discourses derived from the fundamental narratives, at the level of the concrete 
contemporary political and diplomatic issues of the time. Third, it seeks to explore the 
political repercussions of these discourses and how the identity factor served as a 









































4.1 Introduction to the Diachronic Section 
 
In engaging with ontological security as a factor in the EU-China relationship, this 
thesis argues that a longitudinal analysis is necessary. The role of Europe has been 
deeply emmeshed with Chinese ontological security crises for over a century. As these 
crises still reverberate today, an effort is needed to investigate the roots of the Chinese 
discourses of Europe, and how these have developed together with the foundational 
narratives of the Chinese polity itself. Based on this predicate, this section of the thesis 
is a diachronic investigation that traces the development of Europe as a concept in key 
Chinese political and diplomatic texts. Furthermore, it analyses the emergence of 
Europe as a nodal point in the Chinese political discourses, and how the idea of 
Europe has been constructed by key Chinese political entrepreneurs seeking to restate 
the foundational narrative of China in response to the ontological security challenges 
brought forth by European colonialist influences, and the onset of modernity.  
 
A meaningful analysis of the current day concepts, thus, should be rooted in an in-
depth understanding on how these concepts, and their position in the relevant 
discourses first came into being, as well as their development through the 
contingencies of history.354 As Hansen formulated it as a key methodological move for 
a good discourse analysis:  
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Once the key representations have been selected one might turn to 
the third methodological point, which is to draw upon available 
conceptual histories of the representations chosen. Current 
representations might not repeat historical articulations slavishly, 
but they would have to relate themselves thereto. (…) A structured 
reading of conceptual history provides, where applicable, important 
knowledge on how constructions of identity have been argued in the 
past and thus a good indication of where ‘discursive fault lines’ 
might be located in the present.355 
 
In the case of this thesis, the lack of extant conceptual histories to draw upon entailed 
that I have had to include the creation of such, as a part of the process of analysing the 
concept of Europe in Chinese political discourse. Although a range of eminent 
scholarship exists that have analysed the political and economic influences of Europe 
during various discrete moments of ancient Chinese history356, and a number of texts 
have engaged with the identity struggles of the Chinese state throughout the modern 
period,357 there exists to the best of my knowledge no substantial work undertaking a 
history of ideas on the Chinese concept of Europe. This thesis contends that 
undertaking such a diachronic analysis in itself is valuable, and contributes to a gap 
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in the current literature that engages with the political and historical analysis of 
China’s engagement with the European-derived international system after the end of 
dynastic rule brought on by the late colonial era. Beyond this, however, this diachronic 
section is also an essential fundament for a salient analysis of China’s view of Europe. 
Thus, this first section of the two-pronged research strategy of this thesis, is aimed at 
both filling a gap in the extant literature, and utilising such newly created analysis as 
a building block for the second, synchronic, strand of the thesis. 
 
As such, the forthcoming Chapters 4-6 constituting this section will, after a historical 
background on the emergence of the concept of Europe in the annals of the Chinese 
Empire pre-1840, focus on a set of historical junctures that carry particular significance 
in the ongoing Chinese effort to achieve ontological security after the Opium Wars 
marked the traumatic beginning of China’s modern era.358 Considered by the Chinese 
as the  starting point of the “Century of Humiliation,”359 the Opium Wars started out 
as British retribution for a Chinese crackdown on their involvement in lucrative opium 
smuggling, the First Opium War lasting from 1839 to the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, 
and the Second Opium War, with French involvement on the British side, from 1856 
to 1860. Through repeated military defeats of the Chinese imperial forces showcase 
the technological superiority of the European militaries.360 The resulting peace treaties 
heralded a number of what the Chinese termed ‘unequal treaties,’ cementing 
European dominance over the commanding heights of China’s trade, economy, and 
politics.361 This sudden defeat eventually led to the implosion of the Qing dynasty. 
However, whereas dynasties had collapsed numerous times before in Chinese history, 
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only for a new dynasty to rise again within a similar ideological and political 
framework, this time the ontological challenge to the old dynastic system dealt a blow 
to the entire cosmology it was based upon. In the years following, Chinese political 
entrepreneurs would then seek to re-establish a foundational narrative for a new kind 
of Chinese polity. This process would coalesce to come to the fore at four eras of 
modern Chinese history, which form the focal points of this thesis’ diachronic section. 
 
These four main focal points are, respectively: The first phase of the Self-Strengthening 
Movement, taking place ca. 1861–1872, as Chinese reformists sought to integrate 
European technology and knowledge in order to defend against the imperialist 
powers. Secondly, the Early Republic Era (ca. 1910-1915), when a new Chinese state, 
and national identity, was articulated, in particular through the writings of Sun Yat-
sen. Then, as the third main case, the early days of the CCP’s New China (ca. 1945-
1955), when the Chinese Communist Party, with Mao at the helm, built and articulated 
the current party-state after their victory in the civil war in 1949. Finally, the time of 
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (ca. 1975-1990), when the Chinese society underwent 
another monumental transformation, a period bookended by Maoism at one side and 
the end of the Cold War at the other. These focal points are selected on the basis of 
being moments where the importance of articulating a stable identity became pivotal, 
as key political entrepreneurs sought to formulate the discursive justification for their 
state- and nation-building projects. I will thus seek to map out and categorise the 
representations of Europe, and how these relate to the developing foundational 







4.2 The Historical Background of the Chinese Image of Europe 
 
In accordance with the rationale of a diachronic study, namely the investigation of the 
longue durée of discursive developments and identity formation, the remainder of this 
chapter provides a historical background of how Europe first became a part of Chinese 
discourses. Extant literature dealing with the imposition of the modern international 
system upon China in the wake of the Opium Wars and the pressure of the European 
imperialist power, often tend to overstate the degree to which Europe and Europeans 
were a tabula rasa to the Chinese elite.362 However, almost two thousand years of 
stories and accounts of lands of the Western sea, had set the stage for how the traders, 
missionaries and colonizers of the European nations would be viewed by the Imperial 
court. This chapter thus seeks to map out how Europe came to appear on the radar of 
the Celestial Empire, through which pre-existing discursive frameworks these lands 
were being regarded, and how the early development of a concept of “Europe” would 
slowly coalesce and develop alongside changes in the Chinese ideational and political 
circumstances. Given the sparse number of textual material scattered over a millennia-
long time-period, this chapter will not engage in the more in-depth discursive study 
that follows in the main diachronic chapters on the development of the Chinese view 
of Europe in relation to Chinese identity. Instead, this chapter’s aim is to give an 
overview of the historical and discursive context of the early development of Chinese 
representations of Europe. Of particular interest, is that the representations of the 
European ‘Other’ as an ideal, or as an enemy, representations around which key 
Chinese policy debates of the 20th Century would evolve, turns out to both have long 
lineages traceable back to earlier dynastic eras of the Chinese empire.  
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The early Chinese concept formation of Europe consists of two particularly interesting 
features. Firstly, the formation of an idea of Europe was more a process of discovering 
Europe, than a process of relating to the presence of it. Whereas many of the other 
civilizations and empires, such as the Turkish, the Persian, or the Russian, would 
develop with the presence of the European continent and cultures readily accessible 
and acknowledged on the periphery,363 the Chinese experience of Europe was thus of 
a different kind. 364  Being spatially situated on the other extreme of the Eurasian 
continent, the Chinese civilization’s formation of a concept of Europe came about in a 
manner where discovery and knowledge infusion played a larger part in 
acknowledging the European continent, than it did for the other major cultural centres 
along the Eurasian heartlands. 365  Secondly, due to a range of geographical and 
political reasons, the Chinese ‘discovery’ of Europe took place not so much in first-
person, unlike the European experiences during the Age of Discovery, but by being 
introduced to the continent second hand. The range of middlemen, ranging from 
Syrian jugglers to Arab traders, and eventually a growing stream of European 
merchants and missionaries, would relay to the Celestial court their versions of a part 
of the world that continued for the longest time to be unseen by Chinese eyes. As will 
be illustrated in more detail in later sections, the representations of Europe that met 
the colonial powers, as a barbarian power roving the Southern Seas, was in fact a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Earlier understandings of Europe, treated as a half 
mystical continent, had also resulted in a competing discourse of Europe as a brotherly 
civilization en par with China itself. These two fundamentally divergent 
representations of Europe, emphasizing respectively the Otherness or the Sameness 
of Chinese and European ideals, is a discursive fault line that re-emerges also 
throughout the more current-era chapters of the thesis. 
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4.2.1 Romans, Legends, and Ideals 
It was only during the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) that fleeting information about 
Europe would filter through to the scholars of the Chinese imperial court. During this 
dynasty, two centralized empires, Han China to the East and Rome in the West, 
exerted their rule over a vast share of the global population, but were only indirectly 
in contact through long-spanning trade networks across Eurasia.366 It is however in 
this period that the idea of a geographical and political entity, or entities, to the far 
West is starting to emerge. A significant conceptual development in Chinese 
philosophy constituted an important background for the reports about a large 
kingdom past the “Western Seas” (西海). The influential theories of the Chinese 
scholar Zou Yan, ca BCE 350-270,367 outlined a world consisting of nine continents of 
nine regions each, divided by large oceans, with the Chinese world rather than being 
at the centre of the known world, was instead conceived as occupying only one 81st 
of the world’s territory.368 In terms of how the world within the seas was ordered, both 
conceptually and administratively, the Han dynasty conceived of the world as divided 
into five major concentric zones, radiating hierarchically from the central zone of the 
direct royal domain outwards through the two outer non-Chinese inhabited areas, the 
controlled zone (要服), and the wild zone (荒服), designated for the inner and outer 
barbarians, respectively.369 Chinese envoys were sent to prospect in the west in order 
to probe the threat from the outer barbarians, and through their reports based on 
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second hand-information, the Chinese court became aware of lands farther to the 
west, more specifically from the constituent parts of the Roman Empire.370 
 
The first allusions to the what can be identified as Rome, is found in the annals of the 
‘Grand Historian’, Sima Qian. In his Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji 史记), from 
the first century BCE, it is described how an embassy arrived from the King of Parthia, 
which “offered to the Chinese court large birds-eggs, and jugglers from Lijian.”371 In a 
separate section he was also referring to how Lijian (犁靬), and old name for what was 
later to be known as Da Qin (大秦), was to be found several thousand li west of Parthia. 
It is widely accepted that what the Chinese sources refers to as Da Qin was the Roman 
empire, although mainly the Eastern provinces.372 It was, however, only centuries 
later, during the Song dynasty (960 CE-1279 CE), that sources emerge that provide 
details about this country to the extreme west. The Book of the Latter Han (后汉书), 
an official history of the Eastern Han dynasty, 25 CE-220 CE, contains a separate 
section on the Da Qin kingdom, in the chapter detailing the geography and history of 
the regions to the west of China. The section is one of the earliest textual monuments 
on Europe, in that it would become a regular feature, and a source referred to, in 
subsequent scholarly works. 373  Summarising the Chinese knowledge at the time, 
Rome was represented as a sprawling empire across the sea. “The country of Da Qin, 
also called Lijian, is situated in the Western part of the Western Sea. Its territory is 
several thousand li, it contains over four hundred cities, and of dependent states there 
are several times ten.”374  
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Descriptions of this grand kingdom to the west is further relayed and added to, 
through a range of the 24 classical works of Chinese dynastic history, 375  such as the 
Book of Wei (魏书) and the Book of Jin (晋书), as well as in other historical, and as such 
also geographical treatises, such as the Brief History of Wei (魏略) and the Book of 
Song (宋书).376 There are also a certain number of additional texts mainly reproducing 
the information from these main sources.377 In Hirth’s magisterial work of 1885, the 
ancient Chinese annals describing the lands of ancient Rome and Byzantium were 
compiled, forming the fundament for later discussions on the issue. 378  Whereas 
scholars’ main focus on these accounts have been to seek and identify the geographical 
and historical realities behind these accounts, for the purpose of this thesis, the main 
interest is in recognising that Europe first registered on the Chinese record as an entity 
of the unknown.  
 
As such, the first concepts found in the Chinese cultural sphere about the European 
region, were functioning as a fairly empty canvas on which the early Chinese scholars 
could project fundamental qualities of both how they understood the outside world, 
and how they understood themselves. Of particularly eye-catching significance is the 
term given to this far West kingdom, namely the Da Qin (大秦), or the Great Qin. At 
around the same time as the word China was entering the European lexicon, based on 
Roman transliteration of the Qin dynasty, the Chinese themselves would ironically be 
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referring to the Romans using the very same term. 379  As the Wei Shu would explain; 
"The inhabitants are tall and of bright complexion, somewhat like the Chinese, because 
of this they are called Da Qin."380 The annals repeat this point, that these inhabitants 
and their kingdom are referred to by the character qin (秦), because they are similar to 
the Chinese themselves. Shiratori, argues that the Chinese essentially conceived of this 
land as a populated by a lost band of Chinese. 381  The first role of the European 
continent in a Chinese discourse, was thus as a half mythical image of themselves, 
reflected in a grand and well-ordered civilization at the other edge of the world. 
 
The relative obscurity in which the European landmass rested, naturally made 
descriptions of it a fertile ground for exotic speculations. The annals also conjure up a 
range of exoticisms about these foreign lands, of dwarves and amazons.382 However, 
a key feature about the records of the Da Qin, is that it is treated not as mythical, but 
as real. Not otherworldly, but geographically situated in detail, although only 
reachable through extreme exertion.383 The classical accounts of Da Qin describes a 
country that is large, orderly, civilized and peaceful. In a sense, it is a reflection of 
China, only better. This view is closely linked to a wider Chinese literature discussing 
the ideal states of government, in a period of profound political upheaval, and the 
construction of the first centralized imperial dynasties.384 The tidings of a vast empire 
to the west was, it would seem, a welcome canvas on which to project these ideas. As 
the following quote demonstrates, this is a notion of a country, Chinese in character, 
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large, affluent, and well organized through a strict hierarchical structure both 
bureaucratically and geographically.385 
The country is peacefully governed, and dwellings are scattered 
over it like stars. The royal capital is divided into five cities, each 
with five squares of a 60 li circuit. The king resides in the middle city. 
In the city there are established eight high officials to rule over the 
four quarters [of the country], but in the royal city there are also 
established eight high officials who divide among themselves the 
government over the four cities.386 
 
The basic tenets in the first discourses about the European continent found in the 
classic texts, is thus of a country similar to China, whose ruler was in both the political 
and geographical sense the nave around which the country was organized. However, 
this ruler is meritocratically chosen and conferring closely with a set of important 
advisors.387 In addition, the description details a ruler that would follow the Chinese 
key political ideals of the Mandate of Heaven to a fault, stepping graciously and 
virtuously aside should one of the traditional signs of the withdrawal of the mandate 
occur. “When a severe calamity, or untimely rain-storms, visits the country, the king 
is deposed and replaced by another. The one relieved from his duties submits to his 
degradation without murmurs.”388 Additionally, the annals provide a reason for why 
such a twin empire would be so reluctant to extend a hand across the Eurasian 
landmass, as the texts refer to the Parthians blocking Da Qin’s efforts at sending 
embassies to China.389 In Hansen’s terms, then, the earliest Chinese representation of 
European polities, is that of an empire linked to China through signifiers of similarity; 
“civilized”, “well-ordered”, “moral”, “abiding the rules of Heaven”, signifiers that 
separated them in common from the “barbaric”, “chaotic”, “immoral”, and 
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“disobeying” barbarian states and tribes of the outer zones immediately surrounding 
the Chinese heartland. The fundamental representation was of a twin empire sharing 
the same civilizational values, but even more successful in living up to them. 
 
The idealized representation through which one related to what was known of the 
European continent, persisted to some extent throughout the following centuries, 
although as historians were compiling the official histories if the Tang dynasty (618-
906 CE), around the year 1000 CE, a notable change can be traced. The descriptions 
shed much of its former references of a political utopia, in favour of a somewhat more 
precise reckoning of distant events, as the representation of the European continent 
took one more step away from the realm of mythology towards a description of an 
actual, although distant, political entity. This time, the reference point is 
Constantinople and the Eastern Roman Empire, although regarded to be the same 
country as the Da Qin from centuries back, as news of the fall of Rome never made it 
to the annals of the Chinese empire. References to the symbolical geography of the 
realm of Da Qin is no longer found in these later histories, and the emphasis on the 
just and benevolent nature of the ruler and their ministers are tuned down.390  
 
One important change of nomenclature is found in the official histories written about 
the succeeding Sui and Tang dynasties, as the name Da Qin from the written sources 
of the Sui Dynasty onwards gives way to a new main term for the lands at the Western 
extremes of Eurasia, namely Fulin (拂菻). As Hirth argues, it would seem this name 
origins from a Chinese misunderstanding about early Nestorian missionaries’ 
insistence on the city of Bethlehem as their main reference point in the West.391 In both 
official Chinese histories of the Tang dynasty, the Old Book of Tang (旧唐书  ) 
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completed in 945 CE,392 and the revised New Book of Tang (新唐书) written during the 
later Song Dynasty, the descriptions of the Fulin formerly known as Da Qing, mainly 
followed the established pattern.393 Included are also quite detailed descriptions of 
proclaimed customs and rarities regarding the country, such as the plant lambs, that 
are presumably inspired by Central Asian cottonfields “There are lambs which grow 
in the ground. The inhabitants wait till they are about to sprout, and then screen them 
off by building walls to prevent the beasts which are at large outside from eating them 
up. The navel of these lambs is connected with the ground.”394 
 
In the Song shi (宋史) history of the Song dynasty, written in the 13th and 14th centuries, 
the depictions of the land to the West are more precise, and concurrently less 
idealized.395 Whereas other, less central texts, from this period mostly parrot the main 
dynasty histories referred to earlier, it should be noted that in Ma Duanlin’s massive 
work published in 1273, the Wenxian tongkao (文献通考), the lands to the West seems 
to have been regarded as tangible enough to the writer that he engages in one of the 
first critical engagements with the sources on the Western lands. He thus concludes 
based on his argument that unlike what the official histories assume, Da Qin and Fulin 
are indeed two different countries. “If we hold together the two accounts of Fulin as 
transmitted by the two different historians […] I suspect that we have before us merely 
an accidental similarity of the name, and that the country is indeed not identical with 
Da Qin.”396 Indeed, in a later Chinese world map from the 16th Century, Da Qin is 
represented across the Western Sea as one of many countries of half-legend, such as 
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the lands of the pygmies. 397  As the Song dynasty (960-1279) fell to the Mongol 
invasion, the ensuing opening-up of the vast distances of central Eurasia, facilitated 
increased communication and travel across the continent. 398  Chinese sources thus 
mentions Westerners coming to the Khan’s court to offer tribute and trade, namely a 
notice made in the annals of June 6th, 1261 that the court received in audience an 
embassy from the Falang country (发郎国).399 The name Falang (发郎), also transcribed 
as  Folangji(佛郎機),  is likely to have simply been borrowed from the Arabs who used 
this as a general term to refer to the “Franks” of Western Europe.400 These Northern-
Europeans made, however, little impact on the Chinese as a whole.401 The great sea-
change in the Chinese understanding of Europe would only arrive later; with the 
arrival of Catholic missionaries to the imperial court. 
 
4.2.2 Presenting Europe 
From a situation of only very sporadic, and mostly second hand, information about 
Europe being accessible, the mercantile and religious expansion of a range of 
European nations during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), meant that the sources of 
knowledge about Europe multiplied. This new knowledge flowed to China along 
three main sources; through European merchants, via the missionaries particularly 
those at the court, and through written works published in Chinese by Europeans.402 
The first continuous points of direct contact between Chinese and Europeans came 
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with the early European seafaring powers establishing themselves in the Southeast, 
with Macau as the main point of the Portuguese presence. This establishment did not 
happen in a manner that the Chinese found particularly endearing, as the historical 
sources note a range of troubles and armed involvement.403 However, this allowed 
Chinese intellectuals like Zhang Xie to talk to European and other seafarers directly, 
and vet them about their backgrounds.404 In this treatise Dong Xi Yang Kao (东西洋考), 
or Notes on the Western and Eastern, Zhang credits the seamen he talked to. He also 
notes that amongst the other peoples in Southeast Asia a new group of peoples had 
arrived, with which there earlier had been no contact, but who claimed their land was 
to be found by the realm of Fulin. Noting these people’s dark eyes, red hair and large 
noses, their section of the book is labelled as concerning the “Red Headed Foreigners”, 
noting that they said they were coming from a country named Holland (Helanguo 荷
兰国).405 Being only one small group of foreigners amongst the large pool of foreign 
and regional influences in Southeast Asia, though, their presence was largely 
neglected.406  
 
In terms of influencing the Chinese view of Europe and Europeans, a far more 
important factor in these early years of formative experiences, was the influence of 
Christian missionaries, and in particular the Jesuits present in the Chinese court. In 
the official history of the Ming dynasty, in the section listing foreign countries and 
these contacts with the Chinese, the following note on the country of Fulin deserves 
particular attention.  
We have sent officers to all the foreign kingdoms with this Manifesto 
except to you, Fu-lin, who, being separated from us by the western 
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sea, have not as yet received the announcement. We now send a 
native of your country, Niehku-lun, to hand you this Manifesto. 
Although We are not equal in wisdom to our ancient rulers whose 
virtue was recognized all over the universe, we cannot but let the 
world know. Our intention to maintain peace within the four seas. It 
is on this ground alone that We have issued this Manifesto.407 
 
Firstly, this text illustrates how Fulin had stepped out from the shadows of legend to 
such an extent that the newly enthroned Hungwu emperor was seeking to spread his 
claim for legitimacy also there. Europe was now considered a relevant, although very 
peripheral, arena for Chinese succession politics. The second main point to be 
gathered from this text is the name of this envoy, who marks the first entry of 
emissaries and missionaries from the Catholic church, and the religious order mainly 
responsible for introducing the Chinese public to Europe, the Jesuits.408 The Jesuits’ 
achievement meant that information about Europe now came not only in the form of 
stories about obscure red-haired people trading and pirating on the peripheries of the 
Empire, but was presented to the Chinese scholarly elite from the heart of the Imperial 
court. 409   
 
The Ming shi, completed in 1739 as the official history of the Ming Dynasty, thus gives 
a considerably more detailed description of the continent to the Far West. Next to the 
chapter of Fulin, copying earlier descriptions, one now also finds, in addition to 
chapters on the Folangji (Portugal), Spain, and Holland, a separate chapter on Italia (
意大里亞). Italy is described as a country by the Great Western Oceans, that formerly 
had no contact with China, but from where came Matteo Ricci, the man who made the 
Map of Ten Thousand Countries, claiming the world was divided into 5 main 
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continents, the second one of these named the continent of Europe, Ouluoba zhou (歐
羅巴洲). This is one of the very first times the name “Europe” is represented in an 
authoritative Chinese source.410 The resulting compilation of knowledge is, on clear 
display in the Huang Qing zhigong tu (皇清职贡图 , Portraits from the Tributary Offices 
of the Imperial Qing). Compiled at an imperial request of 1751, and listing the foreign 
countries of the world. In volume one, detailing the foreign countries with official 
relations to the Qing emperor, it is starkly demonstrated in visual terms the degree to 
which Europe had been de-mythologized amongst the literati. 411 One would after 
pictures of Korean noblemen, see a very faithful rendition of a man from the barbarian 
country of the Great West Sea, complete with rapier and powdered wig, after which 
follows a leaf depicting a Swedish woman. 412  Europe had been diversified into 
countries, and normalized into becoming part of the recognisable world of human 
beings. However, although this demonstrates that fairly substantial knowledge on the 
topic had been dispatched, there was still considerable confusion as to the difference 
between the country of Da xiyang, Xiao xiyang, and the various European countries.413  
 
The information on Europe that was produced and disseminated by, in particular, 
Ricci and Aleni, was very much an idealized image tailored to their needs for 
proselytising in an empire regarding themselves as the centre of the world. 414 This 
idealized discourse of Europe was a new idea that was accepted by certain sections of 
the courtly elites. This discourse of Europe and Europeans was, however, in sharp 
contrast to the discourses that was formulated by more sceptical personae amongst 
the Chinese literati, based on traditional Sinocentrism, and bolstered even further 
when observing the marauding Portuguese and Dutch seafarers in the South. Thus, 
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two very different discourses of Europe were in play in China at the same point. It is 
interesting to note that for a substantial amount of time there existed considerable 
confusion on whether the referent objects of these two discourses were even the same; 
if the Portuguese traders were indeed from that harmonious continent the Jesuits 
referred to. The missionaries themselves preferred to do little in order to clarify the 
confusion. 
 
The challenges Christian missionaries first met with, when arriving at the Celestial 
Court to spread a cosmology centred in Europe, is well illustrated in the dry comments 
from one of the writers of the History of the Ming: 
"[A] native from the great western ocean came to the capital who 
said that the Lord of Heaven, Ye-su, was born in Ju-tê-a [Judæa] 
which is identical with the old country of Ta-ts’in [Da Qin]; that this 
country is known in the historical books to have existed since the 
creation of the world for the last 6,000 years; that it is beyond dispute 
the sacred ground of history and the origin of all worldly affairs ; 
that it should be considered as the country where the Lord of 
Heaven created the human race. [11] This account looks somewhat 
exaggerated and should not be trusted.”415 
 
Proselytizing to the elite of the Celestial court of the Middle Kingdom that the 
metaphysical centre of the world was to be found far outside of their borders, was no 
easy task. However, Ricci’s strategy was to take advantage of the relatively open 
intellectual environment of the Ming court, and seek to convert them through 
communicating a picture of Christianity and the Christian lands of Europe, that 
emphasized commonality between Confucianism and Catholic faith and 
philosophies.416  
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The image of Europe that was spread in both oral and written form, was an image 
sharing deep commonalities with China, but with a crucial difference in how the 
European nations, through the Catholic faith, had succeeded in fulfilling Chinese 
ideals to a larger extent than what the Chinese themselves had. These books that 
introduced Europe to the Chinese public, in their own language, would go on to 
become textual monuments that were amongst the most central of the few sources 
upon which the Chinese perceptions of Europe was based. 417  A leading Chinese 
scholar on the affairs of foreign countries, and Catholic convert, Xu Guangqi, would 
exemplify this in his writings. "Xu's Europe—Ricci's Far West—was shaped by the 
context in which Ricci used it to narrate his relationship with China: a relationship 
that expressed both commonality and polarity (…) both are bound to the same 
commitments to good order and moral conduct ('rites and music'). But this is also a 
relationship of difference, as China, unlike Europe, is shown to be unable to meet the 
subsistence needs of its people."418 In the end it is this view of commonality that, 
argues Brook, allows Xu to integrate his view of an idealized Europe with his China-
centeredness. Europe was simply offering ideas to help and supplement Chinese 
practices in striving for the same common goals and ideals.419  
 
This same discourse was propagated further by Giulio Aleni, whose detailed treatises 
had even more impact on the Chinese discourses that did Ricci’s, through his Zhifang 
Waiji (Records of Areas outside the Administered Realm) of 1623, as well as the later 
account of Europe in Xifang Dawen (Answers to Questions about the Western Region). 
Europe was again described as an admirable utopian society, a pinnacle of Confucian 
virtues, painstakingly described as the second pillar of civilization, which also entailed 
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talking down the grandeur of the world’s other large civilizations centres, such as 
India.420 Overall, the Jesuits, and their Chinese followers amongst the literati at court, 
constructed a representation of Europe as a continent that was unitary enough to be 
comparable to the Chinese empire. Under the auspices of such a Confucian-Christian 
synthesis, Europe and China were still united as the two pillars of civilization, around 
which were scattered various barbarian and semi-barbarian peoples. This narrative, 
of course, drew on the same discursive constructs that had earlier constructed Da Qin 
and Fulin as a mirror-civilization across the seas. The Sinocentric worldview was thus 
altered to include Europe, under the understanding that Europe in essence was 
Chinese as well, and at times even more accomplished in achieving, through 
Christianity, the perfection of Chineseness. "Last but not least, the good image of 
Europe was sought dissociated from the sea-roving Fo-lang-chi [Folangji] (from ' 
Firanghi', or Franks, the Arabs' name for the Portuguese) who had already earned 
themselves a bad reputation in China." 421  The reason for trying to steer clear of 
connections with the European traders, the discourse about whom fell squarely within 
the standard view of the barbarian peoples to the South, should be fairly clear. 
 
The tensions present in the representation of Europe as an ideal same, was however a 
difficult discourse to hold stable. Although the Chinese themselves did not have first-
hand experiences of Europe, this utopian version was more difficult to swallow when 
the continent was no longer as legendary as in the Han dynasty, but was 
communicated by the continuous presence of foreign scholars arguing in favour of a 
foreign faith. The Chinese scholar Dong Han, writing in the mid-1600s, was not at all 
convinced, when writing about the missionaries’ presence: 
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The assertions he makes are all more or less like this, fantastical and 
exaggerated and without any basis whatsoever. To allow these little 
monks to come from across the ocean and bring their heterodox 
doctrines into the Chinese realm [zhonghua] and then to permit 
them to build temples where they can live and to support them with 
lavish official salaries is to delude people's minds and cause them to 
turn their back on the true Way. Who is responsible for this?422 
 
Such strains of thought were to become increasingly normal in the Chinese public 
discourses towards the end of the Ming dynasty.423 The main sources for Chinese anti-
Christian feelings was based on Confucian religious scepticism, belief in Chinese 
superiority, and Chinese fear of political subversion.424 Driven in part by Buddhist 
monks, but arguing on a Confucian basis, the text Shengchao poxie ji (聖朝破邪集, 
Collected Essays Exposing Heterodoxy), was an early publication in this strand, that 
in 1640 argued for the fundamental incompatibility between Chinese traditions and 
Christianity.425  
 
Chinese scholars and officials were also increasingly connecting the dots between the 
missionaries and their countrymen trading in the South. As Zhang summarizes this 
development: ”Artillerymen and four cannons validated the material connection that 
Shen Que and other enemies of the Jesuits had been trying to establish between the 
missionaries and the Folangji, a connection that the Jesuits had been at pains to 
hide.”426 As earlier mentioned, the Southern traders was designated to the pre-existing 
representation of Barbarians from the South. As such this barbarian subject position 
made it even harder for the Jesuit to uphold and reproduce the representation of an 
utopian Europe. Thus, the second representation of Europe, that would increasingly 
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find traction, would be based mainly on differing signifiers. Whereas the Chinese self-
representation, and as such their ontological security, overall remained in spite of the 
challenges to this from the Manchu conquest, China as “civilized”, “moral”, 
“religiously righteous”, and “superior”, was in this representation contrasted with the 
Europeans as “barbarians”, “immoral”, “heathens”, and “inferior”.  
 
As such, two conflicting, and irreconcilable, representations of Europe would struggle 
for dominance in the Chinese elite discursive sphere; one idealized, furthered by the 
Jesuits, seeking to find a common ground between the ‘world’s two great 
civilizations.’ The second was the descriptions of the European merchants and pirates 
in the South, these being radically different from the Chinese, merely another tribe of 
untamed Barbarians coming from the South. However, the already ongoing debate in 
literati circles about the unity of East and West, or the distinctiveness of ‘Chineseness’, 
would soon take on an entire new meaning, as the increased European mercantile and 
imperial expansion into Asia, contributed to making the latter representation 
dominant.  
 
The Qing dynasty, founded by the Manchu in 1644 after their invasion across the Great 
Wall, eventually firmly adopted the Sinocentric world view.427 From being regarded 
as barbarians themselves, they were to jealously defend their position as rulers of the 
pinnacle of civilization, surrounded by other barbarians. 428  Ironically, the Qing 
dynasty was thus steeped in ontological insecurity from the very start, and it can be 
argued that precisely the closing of the intellectual sphere brought forth by this, made 
the dynasty even more unprepared for the ontological challenges the European 
encroachment would later entail.429 In the following years an increasing, although still 
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very limited, number of Western foreigners would seek audience at the court of the 
Celestial emperor. No longer only in a role of missionaries, but as emissaries from the 
seafaring nations of Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK. These emissaries were 
regarded as similar to the other seafaring barbarian nations arriving to China from the 
South seeking to offer tribute in exchange for favours and trade rights. Foreigners 
from the European countries were thus sought physically contained in conditions 
close to house arrest on Macau and in Canton (Guangzhou), and the diplomatic 
envoys were sought integrated into the existing Chinese tribute system. This set of 
ritualized relations with foreign countries, was a system of tributes along which the 
key tenets of Chinese relations with the other countries in the region was ordered, 
based on the ideals which had been developed into a considerable corpus of traditions 
by the end of the Ming dynasty.430  
 
The famous edicts of the Qianlong emperor, written in response to the Macartney 
expedition sent by King George III in order to seek European-style diplomatic 
relations and trading rights, thus showcase the discourse regarding Europe as merely 
a jumble of distant, small, barbarian, people. As the Qienlong emperor thus 
emphasised in his letter to the British king George III:  
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Europe consists of many other nations besides your own: if each and 
all demanded to be represented at our Court, how could we possibly 
consent? The thing is utterly impracticable. (…) If you assert that 
your reverence for our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to 
acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so 
completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to 
acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly 
transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, 
however, adept the Envoy might become, nothing could be gained 
thereby.431 
 
The discourse treating Europe as a unitary continent sharing common virtue and 
civilizational aspirations with the Chinese, thus lost out to the inclusion of the 
European countries within the discursive structure regarding foreign barbarians.432 






In tracing the historical background of the Chinese concept of Europe, two general 
traits are notable in light of the forthcoming chapters, in that they formed the context 
for the Chinese ontological security crisis that was to come. First, the history of ideas 
briefly rendered here demonstrates China’s separate position compared to Turkey, 
Russia, or Iran, and how their political culture far more separate from direct 
interactions with the European continent. Furthermore, the Chinese were second-
hand receivers of knowledge. They were not discovering Europe, but being presented 
to it by the European themselves, seeking to propagate an image of Europe that 
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furthered the Europeans’ various agendas. Secondly, it is interesting to note that from 
the very first rumours of a civilization at the opposite end of the Eurasian continent 
found its way into Chinese written sources, that image was deeply entwined with the 
Chinese definition of their Self, and their ongoing political and philosophical 
discussions. The relative Chinese separateness from the European continent, and the 
resulting anchoring of the idea of Europe in Sinocentric cosmology, were key 
background factors for the ontological security crisis that emerged after the Opium 
Wars.  
 
On the basis of this longue durée of Chinese representations of Europe, there were a 
number of important developments in 18th and 19th Centuries that carried particular 
weight in shaping the Chinese discourses to where it was at the eve of the great 
disruption in the mid-1800s. As this background chapter has demonstrated, the role 
Europe played for Chinese ontological security changed notably over the course of a 
few centuries, as the concept of Europe took on a variety of radically new meanings 
and got emmeshed into a complex interplay of internal and external economic and 
political developments. As seen, the ancient mythical narrative of Europe, would give 
rise to two distinct set of narratives informing the scholarly community from the late 
Ming dynasty onwards; namely the one, widely propagated by Jesuit missionaries, of 
China and Europe as brotherly civilizations sharing a universal, syncretic cosmology, 
and the second subsuming Europe into the classic Sinocentric discourse as barbarians 
from afar. In a sense, one can here trace the fault lines of the competing cosmologies, 
one centred on the Imperial capital and China, the other on Western-derived 
universalist concepts. The tensions around these two constructs is arguably echoed in 
Chinese ontological discourse even today. 
 
Throughout late Ming and the Qing dynasties, though, increasing hostility to 
Christians in China would degrade both the status of the Jesuits, and the knowledge 
of Europe that they sought to spread. Nevertheless, the works written by the Jesuits 
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would have an impact that would survive a relative hiatus, and become one of the 
main sources for the Chinese view of Europe, when a scholarly scramble for 
knowledge about Europe followed at the end of the 19th Century. When the Qianlong 
emperor formed a vast manuscript library, both Alani’s treatises of the world, and the 
comprehensive world map of the Jesuit Ferdinand Verbriest, were included.433 As the 
editors of the library commented on his Chih-fang wai chi: “Its descriptions are mostly 
strange and unascertainable, and must contain many exaggerations. But the world is 
so large that nothing is really impossible. We include this book for the record and to 
broaden the mind with strange matters."434 The discourse of Europe in China had at 
that point seen the discourse of Europe as another barbarian state become dominant 
at the Chinese court. Significantly, the stabilization of the representation of Europe as 
merely another inferior, barbarian and morally peripheral set of entities, easily 
subsumed into the existing Chinese/barbarian distinction of Chinese cosmology, 
meant that the repeated defeats and later subservience under the industrialised 
European countries, would be even more destructive of the Chinese cosmology and 
the ontological security of traditional Chinese identity. This challenge to the 
ontological security of the traditional Chinese world order, and the Chinese polity 
itself, would give rise to repeated political and philosophical convulsions over the 
coming century. As will be detailed over the coming chapters, Europe would as a 
result emerge as a nodal point for the various Chinese attempts at re-establishing an 
ontological security narrative for a reformed Chinese polity. 
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Chapter 5: Re-Establishing Ontological Security in a 
Eurocentric World – Diachronic Analysis of the 
Early Modern Era 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: The Ontological Rupture 
 
From the mid-1800s onwards, China’s idea of Europe moved from a matter of 
peripheral Chinese academic interest to being acutely relevant for the future of the 
Chinese polity, as the imperial system collapsed in the midst of an ontological security 
crisis brought on by the European influx. A crisis that still reverberates in the country 
today. Faced with an increasing number of military and political defeats, sustaining 
the foundational narrative of the Qing dynasty’s traditional Sinocentrism became 
increasingly difficult towards the end of the 19th Century. This fundamental 
ontological security crisis would set the stage for a number of political projects to re-
establish some sense of ontological security for a Chinese polity, for which a 
reformulation of the discourse of Europe was central. The next century of Chinese 
history, from 1840 to 1949, would witness tremendous changes on all levels of societal 
life, and a chaotic succession of attempts at reformulating the Chinese identity in ways 
that would re-secure the ontological status of a Chinese polity. The Chinese concept 
of Europe would naturally go through a process of fundamental reassessment in this 
period, and the role of the European continent became essential in the efforts to handle 
this fundamental ontological rupture. These efforts were ranging from the denial of 
the need to reformulate the traditional identity narrative, to a number of efforts at 
transforming the identity and practices of the Chinese polity, based on capitalist or 




The tumultuous years following the First Opium War of 1839 were distinguished by 
a number of external and domestic crises. 435   These contributed to a somewhat 
tortuous process of realization amongst Chinese decision-makers and literati that the 
European powers had moved from a scholarly curiosity, to a peer competitor in the 
island kingdoms in China’s near abroad, and had finally become a fundamental 
challenge to the Sinocentric world order, not only on a military, but also on a political 
and ideological level. This rupture of the fundamental identity narrative of the 
Chinese Empire was driven by military defeat first at the hands of the Western 
imperialist powers. Later on, arguably even more significant, was the additionally 
humiliating defeat at the hands of the Japanese ‘little brother’, whose relative 
openness to the technological and political systems of Europe and the USA had 
provided the military edge to hit an endogenous blow to the centre of the Sinocentric 
system.436  
 
The two most consequential examples of Chinese ontological security-seeking in light 
of this shattered worldview will be treated in this chapter. As such this chapter’s main 
purpose is to link current day China-Europe relations with the longue durée of the 
Chinese concepts of Europe, through focusing on how these have influenced the 
various inflexion points of the modern Chinese polity in the repeated attempts at 
reformulating its ontological security basis throughout the last century. The first such 
case of ontological security seeking, is the rise of the Self-Strengthening Movement (
自强运动), ca. 1861–1895, a coalition of intellectuals and policymakers that sought to 
preserve the Qing dynasty and the traditional Confucian political order through 
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adopting Western technology as a means of strengthening the empire’s capabilities in 
face of the European powers.437 The foundational narrative, in sum, related to Europe 
as ‘Threatening and Advanced’; an Other that was fundamentally threatening to 
Chinese ontological security, but that was sought contained through selective use of 
European technologies and military methods. The second case analyses the aftermath 
of the First Sino-Japanese War, the May 4th Movement, and the Early Republic Era, ca. 
1900-1915, when a new Chinese state and national identity were articulated and 
sought realized by the political generation of Sun Yat-sen. This ‘Ideal Europe’, 
reflected a radically changed foundational narrative for the attempted new Chinese 
polity, where Europe became reconstituted into an ideal in a new narrative 
embedding Western notions of linearity and development, and Europe as an ideal Self 
for a Chinese polity to draw upon. In a sense, these two early cases roughly relate to 
a process of firstly understanding Europe and the forces of colonialism and 
modernity, and secondly seeking to implement these into a reformed Chinese Self.  
 
 
5.2 The Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895): Making Sense of a 
Decentred China 
 
The Self-Strengthening Movement (自强运动), also referred to as the Western Affairs 
Movement (洋务运动) emerged in the last half of the 19th Century as a means of 
addressing the old imperial system’s political, economic, and ontological security 
crises through implementing institutional reforms, and adopting Western technology 
as a means of strengthening the empire’s power and legitimacy.438 As the Chinese 
literati sought to measure up the new presence of European merchants and navy 
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vessels at the eve of the Opium War, it was, as detailed in the historical background 
chapter, from a point where the discourse of Europe as a Great Civilization reflecting 
the Chinese, had lost out to the discourse of Europe as Barbarians distinct from 
civilization. The discourse on the Europeans was not only indifferent with substantial 
streaks of xenophobia, however, it was first of all very limited.439   
 
Amongst the wide realms of barbarian countries, then, another group of nations did 
not matter much in terms of the priorities of the celestial court. Ontological security 
was indeed an issue that plagued the Manchu Qing dynasty, but rather through their 
efforts at establishing their non-Han dynasty as a legitimate succession to the mandate 
of Heaven, for which purpose they were strongly asserting traditional imperial 
discourses and practices.440 On the level of practices, the persistence of the traditional 
Sinocentric worldview was clearly demonstrated also through the setup of the proto-
diplomatic system dealing with the European traders and delegations, where there 
was no separate arm of the sophisticated imperial bureaucracy to deal with 
“foreigners” a notable exception of sorts being the office of periphery affairs, tasked 
with handling relations with Russia.441 “Foreigners were not treated as citizens from 
countries considered to be equals. They were ‘barbarians’, to be restricted to 
peripheral areas only.”442 Safely established within the traditional Chinese worldview, 
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a handful of barbarian merchants, pushy though they were, did nothing but affirm 
the normality of the ways of the world. 
 
A number of further key political traits of this era are difficult to grasp unless analysed 
through a logic of identity, illustrating the degree to which ontological security is a 
salient approach. The need to uphold the traditional practices underpinning the 
ontological security of the Chinese empire took clear precedence over territorial and 
monetary issues, to an extent that is fairly inexplicable within a logical framework of 
interests predicated on the ontological paradigm of the nation-state. “It seemed worse 
to allow more Sino-barbarian contacts than to lose territorial integrity or 
sovereignty.”443  The imperial court’s main focus was on regulating ritual contacts 
with the barbarians, whilst territorial and judicial concessions, such as the ceding of 
Hong Kong, was regarded as lesser challenges, given how these did not challenge the 
existing ontological framework to the same degree. Thus, in the aftermath of the First 
Opium War (1839-1842), little heed was at first given in court circles to the matter of 
the European colonial powers. In spite of a few officials arguing for the need to learn 
from Western technologies, the overall sentiment was adherence to the traditional 
ontological narrative underpinning the Celestial Empire.  The Opium War defeat was 
brushed off as an incident, and Chinese victories in smaller following skirmishes taken 
as confirmation of the continued superiority of the Chinese Empire.444 In face of the 
potentially devastating blow to the existing world image, the forces pushing for a 
strategy of cognitive dissonance were strong. Hence the Chinese representative 
negotiating the Treaty of Nanjing gave in to almost all of the British demands, whilst 
simultaneously communicating to the emperor his success in constraining these 
barbarians. Prejudice and outlandish theories about the European merchants, 
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missionaries, and diplomats that had made China part of their circuit was still rife. It 
was a matter of debate amongst the literati and high officials whether the English had 
legs bestowed with a knee joint, or whether they would simply be unable to get back 
up should they be pushed over. 445  Renewed warfare, and renewed defeat to the 
European colonial powers did, however, make it increasingly difficult to stabilise the 
established identity narrative, and Europe would soon come to the fore of the 
domestic debate over the identity of the Chinese polity. 
 
5.2.1 Discovering the Barbarian Civilization 
After 1860 and the defeat in the Second Opium War (1856-1860), a realization grew 
amongst the literati that the Western presence represented a qualitative break with the 
status quo of handling the barbarians of the Southern periphery. Scholars and officials 
would increasingly start referring to a “changed situation”, when discussing the 
challenges faced by the Qing empire post-Opium War.446 This change in the discourse 
implied the presence of a radical new challenge, for which radical new solutions 
became an option. This led to a scramble for information following the Opium Wars, 
at which point it became clear to a growing number of members of the scholarly elite 
that the developments in the Far West could no longer be ignored.447 Among the works 
written in the search for information about this new European threat that had 
suddenly manifested itself, the work of Wei Yuan¸ a prestigious scholar and advisor 
to high ranking officials of Southern China, stands out.  The Illustrated Treatise of the Sea 
Kingdoms was a landmark investigation, finalized four months after the 1842 Treaty of 
Nanjing. 448 The Treatise is a textual monument in the Chinese discourse on Europe, 
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due to its position as the first major, and widely read, Chinese investigation into the 
political and geographical specifics of the European continent. 449  The Illustrated 
Treatise thus eventually became, in the aftermath of the Second Opium War onwards, 
widely disseminated and read. It went to three revisions, adding additional empirical 
material, and numerous reprints, and was even translated into Japanese where it had 
a considerable impact on the Japanese view of the new European presence in the Asia-
Pacific.450   
 
Given the limited information available to Wei and his contemporaries, amongst their 
key sources were precisely the Chinese dynastic histories and the Jesuit treatises 
detailed in the preceding chapter. In his opening essay on Europe, Wei thus notes how 
the continent was earlier known as Da Qin, similar to what the Chinese once termed 
themselves. 451  Nevertheless, Wei Yuan’s main contribution was not to decentre 
China’s position in the world, but rather the opposite. He anchored the European 
presence firmly within a Sinocentric framework that did not fundamentally challenge 
the ontological security of Imperial China, by focusing mainly on their role in 
challenging the maritime periphery of the Chinese suzerainty system. A discourse that 
was in continuation of the narratives of Europe established in the later dynastic 
histories that he referred to. The approach is made clear from the outset through the 
geographical structure of his work. The Illustrated Treatise is not organized according 
to the European concept of continents, that he was familiar with, 452  but subdivided 
into six parts based on six major ‘ocean-regions’, implicitly centred on the Chinese 
landmass. Following up this discursive orientation, his policy prescription was 
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aggressive diplomacy using the well-known strategy of seeking to “use barbarians 
against barbarians”, in order to drive the Westerners from the Southern seas, and 
revive the traditional tributary system.453 
 
Wei’s description of Europe was also very much shaped through the lens of traditional 
Chinese historiography, with its emphasis on the rise and fall of a large unified 
empire, and the conflation of spiritual and political leadership. In particular, the 
Chinese worldview was prevalent in the understanding of the role of the Pope in 
Rome. As Leonard phrased it; “For Wei, the aggressive drive for profit was a direct 
consequence of the lack of virtue and sound political values in the West. And, of 
course, it was the primary cause of European expansion in Asia.” 454  Although 
barbarian, Wei tells his readers, Europe once was a unified continent ruled by the 
political-spiritual figure of the Pope that ruled on behalf of heaven.455 However, in the 
current era, after the fall of the Roman empire, the vast empire had splintered, 
although the pope continued to play an important political-religious role equivalent 
to the Dalai Lama in Tibet.456 The idea of Europe as a related continent in the West had 
thus not disappeared completely, but whereas the Chinese had reunited again under 
the imperial system, Europe had, in this discourse, remained fragmented due to 
lacking political virtue. Thus, Wei Yuan’s treatise is linking the signifiers “barbarian”, 
“splintered”, “immoral”, “profit-driven” to the Chinese empire that in comparison 
epitomes “civilization”, “unity”, “morality”, and “righteousness-driven”.   
 
The Illustrated Treatise did, however, take the step of realising that the Western 
presence although being barbarian, was a qualitatively different challenge than what 
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China had earlier encountered, pointing out that the European presence and their 
advanced weapons technology was something that China had not experienced in 3000 
years.457 As such, he warns that the status quo will not be equivalent to stay the 
onslaught, but in line with the general discourse of the Self-Strengthening Movement, 
he argues that the barbarians need to be studied in order to drive them back; 
“Carefully study the four inner barbarians in order to control the four inner 
barbarians, if you do not carefully study the outer barbarians, the outer barbarians 
will be in control”. 458  The studying would, importantly, not entail seeking to 
implement any of the European practices, that was termed as barbarian. For Wei Yuan, 
the foreigners were not a source of political and moral inspiration, rather they were 
akin of a ‘Sputnik Moment’ spur for the importance of restating traditional Chinese 
values and statecraft.459 
 
Another textual monument, written some years later, Xu Jiyu’s Short Account of the 
Maritime Circuit was pivotal in developing the discourse from Wei Yuan’s regard of 
Europe as politically well organized and technologically competent barbarians. 
Rather, Xu acknowledged Europe as a civilizational centre, although of lesser moral 
value, in a non-Sinocentric world. Xu’s period of ostracism from the court following 
the publication of his account speaks volumes about the ontological security 
challenges even a not particularly flattering account of the world beyond the Chinese 
periphery posed for the foundational narrative of the Chinese empire.460 The 1865 
Tongzhi restauration did, however, bring Xu back to the fore, as he was made a 
member of the Zongli Yamen, the new board for foreign affairs, and later the director 
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of an institution founded to teach Western knowledge to the Chinese.461 When the first 
Chinese resident diplomat travelled to Europe in the 1877, Xu’s book was his primary 
source of information about the continent.462 
 
Like Wei Yuan, Xu Jiyu drew upon both Western sources—ranging from the Jesuit’s 
treatises to material from contemporary missionaries—and Chinese sources. 463 
Importantly, the text differs from the preceding ones by offering an adjusted discourse 
about Europe, a discourse that implicitly also challenged the Chinese discourse of 
their own place in the world. Even though Xu continued to use the term “barbarian” 
(夷) for the Europeans, Europe was treated and described as a civilization in its own 
right.464 It is notable that unlike Wei Yue’s description of the world as subdivided into 
ocean regions around a Chinese centre, Xu Jiyu is basing his geography on the latest 
available European maps, subdividing the world into constituent continents. He 
emphasizes that Asia is the largest, though, and spends considerable time pointing 
out the glories of China, as if to make up for the fact that geography has relegated it 
from the centre of the earth.465 Xu notably took care to start out with a short description 
of the Qing Empire, explaining how it was not appropriate to cover it in detail in a 
treatise of the world outside of it, but spared time to establish that “The master of Asia 
is China”.466 He does also squarely admit to the reader the things he has learned from 
the European sources that took him by surprise, such as the fact that the sun revolves 
around the equator.467  
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In his description of Europe (歐羅巴), it is emphasized from the beginning that Europe 
was the continent where rose the Roman Empire that “Han histories called the country 
of Da Qin. Before the end of the Five Dynasties, Rome did fall, and Europe was 
fragmented into warring states”.468 As the further text expands upon, at length in in 
the cases of Italy and Greece, Europe is being recognized as having a long historical 
tradition as a civilization, that developed largely without Chinese influence. However, 
the fragmentation of European unity demarcates a fundamental difference as opposed 
to the Chinese empire.  
There are numerous tribes, but when speaking only of large 
countries, there are around ten. The people are by nature careful and 
exact, and good at manufacturing devices, and they excel in using ships so 
within the four seas there is nowhere they have not been.469  
 
Thus, the introduction on Europe also serves to illustrate two other points that Xu was 
keen to emphasize: first, a repeated assertion of the innate technological abilities of the 
European peoples, that plays into the ti/yong dichotomy of Chinese as morally 
superior, but Europe as technologically superior, that were to become the dominant 
trait of the new ontological security narrative of the era.470 Second, what a good idea 
it is to borrow technology in order to strengthen oneself. Xu emphasizes, on a note of 
reassurance, that the fearsome art of cannonry, whose consequences the Chinese had 
suffered recently during the Opium War, was originally invented in China, and the 
Europeans only belatedly caught up and learned how to utilise it.471  
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Europe possessed, furthermore, a higher level of culture than the Chinese barbaric 
periphery, and a level of technological progress and government organization that 
allowed for both economic wealth and military power. Thus, “for Hsu’s [Xu’s] 
readers, who in later years began to search for models outside of China, his 
introduction to European states provided appealing suggestions for further study. 
(…) European nations thus began to serve as models for Chinese in search of modern 
political forms and the secrets of state power.”472 Overall, Xu’s textual monument 
relates a discourse defining Europe as a new ‘Other’ to China through a set of 
interrelated signifiers that emphasizes China as being united, Europe as being 
divided; China being large and glorious, Europe small and peripheral; China being 
morally dominant although technologically lacking, Europe being technologically 
adept but morally inferior.  
 
This discourse, based on a new narrative where technological sophistication and 
civilizational/spiritual prowess was no longer linked, but separated, the new 
fundamental ti/yong narrative thus opened for the possibility of retaining ontological 
security based on traditional Chinese identity, even when having experienced defeat 
by modern technology. This ti/yong narrative was based on the paradigm of 中学为体
西学为用 (Chinese studies as essence, Western studies as function).473 As summarized 
in Levenson’s pioneering work on the era’s history of ideas, the Self-Strengtheners at 
the court saw the anti-Westernizers’ isolationist ideas as self-defeating, and instead 
argued that: 
The only alternative to outright destruction of Chinese civilization 
by foreign conquerors was selective innovation by dedicated 
Chinese traditionalists. To justify their proposal in the special sense, 
to satisfy their will to believe that Chinese superiority was still 
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unchallenged, they emphasized that these areas of innovation from 
the West were areas on only practical value, not of essential value. 
Western knowledge would be used only to defend the core of 
Chinese civilization, and it would not impinge on it. (…) This 
rationalization, whereby something of Western culture could have a 
place in China and yet by kept in its place, was an article of faith for 
a whole school of Confucian-official westernizers, the ‘self-
strengtheners’474 
 
Amongst the most prominent and consequential voices in favour of such an 
ontological realignment at the Chinese court in the latter years of the 19th Century, was 
Li Hongzhang, a diplomat, general and politician.475 Through Li’s changing fortunes 
at the Chinese court, he would press the cause of self-strengthening on a broad range 
of sectors, from founding arsenals to seeking school reforms, even sending Chinese 
students abroad for military training in Germany, and inquiring in vain for the 
possibility of having more educated at West Point in the USA.476 In his diplomacy he 
was a main promulgator of the, at the time, rather revolutionary view, that Europe 
ought to be recognized as a culture on par with China. He was the first official to treat 
foreign relations as relations amongst equals, and was also an admirer of the 
successful Japanese efforts at modernization.477 His views of the sameness of China 
and the Western powers is well illustrated in a statement, quoted by Bland: 
 
 The truth is, that at present the foreigners are powerful and the 
Chinese feeble. And whence arises the power of the former? It 
certainly is not innate in them, but depends on the fact that ‘the 
requisites of Government are sufficiency of food, sufficiency of 
military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler’ 
(Confucian Analects). And how is the weakness of China to be 
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accounted for? This is also not innate, but is a result of the truth of 
the above axiom not being fully realised.478 
 
This excerpt echoes the earlier discourses of Europe being fundamentally on par with 
China within a shared universe, in which it was possible, as indeed had happened, for 
countries of a foreign barbarian continent to grow powerful by adhering to familiar 
Chinese virtues better than the Chinese themselves.479  
 
Even after the Zongli Yamen was founded by reformers as an early foreign affairs 
office, the institution was still very much peripheral in the bureaucratic system, with 
sparse resources and direct access to the key personnel in court.480  Nevertheless, the 
decay of Sinocentrism became gradually apparent in the decades from 1850 to 1890. 
Amongst the most evident symptoms, was that the practice amongst the gentry of 
comparing foreigners to animals abated, including the transcription of European 
countries’ names in characters with animal radicals, most prominently the dog-
radical. 481  A similar trend is well summarised by Hao and Wang, noticing that: 
“Changes in the use of key terms give eloquent testimony to this progress in 
understanding the West. Affairs in connection with the West were in the main called 
‘barbarian affairs’ (i-wu) [夷务] before the sixties, ‘Western [lit. Ocean] affairs’ (yang-
wu) [洋务] and ‘Western learning’ (Hsi-hsueh) [西学] in the seventies and eighties, and 
‘new learning’ (hsin-hsueh) [新学]  in the nineties.” 482  This change constituted an 
important new discursive framework for the coming number of Chinese diplomats 
that would, for the first time in the history of China, embark on diplomatic missions 
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to Europe, in order to secure their fledgling empire through embryonic engagement 
with the European diplomatic community. 
 
5.2.2 Meeting Europe Face to Face 
In the years following the Opium Wars, the Self-Strengthening Movement gathered 
pace during the related Tongzhi Restoration reform programme (1860-1874).483 This 
move towards realising the importance of knowledge of the West,484 as Wei Yuan had 
advocated, laid bare the extremely limited range of the Chinese literature on the topic. 
In seeking to address this shortcoming, a range of key texts of an entirely novel kind 
came into being, namely the first-hand accounts originating from newly instated 
diplomatic fact-finding missions to Europe and the USA. The most influential of these 
are the first-hand accounts relied to the Zongli Yamen. The missions would tend to 
travel abroad for over a year at the time, staying in the UK and France in particular, 
but also visiting a fairly wide range of other Western countries, from the USA to 
Sweden. The accounts were published in multiple editions, often including 
commendations from high-ranking political figures in form of forewords or title 
calligraphy, and they became central in disseminating knowledge about the West, as 
well as narratives about the West, and Europe’s place in the world next to China.485  
 
Key amongst these first political travelogues that would shape the Chinese discourses 
of the identity configuration between themselves, Europe, and their respective places 
in the world, were Zhang Deyi’s dispatches from his mission in the years 1866-1872. 
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They cover in fragmented, but extreme details his experiences and knowledge 
gathered from the trips to the European and American capitals, spanning from 
discussions of European children’s games to fire brigades, fashion, swimming 
lectures, and contraceptives. 486  Amongst the dispatches one can still trace the 
continuation of the self-strengthening discourse, although with a notable change in 
the evaluation of Europe, as exemplified when he describes a scathing conversation 
he had with a young overseas Chinese studying Catholicism in the US, reproaching 
him that  
I pity your stupidity (…) This Jesus, born 1,860 years ago – during 
the reign of the Han Emperor Pingdi – spoke his fine words for the 
instruction of the West, instruction accepted since by the peoples of 
Europe, to whom they are a blessing; Confucius, born some 550 
years before him- in the time of the Zhou Dynasty – left the tradition 
of his great words and deeds for the instruction of Asia (…) Why do 
you, an Asian, reject this for something else?487  
 
The idea articulated is the notable step of accepting the Western European culture and 
political system not only as a technological civilization in itself, but also one that is a 
moral civilization in its own right. The civilization is still regarded as alien to the 
Eastern Chinese one, but not necessarily as immoral—only different. However, the 
Chinese civilization was recognized as the oldest and senior one, allowing Zhang his 
sceptical attitude to throwing away millennia of Chinese learning in favour of ‘only’ 
centuries of learning from the Europeans.488 This preoccupation with civilizational age 
as a mark distinguishing Chinese society has continued to play a central role in 
Chinese ontological security. Even the Communist Party’s revolutionaries taking 
dubious archaeological evidence in favour of declaring China the “world’s oldest 
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continuous civilization”, a term that to this day continues to be invoked repeatedly by 
Chinese delegations abroad, as detailed in later chapters.  
 
Even more radical discursive change are also found in the dispatches relayed home to 
the Imperial court, such as those by Guo Songtao’s mission in the years 1877 to 1879; 
“I feel that of the many necessary things which would help us to govern our country 
well and establish a solid base for national wealth and strength, these two [railways 
and telegraphs] would enable us to establish a state which would remain strong for a 
thousand years”489 Guo did, however, also go considerably further in pioneering the 
suggestive thoughts that the political and economic models of Europe, were “well-
ordered, enlightened, and methodical”490, and perhaps even worthy of being emulated 
by China. 
In Europe people have been competing with each other with 
knowledge and power for the last 2,000 years (…) have evolved a 
code of international law which gives precedence to fidelity and 
righteousness and attaches the utmost importance to relations 
between states. Taking full cognizance of feeling and punctiliously 
observing all due ceremonies, they have evolved a high culture on a 
firm material basis.491 
 
This constituted a radical break with the current ti/yong discourse that had established 
a temporary sense of ontological security for the Qing dynasty based on the sharp 
division between European technological superiority, and Chinese political and moral 
superiority. As such the publication of these thoughts caused an outcry amongst the 
literati and at the court, leading to the journal getting banned and even the printing 
plates being destroyed.492 
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There were however also dispatches reflecting ideas of a less radical bent, that 
reaffirmed the foundational narrative of the Chinese as superior in essence, albeit 
struggling to measure up to the technological level of Europe. As Liu Xihong, vice-
minister to the UK, described it, “I informed these people of the fact that we Chinese 
base our culture on the pursuit of righteousness rather than the pursuit of profit”493 
And following in the similar vein of separate political laws for the two civilizations, 
although Liu was very much in favour of studying European technology, he 
emphasized that this should be limited and within the purview of Chinese traditions. 
They concentrate on such miscellaneous tricks, using boats and 
vehicles made to bring in profit, and firearms made for killing, trying 
to produce more and more of such things to become wealthy and 
strong. How can we call all this useful, real knowledge? Since the 
beginning of history, China has endured longer than any other 
civilization, and has produced a hundred and several dozen sages 
one after another (…) The depths of our philosophical discussions 
greatly exceeds those of the West.494 
 
To this he also added sharp rebukes towards the Japanese reforms that demanded that 
Western laws and costumes should be utilized, pointing out how this broke with the 
idea of the spiritually superior Eastern civilizations.495 
 
The dispatches of Xue Fucheng had a particular impact, and his journal from the 
mission from 1890 to 1893 became standard study material for the 1901 civil service 
examination, exemplifying the centrality if these texts for the Chinese literati in 
dealing with the knowledge of and from the West.496 Being an ardent supporter of 
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importing European technologies and traditions, he finds ontological security through 
creating a discourse that is reminiscent of the old idea of Europe as a parallel 
continent, although according to Xue, a continent that was in its days inhabited by 
Chinese themselves. 497  As such, since the Westerners originally had borrowed 
everything from boats and clothing from the Chinese, why could not the Chinese 
borrow things back in return?498 As such, the fundamental narrative upon which the 
Self-Strengthening Movement sought to restore Chinese ontological security was 
reinstated, namely that there may be another civilization present on the globe, but the 
Chinese empire remains the senior one in moral, racial, and historical terms. 
 
As demonstrated throughout this analysis, the key discursive changes that the 
Chinese idea of Europe went through in the period after the Opium War, were firstly 
that of recognising the presence of another great power centre outside of China itself. 
Secondly, Europe was increasingly acknowledged as another civilizational centre. As 
illustrated in the preceding sections, this did provide an entirely different ontological 
challenge for the Sinocentric system, and during the Self-Strengthening Movement 
this ontological crisis was sought addressed through the ti/yong narrative that gave 
the Chinese civilization a privileged moral and spiritual quality as opposed to Europe. 
As summarized by the viceroy Zhang Zhidong in a missive to the Emperor: 
In order to render China powerful, and at the same time preserve 
our own institutions, it is absolutely necessary that we should utilize 
Western knowledge. But unless Chinese learning is made the basis 
of education, and a Chinese direction given to thought, the strong 
will become anarchists, and the weak, slaves. Thus the latter end will 
be worse than the former.499 
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The narrative of “Chinese essence, European technology”, drew upon the ancient 
Buddhist concept of Essence-Function (ti-yong 体用 ) denoting the hierarchical 
relationship between fundamental truths, and the concrete utilization of these at a 
given point in time, as a way of trying to recreate a foundational narrative 
underpinning the ontological security of the Qing dynasty, even in the face of the 
abrupt end of two millennia of technological superiority. This attempt at recreating 
the foundational identity narrative of the imperial Chinese polity opened for a 
particular range of policies; those of the Self-Strengthening Movement. Eventually, as 
will be treated in the next chapter, these efforts proved not sufficient to secure the 
imperial courts position, neither in material nor ideational terms.500 Thus, few years 
later the idea would form that the old Chinese essence (体) in itself was flawed, and 
that yet another radical reformulation of the Chinese ontological position seemed 
necessary, based on European political and philosophical contributions. In this 
fundamental process, the role of Europe was pivotal, in the negotiations and 
discussions over the foundational Chinese narrative of themselves.  
 
 
5.3 The Republic of China (1900-1915): Aspiring for the Family of 
Nations 
 
The most important attempt at re-establishing the ontological security of a Chinese 
polity after the fall of the Qing dynasty, was politically manifested in the foundation 
of the fledgling Republic of China in 1912. This polity was founded on the basis of 
discourses and practices that were largely of European origin, and thus symptomatic 
of the further step in the role of Europe for Chinese ontological security; namely that 
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of the change from being an alien and barbarian, to being an alien civilization, and 
then to being a civilizational standard. This monumental shift came about as part of 
an ongoing cultural and political reorientation over decades, that also saw Chinese 
intellectuals actively translating and disseminating numerous European texts, from 
Montesquieu to Bentham and Adam Smith.501 This would intensify during the years 
of the early Republic, notably through the ideational legacies of key scholar-politicians 
such as Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, and a number of other intellectuals of the May 
Fourth Movement. Such ideational reorientation tends not to come lightly, however. 
In addition to the preceding crises brought on by the European colonialists, yet 
another shattering blow was dealt to the Chinese ontological security through their 
humiliating defeat against their former subordinate Japan in the First Sino-Japanese 
War in 1894-95. A former part of the Confucian civilizational area, Japan had 
embarked on a route of rapid Westernization and industrialization, and the defeat 
thus brought also an immense endogenous challenge to the traditional Chinese sense 
of ontological security. 502  This gave further impetus to a renewed drive of 
introspection and ontological security seeking. 
  
In this period of dramatic political, social and economic upheaval, a number of 
narrative entrepreneurs thus contended to formulate a new foundational narrative for 
a Chinese polity that could harness legitimacy both domestically and externally. As 
Callahan points out with regards to the various political ideas and practices of the era, 
“The goal was to construct a “China” worthy of being saved.”503 The main movement 
that sought to do this was the Republican one, which although politically struggling 
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and at times unable to assert political authority over a territory populated by assorted 
warlords, was pioneering a rally around a new narrative for the Chinese, as an equal 
and sovereign state in the world. A key difference is how Chinese ontological security 
seeking now focused more on how the image of China could be accepted by the 
international society on premises not of traditional Chinese making. For this purpose, 
three deeply interwoven discursive developments took place; firstly the Chinese 
polity was sought re-formulated on the European derived basis of the nation-state, a 
discursive development with little precedent This new ontological basis of the polity 
was then sought legitimized internally and externally. The latter most notably 
exemplified through the act of a fractured China to join in the First World War on the 
side of the allies, seeking to shore up both its internal and external ontological security 
in the process. In all of these three aspects of the ontological restructuring of China, 
the role of Europe was essential. 
 
5.3.1 From a (Chinese) World to a (European) Nation 
Laying the necessary ideational foundation for the emergence of the Republic of 
China, was a broad intellectual movement, whose reappraisal of Europe was integral 
to the foundational narrative on which these narrative entrepreneurs sought to 
establish a new, ontologically secure, Chinese political community. The concept of 
Europe, and European polities, amongst large swaths of the political and intellectual 
community, thus moved rapidly from being regarded as a threat to China’s 
ontological security, to something more akin to a saviour. This fundamental change 
in the discourse of the West was spearheaded by journalists and intellectuals such as 
Yan Fu, and most notably, Liang Qichao.504 The key tenet of this intellectual new wave 
was one of seeking to find the right balance between traditional Chinese and Western 
                                                 




impulses, for which purposes Liang argued for a whole range of educational, 
institutional and social reforms.505 Liang, as one of the leaders of this proverbial “Age 
of Openness”, 506  spearheaded translations of an enormous amount of Western 
literature into Chinese,507 and disseminated these widely through journals such as his 
immensely successful New Citizen Journal (新民叢報 ),distributed at around 100 
locations in China as well as in Japan and overseas.508 He thus was a key part of the 
movement to increasingly disregard the role of traditional Confucian culture towards 
a vision of universal progress; the world’s nations commonly developing from old to 
modern societies.  
 
As Liang argued in his article On the Scientific Spirit and Eastern and Western Culture, 
there is no essential difference between Eastern and Western civilization within the 
universal scientific and social laws. It was mainly historical developments that left the 
countries on two different steps on the universal timeline of progress. 509   
After the Qin and Han dynasties the anti-scientific spirit pervaded 
in China for 2000 years; after the fall of the Roman Empire, the anti-
scientific spirit also pervaded in Europe for more than a 1000 years. 
(…) Until the Renaissance, after which the health of the intellectual 
community gradually was reinstated.510  
 
The Scientific Spirit is, goes the key tenet of his thinking, not about a division between 
East and West, but between old and new, traditional and modern.511 An integrated 
aspect of Liang’s implementation of the range of Western philosophies, was also the 
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Social Darwinist thinking that was widely in vogue around the world in that era, in 
which the yellow race that was closest to the white one, now needed to stand up in 
order to avoid suppression. This notion entailed, of course, an intense discursive 
struggle about who exactly was constituted as the “yellow race”, as “Han”, or as 
“Chinese”.512 As summarized by Hughes, “reformers and revolutionaries saw their 
priority as salvation of the racially-defined national community in the international, 
Social Darwinian struggle for survival.“ 513 In a sense, this served as a convenient 
shortcut for naturalising the idea of a universal, linear progressive timeline. 
 
The key found by the new ranks of the Chinese intelligentsia,514 was that the Chinese 
people for historical and geographical reasons had never conceived of their country 
as a nation-state, but rather as the unbounded polity of the Tianxia “all under 
Heaven.” This discourse of a world without borders under Chinese tutelage, came 
increasingly to be regarded as parochial.515 The challenge was thus to change the 
Chinese foundational narrative, from one based on the emplotment of the traditional 
tianxia-view of the world as an extension of the Chinese empire. Instead, these 
narrative entrepreneurs sought a polity based on the Westphalia-derived idea of its 
ontological security being based on the emplotment of nation-states, guojia 国家, as 
the legitimate way of ordering large-scale communities. With regards to the 
composition of this nation-state, Liang Qichao argued for a more civic nationalism 
than the Han-based ethnic nationalism on which Sun Yat-sen’s early struggle against 
the Manchu Qing dynasty was predicated.516 As one part of this effort at redefining 
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the Chinese ontological security imaginary, Liang went so far as to suggest an entirely 
new historical narrative. In his manifesto-like outline of a new Chinese history; New 
Historiography, he further follows up on the fundamental narrative of a universal 
timeline for development, by deciding to subdivide Chinese history not into the usual 
dynasties cycles, but into linear periodization.517 This subdivision was, significantly,  
based on those found in traditional European historiography; Antiquity, Middle Ages, 
and Modernity.518 The force of historiography was thus central to his work, and to his 
argument that China had to follow the European experience through changing from 
a tianxia to a nation-state: “Historiography is of the principal and most essential 
knowledge, it is the mirror of a nation’s people, and the wellspring of a patriotic heart. 
In present Europe [歐洲], nationalism has led to flourishing, guiding countries to 
civilization.”519 As summarized by Levenson; “It was the contraction of China from a 
world to a nation that changed the Chinese historical consciousness.”520 Jin and Liu 
have  attempted to quantify this change through looking at a wide database of Chinese 
writings, and tracking how there was a shift in the frequency of the terms tianxia and 
guojia around that point.521 This process was part and parcel of ontological security, 
to which Liang Qichao contributed to propagate a new narrative that could bestow a 
Chinese polity with the an ontologically security identity both internally and 
externally. This, through a new emplotment of a foundational narrative of for 
ontological security, imported from abroad; that of the nation-state.522   
 
Overall, this new movement drew upon a discursive construct of fundamental 
similarity between Europe and China. The signifiers of these monumental texts 
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contrasts sharply to those from even only half a century earlier, and links Europe as a 
“modern”, “nation based” , “white”, “developed” with a China that is “backwards”, 
“civilizational”, “yellow” and “developing”, thus underlining the commonality 
between the two civilizations along a shared temporal arc, in spite of Europe being in 
front on the same road of modernity. Liang had to take the extra step of admitting 
that, although he was an optimist about the chances to restore China in a family of 
nations, right there now there was a large gap separating the Chinese from the modern 
European civilization.523 To be sure, the narratives drawn up in this discourse differ 
immensely from those of the Self-Strengthening Movement only a few decades earlier, 
representative of the degree of rapid change in the social and political landscape of 
the late Qing empire. 
 
By the eve of the First World War, almost the entire Chinese intelligentsia was united 
behind the new suggested narrative of seeking China’s rebirth as a fully-fledged 
nation-state.524 In particular as the country’s intellectuals were being swept up in a 
new wave of cultural renewal, namely the New Culture Movement, sprung out of the 
May Fourth demonstrations following the Treaty of Versailles. Being described as akin 
to a Chinese Enlightenment,525 as Fung laid out in his treatise on early Republican 
philosophical debates, the realization of Europe as a necessary model had with 
immense speed become so commonplace that this was now a discursive framework 
that even the conservative voices was operating within, in sharp relief to the 
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conservative voices of the Imperial elites only decades earlier.526 As such, a radically 
new, European-inspired, national narrative was seeking to establish discursive 
dominance, and with it came the efforts at establishing a radically new, European-
derived, reestablishment of the Chinese polity; that of the Republic of China. 
 
5.3.2 Building a Nation from Loose Sand 
The importance of Europe in shaping the foundational narrative for this new polity 
was, even if arguably less so than Japanese and American influences, considerable. 
Europe formed the ideational and political backdrop for the efforts at re-establishing 
a foundational narrative for the new Chinese republic.527 The key figure of the early 
Republic of China, and revered to this day as the father of the modern Chinese nation 
in Taiwan, and increasingly also in the People’s Republic of China is the revolutionary 
Sun Yat-sen.528 Being himself a Western trained physician, and a baptized Christian, 
he began travelling around the globe seeking to drum up monetary support from a 
large diaspora of overseas Chinese that had come to establish themselves in the USA, 
Europe and in Southeast Asia. 529 The writings of Sun Yat-sen underline the same 
fundamental ontological narrative as those of Liang Qichao, with whom he shared a 
contentious relationship. 530 In sum, Sun’s programme is the creation of a modern 
Chinese nation, able to take on the construction of a modern Chinese nation-state that 
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could enter into the international, Western-based, society on an equal basis. As 
summarized by Sun:  
For the first time I understood that though the European powers 
achieved national wealth and power, they were not able to give their 
peoples full happiness. For this reason, European men of 
determination were still striving for a social revolution. I now 
wanted to create a single-effort, eternal plan which would 
simultaneously solve the problems of socialism, nationalism and 
democracy.531  
 
In his work, The International Development of China, Sun lays out a range of ambitious 
visions for how the Chinese polity could flourish, and the role the outside world could 
play in helping this come to fruition.532 Utilizing Hansen’s analytical approach, the 
linkages between the key signifiers here are those of a unifying time, when the 
essentially similar civilization, will allow for China to join the European countries in 
casting aside tradition in order to belatedly embrace modernity, and the American 
ideal of the Melting Pot, which will allow them to rapidly catch up.533 This approach 
is demonstrated through large scale plans of modernising not only roads and 
communications, “The Chinese are a stagnant race (…) It is the movement of man that 
makes civilization progress. China, in order to catch up with modern civilization, must 
move.”534 
 
Again, the role of Japan was an important inspirator for the idea of a form of 
modernization that was a common path on which all people could tread in order to 
achieve equality in the international family of nations. As exemplified in Sun’s famous 
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first lecture on Nationalism: “Previously, we thought that what the Europeans [歐洲
人] are capable of doing, we are not capable of doing, but now the Japanese are capable 
of learning from Europe, so it is clear that we can study Japan, we are able to learn 
how to resemble Japan, and thus know how in the future we can learn to resemble 
Europe.”535  At the heart of this new foundational Chinese narrative. Sun Yat-sen was 
arguing for China to get back to the state of a great country that it was before, although 
not as an essentially different civilization, but as a particular part of global 
civilization.536  
 
The key political manifesto of Sun Yat-sen, first enunciated in 1905 and thereafter 
developed into a guiding ideology, was the Three Principles of the People (三民主義), 
commonly translated as; Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Welfare (民族，民权
，民生), although the terms implied slightly different connotations than in the current 
day.537  Summarized in a series of lectures in 1924, he sets out a new vision for the 
Chinese polity; who they are, how they should organise, and what livelihood they 
deserve. For the purpose of this thesis it is the enunciation of the ontological basis of 
the Chinese polity that carries most significance, and the principle of nationalism does 
re-emphasize the centrality of the Chinese ontological move from a civilization to a 
nation-state, based on principles to a large extent drawn from European discourses. 
He points to how the West have successfully managed to be the first to develop, as the 
four main ethnic groups of the “white race”, successfully harnessed the power of 
nationalism:538 “China was a strong nation for several thousand years, but its obstinate 
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adherence to tradition caused it to fall behind Europe and America in strength and 
prosperity. After the Manchus conquered it, China became still weaker”539  
 
As Sun noted the Chinese traditional experience had elements with which to help 
enrich the global modernization efforts. “China was to learn from the West with 
regard to science and technology but to treasure her own unique ‘learning’ which 
created her identity and from which the West might also learn.”540 For example, how 
the new Chinese polity through policies of  a more socialist bent, may avoid some of 
the social ills and income disparity plaguing the Western.541 “Today, no nation is richer 
or stronger than England and America, none more civilized then France. (…) They 
have achieved admirable forms of government, yet their poor and rich classes are still 
too far apart”542 Being Christian himself, he points out that “compassion [仁爱] is also 
one of China’s virtues. In antiquity the greatest articulator of compassion was Mozi, 
Mozi’s doctrine of universal love, and Jesus’ doctrine of universal brotherhood are the 
same.”543 In this he also echoes some of the earlier philosophers treated in the previous 
chapter, that in engaging with the early missionary influx from Europe argued in 
favour of a syncretic morality between East and West.   
 
Of course, one should not underestimate the degree to which the traditional Chinese 
ways of hierarchy, rituals, and dyadic social frameworks did structure the narrative 
emplotment of the new polity. The struggle for an acceptable national ontological 
framework did, for Sun as well as for others, very much entail efforts at combining 
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European practices with Confucian traditions.544 However, it also drew upon the idea 
that China can contribute to the development to this common civilization, that is 
shaped by forces, drawing on the ideas of evolution, that shapes mankind in the same 
manner. As Sun formulated it: “In a nutshell, it is my idea to make capitalism create 
socialism in China so that these two economic forces of human evolution will work 
side by side in future civilization.”545 Nevertheless, there was a considerably angst in 
Sun’s lectures, presented after the First World War, when the struggle for colonial 
liberation had barely started. For instance, “Of the world’s 1.5 billion people, the most 
rich and powerful ones are the 400 million people of the white race in Europe and 
America. The white race takes this as a basis to go and exterminate races of different 
colour. […] and the yellow race of Asia is currently being oppressed and may before 
too long also face annihilation.”546 Reflecting the increasingly close ties between Sun 
and the communists in Moscow, it is telling that the big hope he sees in this gloomy 
picture, arrives in the form of the Russian revolution.547 He thus warns against letting 
the cosmopolitanism contended by parts of the May Fourth movement, be 
prematurely applied to the Chinese society, which first needs to see national 
liberation, before it can go on to embrace universality notions.548 “So in order for us to 
save China, the first thing to think of is how to restore nationalism.”549  
 
When the Chinese revolution began on 10 October 1911, Sun Yat-sen was indeed 
abroad, fundraising in Denver, Colorado, 550  , but his central role as an ideologue 
meant that he was appointed the first president of the newly formed Republic that he 
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long had been agitating for.551 He was, however, forced to abandon his position in 
favour of the army leader Yuan Shikai only 45 days later, as the republic failed to find 
a solid footing in the chaotic and contingent circumstances of early 20th century 
China.552 During the following Warlord Era, the Kuomintang , (KMT) Nationalist Party, 
co-founded by Sun, would regroup and slowly rebuild from their base in the Southern 
Chinese province of Guangdong, drawing on support from the Soviet Comintern, and 
joining, under Soviet tutelage, in a short-lived alliance of convenience with the 
growing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  
 
The fundamental reformulation of the ontological narrative of the Chinese polity that 
was rapidly constituting itself at the start of the 20th century, was not only relevant for 
the domestic political and discursive configurations. Illustrating how the 
configuration of a polity’s ontological security discourses is primary to the 
formulation of the interests of this policy, the new foundational narrative of the 
Chinese state fundamentally changed the material interests they were pursuing.553 The 
transition from the universalist empire, implicit in the traditional view of the tianxia, 
to a national-state imbued geographical delineation with a fundamentally different 
importance for the ontological security of the self. Borders suddenly mattered. 554 
Utilising Ejdus’ terminology, one of the key traits of the modern nation-state is how 
this identity emplotment introjects the geographical materiality of boundaries into the 
foundational narrative in a distinct way. 555  Thus, moving from a foundational 
narrative establishing ontological security on the logic of a nation-state, implied an 
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entirely different range of geopolitical priorities; handing off pieces of Chinese 
sovereign soil to foreigners were no longer a trifle but now a matter of national 
security. “Treaty rights which were irrelevant or trivial to the Qing diplomats became 
national values now."556 This change was also reflected in the diplomatic practices, as 
being a diplomat was suddenly elevated from a humiliating profession at odds with 
the existing ontological image of the polity, to be a prestigious call to secure China’s 
place as an equal nation-state. This change was also echoed in how the diplomatic 
service was organized.557  
 
The degree to which the discursive realignment towards a European-derived 
nationalism manifested itself amongst the leaders of the Chinese polity, was on exhibit 
through a number of crucial moments throughout the era, and was a key determinant 
providing rationale for the young regime to go to war.558 In a key move symptomatic 
of the will of the new Chinese republic to breach into the club of mainly European 
nation-states as an equal member, was the decision of the warlord and then the 
Beijing-based Prime Minister Duan Qirui, in 1917 to enter into the First World War on 
the side of the Allies. As exemplified in e.g. Ringmar’s account of the Swedish decision 
to enter the 30 Years’ War,559 the act of war may be a prominent way to anchor one’s 
identity, both externally and internally.560 This was in military and political terms an 
époque defining decision.561 Sending short of 100 000 labourers to the Western front, 
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although none of them soldiers around 2000 died in the war effort, this was the first 
time China voluntarily entered into an international conflict.562  
 
Even though there were certain direct material political gains to be potentially 
gathered for China, mainly to reclaim territory from the Germans, one of the main 
considerations for entering into the war can be viewed as that of Ontological Security; 
an act that would solidify the ontological security status of the new Chinese Republic 
both internally, and externally amongst the family of nations in the wold.563 China's 
entry into the war was a major turning point in its foreign relations.564 “The Republic 
self-consciously entered "international society" for the first time in its diplomacy of 
1918-20, agreeing to abide by the rules and norms that in theory governed 
international behaviour.”565 However, when China’s post-World War I demands were 
passed over at Versailles, in what was seen as a delegitimating snub from the Western-
based international community, large demonstrations erupted on May 4th 1919. These 
were spearheaded by the student community, that would spur on the ideas of the 
necessity to radically modernise Chinese society, culture and politics. 566  As Hunt 
pointed out, an increasing number of people drew from the unsuccessful earlier 
reform attempts the conclusion that “destruction of the old political and social system 
was the painful but unavoidable path to unity and order and ultimate renewal”.567 
Indeed, of the many movements tracing their lineage back to the ‘May Fourth 
Movement’, was one that would eventually be given that chance to formulate a new 
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This section of the diachronic analysis has demonstrated how the Chinese concept of 
Europe was intimately entwined with Chinese ontological security seeking. This role 
of Europe was amplified all the more, give the direct linkages from the European 
continent to the fundamental Chinese ontological security rupture that took place in 
the late 19th Century. In the span of a mere 50-year period, a dynastic imperial system 
lasting for millennia was reshaped in the forges of a number of revolutions, rebellions, 
wars and world wars. The two cases analysed in this chapter constitute key moments 
of discursive change, seeking to re-establish an ontologically secure Chinese polity, 
although in two diametrically different ways. The discourses of these two key eras 
thus coalesce around two foundational narratives relevant for how a Chinese polity 
should relate to Europe. As detailed, the late Qing dynasty’s self-strengthening efforts 
sought to readjust from traditional Sinocentrism to re-establishing ontological security 
through the idea of realising, and implementing, European technologies, but insisting 
on the superiority of Chinese traditions. This is famously summarized as the principle 
of ti/yong; taking the Chinese culture as the essence (体), whilst utilising (用) their 
technology. The second narrative, predominant in the case of the Early Republic, 
gradually leaves this idea of Chinese traditional political and cultural superiority 
behind. Instead it sought to establish a Chinese polity basing its ontological security 
on imitating not only the technology, but also the political and philosophical 
                                                 




structures of Europe, and seeking confirmation for this new identity also outside the 
borders of the Chinese polity itself. These changes in the basis on which Chinese 
political entrepreneurs sought to re-establish an ontologically secure Chinese polity, 
is embodied in the changing foundational narratives of this era. For these narrative 
entrepreneurs, the Chinese identity crises necessitated a renegotiation of the basis a 
Chinese political identity should be based upon, and implied a rethink of the 
fundamentals of what it meant to be Chinese, and how this Chineseness should relate 
to the world that had recently come crashing in their door. 
 
The development of the Chinese foundational narratives through this period 
decentred China, from the centre of ‘All under Heaven’ to a country seeking approval 
and a seat amongst the others in the European-defined family of nations. This process 
entailed a wholesale reformulation of the ontological essence of a Chinese polity, from 
that of a singular universal empire, to that of being one amongst the world’s two great 
civilizations, to that of being one nation-state amongst others. Overall, through this 
period, one can trace the development from the late Qing dynasty reformers’ concept 
of the use/essence, or ti/yong (体用), discourse within which narrative Chinese society 
should make use of Western technologies, without giving up on the radically different 
essence of Chinese civilization, to the new reformists’ discourses on how human 
societies all are evolving based on the same ‘universal laws’ (公理). This discursive 
development was inherently entangled with a similar discursive change of 
foundational narratives in which Europe played a key role, that of the ontological 
foundation of the polity changing from that of an imperial Tianxia, to that of a nation-
state after the European model. 
 
Analysing these narratives through the theoretical lens presented in the preceding 
chapters, these foundational narratives are identified and classified based on two 
main structuring features; the extent and modality to which Europe and the European 
countries are regarded as an Other, as related to the particular Self of the relevant 
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Chinese political project. Secondly, how Europe as a political, technological and 
ethical concept is regarded as tied to China in terms of the narrative’s temporal aspect. 
Intimately emmeshed with these radically new, repeated attempts at re-establishing 
an ontologically secure Chinese polity, was the fundamental reorientation of the 
Chinese discourse of Europe. In only a few decades the role Europe played for Chinese 
ontological security changed immensely; from being both alien and barbarian, to 
being an alien civilization, into becoming a civilizational standard for the former 
Middle Kingdom to strive for. Europe went from being a radically different Other 
challenging the core tenets of the traditional imperial foundational narrative, into 
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This era of immense discursive change, was also an era of continuous experiments at 
establishing new ontologically securely based governments, most of which were 
explicitly European-derived, whether parliamentary republics, dictatorships, Yan 
Shikai’s short attempt at constitutional monarchy, or the forthcoming communist 
takeover. The reformulation of the foundational narrative that was common to all of 
these efforts at re-establishing an ontologically secure Chinese polity, was closely 
entwined with Europe’s new role as an ideal Self, as Chinese policymakers for the first 
time in Chinese history, found their ontological security to a considerable degree was 
shaped in relation to to countries at the opposite ends of the Eurasian continent. The 
linking of China’s ontological security with its efforts at status-seeking amongst the 
extant great powers had redefined the rules of ontological security seeking, as this was 
now also a matter of ensuring recognition, and seeking to join in, a club of 
international peers.  This then opened a discursive space for a number of new policy 
options, such as joining in the First World War, that would have been inconceivable 
only decades earlier. Partly due to the unintended consequences of joining in the war 
in Europe, however, more radical political groups did also find a footing in this period. 
The cases of the next chapter thus analyse the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts at 
addressing China’s identity crises through a new modality of ontological security 




Chapter 6: A New China in a New World - Diachronic 
Analysis of the Post-War Era 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: Making Marx Work for China  
 
Emerging from a century of political struggle and experimentation with radical new 
modes of achieving ontological security, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
succeeded in realising a durable Chinese polity in 1949, after years of civil war, The 
renegotiations and tension regarding Chinese ontological security seeking did not end 
at this point, however. As such, the role of Europe in this new reformulation of a 
foundational narrative for China, was still in flux. Even though European countries 
after the Second World War played a lesser role in shaping Chinese identity 
narratives, it by no means ceased to be relevant. Thus, as representations of Europe 
changed, in line with the new ontological narratives, the Chinese view of Europe as 
an Other, and the role of Europe in the world, did also change at multiple points along 
the trajectory of CCP rule. The construction of the discourse of ‘Capitalist Europe’, 
entailed the move of the non-communist Western Europe from being considered more 
of a Self, to belonging to a particular category of Others within a new Chinese 
foundational narrative with global connotations. Over the later years of the 20th 
Century, the restructuring of the foundational narrative after the Mao era entailed a 
place for Europe as an ‘Equal and Useful’ Other, as the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) increasingly sought closer economic ties with the continent, whilst being 
sceptical of the challenge of Western-derived notions of political universality. 
 
This chapter analyses the changes in the Chinese discourse of Europe, as the Chinese 
discourse about themselves was renegotiated throughout the 20th Century. The focus 
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is on two main cases. First, the articulation and construction of the PRC’s ‘New China’, 
as the CCP sought to gain legitimacy for their foundational narrative of a Chinese 
state, in the years prior to and after the foundation of the People’s Republic. The 
second section of the chapter looks at the processes of change brought to the PRC by 
Deng Xiaoping’s reform efforts, and how these related to the then-Chinese 
leadership’s concepts of Europe and their European policies. These new ontological 
security narratives are analysed through focusing on Deng’s reconceptualization of 
the Chinese foundational narrative as part of his momentous reform effort from 1978 
onwards, and how this narrative was challenged by the Tiananmen demonstrations 
in 1989, after which a readjustment of the Chinese foundational narrative can be found 
in the sources. The tensions inherent in the foundational narrative as seen during the 
years since the PRC’s foundation, not only constitutes the basis of the current-era 
discourses analysed in the synchronic section, they also continue to be key fault lines 
shaping Chinese politics today. 
 
 
6.2 The CCP’s New China (1930-1955)  
 
In an iconic moment of 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the beginning of the new 
People’s Republic of China, declaring that the “Chinese people have stood up”.569 This 
new polity was from the beginning constituted in a discourse of a fresh start for the 
Chinese people, after years of subjugation and wars.570 With Mao at the helm, the CCP 
formulated a different foundational narrative to address the ontological insecurity 
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that lingered on from the end of the republic, drawing on Russian and European 
influences to reshape the Chinese polity.571  This new narrative entailed Europe being 
constituted in a different manner, and thus opened for a different range of foreign 
policies towards a Europe now split by the Iron Curtain. The Communist narrative 
did not emerge spontaneously, but grew forth from a number of earlier discourses 
drawn from the more radical fractions of the May Fourth Movement and the early 
KMT’s efforts at re-establishing an ontological foundation for a New China in face of 
imperialists from abroad and the end of the traditional imperial system within.  
 
This section thus focuses, firstly, on the period surrounding the establishment of the 
PRC, during which the CCP transitioned from a rurally based guerrilla movement to 
a governing body formulating and implementing a vision for one of the world’s 
largest polities. What was the role of Europe in seeking to create and sustain domestic 
and international legitimacy for this novel experiment in creating a new foundational 
narrative for the Chinese polity? Secondly, this section will investigate how Mao 
Zedong’s view of China’s position in the world drew up a particular discursive space 
for the former European colonial states. The somewhat shorter length of this section 
of the chapter, reflects the fact that the role of Europe was of less importance in the 
Mao era than in the days of the Early Republic. This thesis will, however, argue against 
regarding the European influence on Mao’s China as negligible. As this section 
outlines, it would be a mistake to underestimate the enduring persistence of European 
influence through the established ontological discourse narratives. As Moncada 
summarizes her analysis of the PRC elite’s view of the European integration project; 
the worldviews of the ‘Great Helmsman’ were of key importance in establishing the 
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discursive framework for both the Mao -era policies, as well as for his successors. 572 It 
is thus vital for the understanding of China’s developing discourses of Europe to 
understand how Mao’s concept of Europe resonated with his view of the Chinese 
polity and the world at large.  
 
6.2.1 Mao’s Sinified European Philosophy 
The shaping of the foundational narrative for the ‘New China’, cannot be 
meaningfully distinguished from Mao Zedong, an offshoot of the May Fourth 
generation, whose rise to instilling his own ‘Maoist’ ideology on the communist 
tradition and the Chinese state, was key.573 As Schram summarizes the role of Mao in 
creating a new foundational ontological narrative for the Chinese polity: “The 
problem of how to come to terms with the modern world, while retaining China’s own 
identity, still represents perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Chinese. Mao did 
not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the 
West as no Chinese ruler before him had done.” 574  Already from Mao Zedong’s 
founding years as a student, the key strand of his developing philosophy was the 
engagement with the core question of how the Chinese policy should be reshaped, in 
the tension between the traditional tenets of Chinese civilization and the new technical 
and ideological impulses from Europe.575 Whilst being extremely critical of a range of 
traditional practices, not the least the Confucian influence on teaching and ideological 
life, 576  he would at in his early days times also be quoting even Confucius 
favourably.577  
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Mao formulated this essential dilemma in a letter to his former teacher Li Jinxi in 1919, 
pointing out that in spite of his harsh criticism of traditional Chinese thought, 
“Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be 
transformed at the same time as Oriental thought.”578 The translation of the Marxist 
doctrine to Chinese would in itself highlight some of the issues and the tensions 
embodied in applying the intellectual doctrines of an urban German to the Chinese 
countryside. 579  However, Mao and his cadres succeeded in turning this unorthodoxy 
into an advantage, 580  as the newfound Mao Zedong Thought addendum to 
communism served to reinforce the uniqueness of China, is providing the founding 
narrative of the polity of the PRC. In this sense, Mao was drawing upon the narrative 
tenets of the ti/yong dichotomy as the ancient self-strengtheners, a narrative structure 
that also dovetailed well with his later works on the dialectical nature of reality and 
conflictual-driven political progress.581 As he summarized the notion, in a strikingly 
similar phrase; “Use the old to serve the new, use the foreign to serve China(古为今用
洋为中用).”582  
 
It is furthermore worth noting that the development of Mao’s communist convictions 
happened in an intellectual context intimately related with European events and 
ideological trends, as the intellectual trends in China had increasingly become 
                                                 
578 Z. Mao 2015, 132 
579 Schram 1991; Ebrey 2010, 288; Schram 1989; Yü 1993; Soo 1981; Knight 2007, 210–
14 
580 A typical example would be how the key term “proletariat” was translated into 无
产阶级, literally the class without property, thus far more expansive than the 
industrial proletariat referred to in the original discourse. See: Fairbank and 
Goldman 2006, 320–23 
581 Nathan and Scobell 2015, 31; C. R. Hughes 2011b, 131–32; Schram 1991, 101–2 




intertwined with the comings and goings of Europe.583 As Mao wrote in 1919 at the 
dawn of the interwar period, in one of his earliest pieces of widespread importance:  
In Russia they overthrew the noblemen, banished the rich, and the 
labourers and peasants together formed a Soviet government. […] 
The entire world has been affected. Hungary has risen, in Budapest 
a new government of labourers have also appeared. The Germans, 
the Austrians, and the Czechs are doing the same […] The wave of 
anger after sweeping the West then turns East. England, France, 
Italy, USA already have seen multiple great strikes, after which India 
and Korea have also seen a number of great revolutions. Yet other 
armies arise; in the Chinese area between the Great Wall and the 
Bohai Sea, the May Fourth Movement has broken out.584  
 
Key to note, this latching on to the Marxist European doctrine of national and class 
liberation, did in Mao’s mind offer a way out of Chinese subservience, and provide 
the Chinese nation with a chance to excel: “I dare to make one assertion; one day the 
Chinese people’s reform will be more complete than any other nationality, the society 
of the Chinese people will be more radiant than any other nationality. The great union 
of the Chinese people will be successfully achieved before any other region or any 
other nationality.”585 This had the added value of articulating a form of identity where 
the ontological security was tied to a representation of China as a revolutionary 
nation. No longer needing to seek approval from the international peer group of the 
Western-based ‘Standard of Civilization’ family of nations, this narrative construct 
defined them as part of the high-status peer-group of advanced revolutionary socialist 
states. Thus, the Chinese polity could re-establish a sense of greatness through the 
agency of the CCP, and the vehicle of Marxism. This basic narrative of a renewed 
China is still amongst the key ontological narratives for the leadership of the CCP, as 
will be illustrated in the synchronic section.  
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In one of Mao’s seminal theoretical works, On Contradictions(矛盾论), he emphasizes 
the similarity between the old era in China and in Europe, but acknowledges how the 
theory of Hegelian dialectical materialism and Marxist historical materialism was an 
idea developed in Europe, from which it spread, and “caused an enormous change to 
thought in China.”586 The development visible when comparing Mao’s view of the 
early days of the Second World War, with the Chinese efforts of the First World War 
are striking. Mao’s different conceptualization of the world, resulted in the view that 
the Second World War was a situation where the Allied powers of France and Britain, 
as well as Germany, where all fighting an unjust imperial war, that amounted to a 
predatory conspiracy towards the peaceful interests of the Soviet Union, that had been 
contributing to anti-Imperialist causes in Spain as well as against Japan in China. This 
alternative foundational narrative compared to the one motivating Chinese entry into 
World War I, demonstrates how the changed worldview implied a differing set of 
political drivers. In essence, the CCP like the Republic of China still sought external 
recognition through demonstrating adherence to international standards, but they 
sought this through membership in a different club of nations, but importantly, one 
that still held out the promise of equal treatment and status recognition.587  
 
In 1939 Mao Zedong co-wrote a comprehensive textbook on the Chinese revolution 
and the CCP, that went on to become a key text both within and outside the party. In 
it is given a comprehensive summary of the CCP’s new foundational narrative for 
China, and Europe’s place in it, that well illustrates the foundational narrative 
propagated. As he emphasizes, the Chinese society did historically develop after the 
same universal Marxist laws as the other nations on earth. However, the textbook also 
hails China as the world’s longest lasting civilization and praises the number of 
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accomplishments and inventions they invented before the Europeans. In spite of his, 
however, the foundational narrative of the Chinese nation is here depicted as one of a 
brave and freedom-loving peasantry that have throughout history rebelled again and 
again in pursuit of freedom.588 The role of the European, and later also Japanese, 
imperialists are thus fitted into the broader narrative of Marxist dialectics where they 
through their efforts at reducing China to a semi-colony inadvertently also 
contributed to the rise of capitalism and the degradation of the feudal system. As such, 
the Chinese people are currently faced with a double oppression, demonstrated by the 
double main societal contradiction of Chinese nationalism against imperialism, and 
the Chinese feudal overlords against the masses of the people. 589 However, in the 
midst of all this oppression, the CCP’s Maoist narrative still offers a privileged 
position to the Chinese proletariat, turning this weakness to a strength, as in “the 
colony and semi-colony of China, there is no economic basis for the socialist reformism 
like there is in Europe, so […] this class is the most revolutionary.”590 
 
This new foundational narrative sought to anchor the ontological security of China to 
a new set of radically realigned signifiers, where China and Europe are still considered 
as equal civilizations ruled by universal laws. In this the texts of the political 
entrepreneurs of the CCP reflected those of the early reformers such as Liang Qichao, 
in adhering to their then pathbreaking new narrative of regarding Chinese politics as 
being a part of a universal, linear history. However, the universal narrative adhered 
to was of a different kind. As such, the signs of Self and Other were now based on 
ideological divisions, so that the Chinese proletariat “masses” are identified as similar 
to the Western proletariat, whilst being juxtaposed to the “imperialists” and 
capitalists” that are he common enemies of the Chinese and the European 
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downtrodden. Thus leaving aside, of course, the detail that there were hardly any 
proletarians in China at that point. Instead of the main signifier being that between a 
“developed” Europe and an “underdeveloped” China, the signifiers contrasted a 
bourgeois Europe with a budding revolutionary China. Thus, in the Communist 
historical view, the Chinese had the chance to effectively claim they were more 
advanced than Europe, as the revolution had progressed further there. 
   
Illustrating again how the European “masses” had gone from Other to Same, is Mao’s 
foreword, at the dawn of the PRC’s establishment, to a European book compiled in 
Czechoslovakia for European communists in the CCP’s victory in China.: “The 
struggles of the people of China and the peoples of Europe are two inseparable and 
mutually reinforcing parts of a common cause, despite the fact that owing to the 
differences in the levels of social development the stages of the development of their 
revolutions are different.” 591  These are the same notions that can also be found 
amongst the numerous official communications and telegrams he would send in his 
official capacity, to various European countries, in particularly in the East Bloc, in his 
years at the helm of the PRC.592 This same discourse also formed the backbone of the 
foundational narrative of the new People’s Republic of China, as illustrated in his 
famous speech at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on the 21 
September 1949, at which point the rationale for the new polity of the PRC was 
declared, in a textual monument, the most famous section of which is perhaps the 
declaration that the Chinese People has stood up:  
 
The Chinese have always been a great, brave, and diligent people, it 
is only in recent era we have fallen behind. This falling behind is 
entirely the result of foreign imperialism and domestic reactionary 
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governments’ oppression and exploitation. […] From now on our 
nation will be included among the great family of the world’s peace- 
and freedom-loving nations. […] Our nation shall never again be a 
nation to be insulted.593  
 
Moreover, the final accords of the speech illustrate nicely how the PRC was based on 
the idea of a common universal civilizational narrative, where China had fallen 
behind, but wold now rapidly catch up. “The time when the Chinese were considered 
uncivilized is over, we will emerge in the world as a nation of high culture.”594  
 
If these notions sound familiar in their echoing of the thoughts of Sun Yat-sen’s ideas 
for the rejuvenation of the Chinese state, this is no coincidence. Mao repeatedly tapped 
into the narrative created by the early nationalist movement, seeking to draw upon 
Sun’s national standing by branding the CCP as the true heir to the independence 
struggle, and the only force capable of truly realising the Three Principles of the 
People.595 As illustrated in Mao’s quote that “The Chinese Communist Party is the 
Chinese people’s most faithful spokesperson.“596 In relating to this basic ontological 
proposition, he also argued that the long sought after equality that the Chinese was 
yearning for, such as rescinding the “unequal treaties” from the colonialist era, 597 
could only be won through the tutelage of the CCP.598 As Mao summarized it in the 
piece chosen to end the 4th volume of his selected works, underlining how the Marxist-
Leninist ideology worked so well because it was aligned with the realities faced by the 
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Chinese people: “Ever since the Chinese people learned Marxism-Leninism, the 
Chinese spirit turned momentarily from being passive to being active. From this 
moment onwards, the period of modern history where the Chinese people and the 
Chinese culture was looked down upon should be over.”599 In sum this discourse is 
drawing up a narrative where ontological security is sought reestablished, in a manner 
that demonstrates the continuation of certain discursive structures, but these are 
linked through a new set of Marxist-derived narrative innovations. Thus, these textual 
monuments of the early Maoist era continue to link the concept of China as essentially 
similar to Europe, in a foundational narrative of essential universality. However, the 
modality of this sameness is reformulated, in line with Marxist dialectics. Thus, China 
is reconstructed through the interlinked signifiers of being “suppressed”, 
“proletarian”, revolutionary”, “reborn”, whereas Europe is no longer an entity of 
antithesis to this identity, but divided into two main bodies of which one, the 
European proletariat and communist movements, share these signifiers in common 
with China.  
 
 
6.2.2 Europe in the Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic 
Of course, one of the key ways in which the heritage of the European intrusion on the 
Chinese territory was still alive in Maoism, was the extent to which the Chinese 
Communist Party’s expressed objective of fighting back against was related to Chinese 
lived experience. 600  However, Europe was by now a concept where the main old 
colonial powers from the earlier century of humiliation, France and Britain, were 
rebranded as part of the reactionary force in the world together with the US. 601 
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Meanwhile, the Eastern European countries were part of the communist movement of 
which China saw itself as a leading member.602  
The People’s Democracies of Europe (欧洲各人民民主国家 ) are 
currently consolidating themselves internally and uniting with each 
other to arise. With France and Italy in the lead, the anti-imperialist 
forces of the people in the capitalist countries are developing. […] 
We, and the world’s democratic forces, together, as long as everyone 
exert themselves, will surely be able to defeat imperialism’s plan of 
enslavery.603 
 
In Mao’s writings the old discussions about “learning from the West” and which role 
and value to bestow upon the ideas and technological practices entering China from 
Europe is given a new twist, as he details how the young educated classes were in 
eagerly travelling to Europe to learn from the West. However; “The aggression of the 
imperialists shattered the Chinese people’s pipe dream of learning from the West (学
西方). […] The Chinese [then] found Marxism-Leninism, the universally applicable 
truth, and the face of China began to change.”604 This debt to the introduction of 
Marxism as a Western concept, not branded foreign per se, but another Western 
concept, that this time happened to be right, is an oft repeated fundament. It defined 
for the new Chinese polity a time of awakening, when the Chinese people joined their 
suppressed brothers around the world in the struggle.605 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note how even Western Europe was considered as less 
of a capitalist ‘Other’ than was the United States. Mao Zedong was at times being 
particularly optimistic about the degree of contradiction between Western Europe and 
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the US, and how this could be utilized. This particular discourse was theorized first in 
1946, as Mao laid out a view of the world were Western Europe was not constructed 
as belonging in the American camp, as the Soviets and Americans regarded the 
situation, but rather as belonging to the “intermediate zone” (中间地带 ). This 
described the zone of superpower competition consisting of all the countries and 
continents in between the two superpowers; the US and the USSR. 606  “The second 
‘Third World’ is in Western Europe [西欧], consisting of highly developed capitalist,  
and also somewhat imperialist countries, these countries are on the one hand 
oppressing people, but on the other hand they are also being oppressed by the US, 
thus having contradictions with the US.”607 This worldview was further strengthened 
in the early 60s, when Mao redefined the concept to explicitly distinguish between 
two separate intermediary zones; one consisting of developing countries, and one 
consisting of the developed capitalist countries, Western Europe included. 608 
Following the idea that both these intermediate zones was chafing under the 
imperialist suppression of the US and the USSR, the strategic logic that was applied 
drew on the historical precedence of the “united front”, allying with competitors to 
defeat the primary enemy, such as the CCP’s alliance with their rival KMT against 
Japan.609  
 
This narrative of Europe as an unlikely ally against American imperialism opened a 
discursive space for the rapprochement between Mao and Charles de Gaulle’s France. 
As these two countries, in a diplomatic coup for China, established relations with 
Beijing in 1964, the idea that they could act as anti-imperialist leaders each of their 
own section of the intermediary zone took root, and gave France a diplomatic 
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importance in China beyond what its power basis should suggest.610 In the early 70s, 
as the split between China and the USSR had become a main concern of the Chinese 
leadership,611 Mao’s discourse about the global zones developed into the “Theory of 
the Three Worlds” (三个世界的理论), that was later picked up by Deng Xiaoping, and 
were to form a key international politics discourse in the years ahead.612 One of the 
tenets of this theory was how Europe was placed as a Second World country, as 
opposed to the Hegemons Soviet and the US in the First World, thus continuing the 
discourse of Western Europe as a potential ally against the superpowers. This 
discourse would, however, wax and wane reflecting the Chinese momentous 
rapprochement with one of these superpowers, the US.613 Nevertheless, this reinforced 
the discourse, that would run throughout Chinese European policies in the years 
ahead, namely that the European countries, and the EEC/EU in particular, may be 
useful for counterbalancing the superpower dominance, and in achieving a more 
multipolar world.  
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As such, Mao did on a number of occasions show support for the efforts at 
strengthening the European community, and countries’ place in the world.614 As Mao 
expressed in a talk with former British PM Heath: “You go on strengthen Europe, and 
we are happy!” (你们欧洲强大起来，我们高兴啊!)615 The discourse of this era thus 
showcased continuity from the earlier discourse of Europe as less of a radical other. 
The main new development in the political narrative, was that the discourse of the 
‘Three Worlds’ radically transformed the subject position of the Soviet Union to being 
part of the imperialist camp. The role of Europe in this renegotiation did, on the other 
hand, stay fairly stable, and as demonstrated the discourse did increasingly draw 
upon signifiers in common between both Europe and China, even when talking about 
the European countries to the west of the Iron Curtain. One of the more ironic twists 
is perhaps how the new discourse found common ground with what was once 
predominantly referred to as foreign, radically different, imperialist powers; instead 
Europe was in this new narrative linked to China, and differentiated from the USA 
and Soviet as a group that was “dissatisfied with imperialism.” 
 
 
6.3 The Reform Period (1978-1990) 
 
In a political feat singular amongst the world’s communist leaders emerging from the 
early 20th Century, he managed to set his country on the path to economic success, 
whilst simultaneously keeping the power of the party-system In the years after the 
death of Mao Zedong, in the aftermath of the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, Deng 
Xiaoping did eventually emerge victorious from the fractional infighting that 
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followed, 616 and launched China from relative isolation to actively embracing the 
outside world.617 Deng himself, was one of the veterans of the CCP, although his 
relations with Mao became fraught, and he fell out of favour and was condemned with 
his family as a rightist on a number of occasions.618 A challenging part of his political 
project was thus to construct a narrative that allowed for bridging the CCP legitimacy 
from the past, whilst simultaneously staking out a radically new course in defiance of 
the catastrophic policies enacted by Mao Zedong. In the famous resolution of CCP 
History, the party under Deng’s directions opted for the same 70% right - 30% wrong 
ratio as the Soviet Union did with Stalin, but simultaneously exalting Mao’s 
theoretical and political contributions. 619  
 
In this interlinked domestic and external renegotiation of the foundational narrative 
for a new era of the PRC under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Europe was also 
playing a part. Whereas most of the extant literature has tended to focus 
overwhelmingly on the role played by the USA and on Chinese domestic factors in 
one of the most momentous changes in Chinese history, I will argue that the European 
influence, although less pronounced, is still worthy of more attention than it has till 
now received. In particular, this section addresses the role of Europe in this new 
renegotiation of the Chinese identity and ontological security through two key 
renegotiations of the foundational narrative. Firstly, how Europe played a role in 
inspiring and shaping the reform efforts of Deng Xiaoping and his allies in the upper 
echelons of the CCP. Secondly, the role of Europe in Chinese ontological security 
seeking after the demonstrations leading up to the massacre of Tiananmen Square in 
1989 forced the existing leadership to readjust the Chinese national narrative, seeking 
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to address the tension between a rapidly reforming economic system, and a political 
system that was still firmly authoritarian.  
 
6.3.1 Opening Up China, and Embracing the European Example 
The Chinese opening to the US as one of the pivotal points of the Cold War has 
rightfully received an overwhelming amount of coverage.620 In this new renegotiation 
of the ontological status of the Chinese polity, however, the European continent, 
particularly France, still played an important, although often overlooked, role. For 
Deng personally, the experiences during his half decade in France from 1920 to early 
1926 as a young student were a formative period. 621 It was there he joined the very 
recently established Chinese Communist Party’s local arm. 622  As Westad would 
summarize about this cohort, that later came to power in the CCP’s upper echelons; 
“Common for all of them was a need to draw on the European experience to improve 
China, while resisting foreign attempts at dominating their country.”623  
 
As such, it was perhaps natural that the Chinese image of Europe also was strongly 
involved in Deng’s reformulation of the Chinese ontological security narrative. As 
detailed earlier in this chapter, Mao’s 1974 theory of the ‘Three Worlds’ had redefined 
Western Europe’s place in the PRC’s geopolitical discourse, from being part of the 
imperialist world, to being part of the ‘second world’. As such, these were countries 
that could join with China to mount resistance towards the imperialist powers of the 
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first world; USA and the Soviet Union.624 The strategic importance of a strong Europe 
on the USSR’s Western flank was strongly emphasized by Deng, who would also 
express his full support for Western European integration.625 As Deng said to the 
French President, “We attach, precisely, great importance to what happens on the 
European side. If the two Superpowers want hegemony they first have to control 
Europe. We agree with you that Europe represents an economic, political and military 
power. But the condition is that it is united.”626 The choice of France and Europe for a 
number of symbolically important official visits was, moreover, not coincidental. 627 
Importantly, the earliest of these visits were undertaken at a point when relations with 
the US were still uncertain, but all the Europeans countries visited had already 
formally recognized the PRC.628   
 
In a 1987 talk with the visiting Dutch Prime Minister, Deng Xiaoping utilised the 
occasion to present a sweeping overview of the reformulated foundational narrative 
for a new, rising Chinese polity. The narrative, neatly summarizes the discourse that 
had been by then presented in numerous other of his texts from the reform period.629 
In short, it reconfigures the historical arc of the Chinese narrative, through focusing 
on how the CCP as the transforming force of China, has diligently strived to better the 
conditions of the Chinese people. Although it made some grave errors on the road 
from the very beginning, it has continuously been seeking to learn from the errors and 
adjust its course. 630  Thus, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were 
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disastrous mistakes that the Party under Deng has now reviewed. Through learning 
and adjusting their course, the party is now instead delivering prosperity, “based on 
the facts.” The narrative weaves together the man-made disasters of the CCP under 
Mao not as a disqualifying horrendous policy failure, but as part of an ongoing process 
of creating progress though learning from successes and failure on the way. This then 
solved the dilemma of keeping on to the vestiges of Communist Party legitimacy 
whilst pursuing rather un-communist policies. However, at the end of the same 
speech, Deng raises the warning, also repeated multiple times,  that the leadership of 
the CCP is not to be questioned, and that the CCP still is opposing bourgeoisie 
liberation in the sense of “wholesale Westernization (全盘西化 )” of China, even 
though this opposition will now be fought in the schools through education, rather 
than Mao-style political campaigns. 631  This key division between economic and 
technological openness, and societal and political anti-Westernization, thus echoes the 
earlier ti/yong narrative of the Self-Strengthening Movement era. In many ways, it also 
set the stage for the democratization crackdown at Tiananmen Square two years later. 
 
In this reformulated foundational narrative of China and its place in the world, Europe 
had taken on a different role. As Deng formulated it in a keynote speech: 
 
When we analyse the world situation, we pay particular attention to 
Europe, Europe is the crucial region in determining peace or war. 
[…] We hope for a united, strong and developed Europe. […] We 
feel that Europe is relatively open, especially with regards to 
technology, with which we are relatively satisfied, although 
naturally not completely satisfied. So, we have determined the 
policy of working together with Europe, including booth Western 
and Eastern Europe, to develop friendly and cooperative relations.632  
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Thus, in Hansen’s terms, the set of signifiers linking and differentiating the Chinese 
concept of China and the Chinese concept of Europe, is no longer closely tied to the 
revolutionary ideals, where a revolutionary China could teach the still bourgeois 
countries of Europe the way towards a new international order. Importantly, this also 
explicitly negated the difference between the ‘two camps’ of Eastern and Western 
Europe, that was a key representation of the Mao era. Although the signifiers that 
linked China and Europe together as a common group in standing against 
imperialism, the discursive change under Deng saw both China and Europe along 
lines more reminiscent of the pre-Maoist Era, where Europe again was a source for 
useful learning for China. 
 
In other words, in the later Mao era, two distinct narratives were competing for 
becoming dominant, and informing the foreign policy of the PRC; one being the 
revolutionary image of China leading the Third World as the core of antihegemonic 
struggle against the US and the Soviets; the other image being that of regarding China 
as an equal member of the world of states.633 With the ascendancy of Deng, the latter 
narrative won out. This reformulation of the foundational narrative, opened up a 
range of new venues for the country’s foreign policies; for example the punitive war 
against Vietnam, formerly a brotherly, Asian, Third World socialist country.634 The 
main focus was no longer on being at the helm of the world revolution, but on 
developing the economy and opening up for foreign expertise to help in this regards, 
tellingly China thus rapidly went from being a net aid- giver to a net aid receiver. The 
Maoist alignment with the downtrodden revolutionaries of the Third World also 
evaporated, in line with the material support for Marxist guerrilla movements in the 
developing world.635  
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The importance of Europe as a source of technology and as a valuable trade partner 
for China’s development became increasingly prevalent as relations with the US 
evolved. Deng was also still supportive of a strong Europe whose “peaceful power” 
in the more relaxed international atmosphere was still a welcome contribution 
towards international multipolarity.636 In a 1985 meeting with the former British Prime 
Minister, these two economic issues were thus the main focus.637 Thus, Europe’s place 
in the overall Chinese narrative was still shaped by the discursive structures 
enunciated by Mao, where Europe was considered as less of an Other than were the 
hegemons of the US and Russia. As such, early on in the modernization process this 
eased the transition to increasingly regard Europe as firstly, a partner in economic 
development and technology transfers; secondly, this also lent itself to a view of 
Europe as not so much part of a hostile capitalist NATO camp, but as a Second World 
player with an outsized role to play in the cause of peace, through balancing against 
the first world hegemons of US and the Soviets. In particular, and as the years went 
on, exclusively; against the Soviet Union.  
 
It is interesting to note the degree to which Deng, and the Chinese political leadership, 
are referring to Europe (欧洲 ), even when talking to heads of states of separate 
European countries, and even during era of the Iron Curtain drawing a distinct line 
between the communist East- and the capitalist Western Europe. This may be 
symptomatic of a wish for greater European unity as a separate power pole in world 
politics. As Moncada points out, the Chinese leadership’s new foreign policy outlook 
with regards to the ‘two hegemons’, the Soviet Union and the US (苏美两霸) lead to 
them lending support to the construction of a stronger European camp at the Western 
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edge of the Soviet empire.638 In a talk with the European Community’s Commission 
Chairman in 1983, Deng emphasized that he had always hoped that for the sake of 
world peace, the European continent would unite.639 In earlier talks with the PM of 
Luxembourg, he declared himself a “warm-hearted supporter of European unification 
(欧洲联合的热心支持者 ).” 640  At a high level meeting with the French in 1985 
emphasising on his behalf the Chinese “hope that Europe will rise up even stronger. 
We have common interests. On the South-North issues, our two sides have common 
approaches and viewpoints.”641 In a stark historical rebuke of the late Qing he was 
explicitly cheering on the influx of outside knowledge and technology, admonishing 
foreign scientist to come, from both Western and from Eastern Europe.642 Still, political 
and ideological tensions lingered on, as reminiscent of the ti/yong dilemma of the late 
Qing dynasty officials, the CCP was happy to accept European technology, but far 
more weary of their ideas and political institutions. 
 
6.3.2 Chinese Characteristics and European Values 
The Deng era in Chinese politics was book-ended by two considerable ontological 
security crises, running from the post-Mao debacles following the Cultural 
Revolution, to the events of the Tiananmen massacre. In both of these cases, Deng 
succeeded in pushing through his position and, in spite of considerable opposition, 
solidifying his narrative of the Chinese polity. In the latter of these two crises, the role 
of Europe was arguably even more notable, as the fall of the USSR and the end of 
Communism in Eastern Europe made the Third Wave of democratization acutely 
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relevant for the CCP.643 In certain circles of the CCP and the Chinese intelligentsia, the 
European influence thus took on a particular strong hue as Deng’s reform years 
coincided with the growing reform and democratization movements in Eastern 
Europe. These constituted a fundamental challenge for the CCP narrative, and thus 
being a crisis for both the ontological security of the regime.644  
 
This was not lost on the CCP leadership, who feared that a Solidarity-style 
independent labour union could rise to challenge the existing political system, as had 
happened in Poland. 645  Deng, as summarized by Goldman, “believed strongly in 
technocratic and economic reforms, but only within the prevailing political and 
ideological framework, very much in the tradition of the nineteenth-century self-
strengtheners.”646 Although the China of the reform era was tirelessly pursuing and 
utilising foreign technology and economic know-how, the 19th Century yong, the 
inclination to also imitate Western political and civil systems from which they grew, 
the equivalent of ti, was treated with far more scepticism, although Deng had in talks 
with European officials played with the thought of Chinese elections in half a 
century’s time.647 Corroborating again the old ti/yong division, and pointing towards 
the handling of the demonstrations to come, Deng’s key speech to leading members 
of the Central Committee in 1986 emphasizes the need to uphold the Four Cardinal 
Principles, protect the dictatorship of the CCP, and to resist bourgeoisie liberalization, 
and pointing out in straight forward terms that with regards to the necessary rising of 
peoples prosperity; “We cannot do it without dictatorship. (…) The struggle against 
bourgeois liberalization will last for at least twenty years. Democracy can develop 
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only gradually, and we cannot copy Western systems. If we did, that would only make 
a mess of everything.”648 
 
The Tiananmen massacre did bring a sudden chill to the rapidly developing China-
Europe relationship. 649  In spite of the violent crackdown of the demonstrators on 
Tiananmen, the anti-Communist demonstrations in Europe only grew more powerful 
in the great democratic upheavals in Europe in the years 1989 to 1991. This aroused 
considerable nervousness amongst the Chinese elites.650 The response in aftermath of 
the Tiananmen massacre was likewise very much influenced by the vista of social and 
political movements in Eastern Europe. As Yahuda points out, “Deng regarded the 
clamour about human rights abuses in his country as less a sign of the existence of 
international norms of behaviour than as evidence of a dark plot by Western forces to 
undermine socialism in China and elsewhere by a sinister subversive policy of 
‘peaceful evolution.’651 Such understanding of these political trends was made very 
clear in the famous comments by Deng that were circulated in the CCP as his 
guidelines for the coming years, as a warning against the forces of political 
liberalization.652  
 
Deng Xiaoping and the remaining party leadership did, however, recognize that in 
light of the widespread demonstrations in Beijing, in the Chinese provinces, and 
against Communist regimes abroad, another readjustment of the fundamental 
narrative of the regime was apparently necessitated. As Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong thought had failed to capture the hearts and minds of the Chinese youth that 
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was living under radically different conditions than those of decades past, the solution 
was to tone down the communist rhetoric in favour of doubling down on the revived 
ideology of patriotism, and the historical memory of the 100 years of colonial 
suppression, and the Japanese invasion during World War II.653 As Hughes draw the 
long lines of this era: “Since then, the process of “reform and opening” has continued 
to seek an optimal balance between preserving the CCP’s version of the Chinese 
essence through patriotic education and the propagation of “national humiliation” on 
the one hand, while opening up the economy to globalization and training personnel 
who can create the wealth and power necessary to save the nation on the other.”654 
Old historical narratives focusing on grievances towards Western colonialists were 
brought back to the fore with gusto. The Western sanctions against China in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre was a convenient target for this new patriotic 
education, in which the CCP was now the embodiment of the national revival, instead 
of a force to overthrow Chinas traditional past.655 This forceful reassertion of the CCP’s 
narrative overcoming more liberal counter-narratives of this era is excellently 
summarized by Nathan and Schobell:  
As China joined the world decisively under Deng Xiaoping, the 
disagreement between those who favored and those who opposed 
Westernization (often referred to respectively as “liberals” and 
“conservatives”) became once again the fundamental cleavage in 
Chinese politics. In 1988, an officially produced television 
documentary series, Elegy for the Yellow River (Heshang), used 
language almost identical to that of late-nineteenth-century 
reformers to declare that China’s inward-looking, land-bound 
civilization was moribund, and that China would have to “join the 
blue sea” of Western culture in order to escape disintegration. The 
authors of Elegy went into exile in the aftermath of the pro-
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democracy demonstrations of spring 1989. The issue of cultural 
identity was taken over by conservative leaders who were concerned 
about cultural subversion by the West. Attacking what they alleged 
were American schemes to promote “peaceful evolution” and 
“bourgeois liberalization,” they tried to promote a nationalistic mix 
of Confucian and Sino–Marxist values.656 
 
 
The historical ramifications of the ontological rupture of the mid-1800s still resonated, 
as Deng’s narrative won out inside the CCP, and was further propagated 
domestically. As expressed by Deng, whilst pointing out how six of the G7 members 
establishing post-Tiananmen sanctions were the same as the Eight Nation Alliance 
invading during the Boxer Rebellion; “I am a Chinese, and I know of the history of 
foreign countries invasion of China. When I heard that the seven Western [西方
]countries at their summit meeting decided to impose sanctions on China, I 
immediately associated it with the history of 1900 when the Eight-Nation Alliance 
invaded China.”657 One can here see illustrated the adjusted foundational narrative, 
where the European proletariat is no longer the “same”, as the discourse have moved 
back to regarding Europe as a more unified actor. China’s 100 years of colonialism 
was no longer mainly the work of the European bourgeoisie, but of Europe and the 
West as such. Following from the logic of this fundamental narrative is the 
consequential political view that if the Western essence, ti, is too different from the 
Chinese one; then there is in fact no choice between Chinese democracy or Chinese 
autocracy, but between Chinese autocracy and chaos. Talking about his fear for chaos, 
as the precise antecedent of what China needs to develop, namely a peaceful 
environment at home and abroad, and pointing out in terms reminiscent of the 
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essentialist Mandarins of the past, how Islamic countries and others were so different 
from Europe that European ideas of civil rights did not apply to these societies. “It 
will not work to require all the countries in the world to copy the patterns of the 
United States, England, or France.”658 
 
The polity of the PRC was based on the narrative that the CCP was the actor that had 
managed to restore the Chinese place as an equal member of the family of nations. 
Thus, the leadership had long struggled to achieve legitimacy and recognition 
internationally: through the communist society in the early days, then as a Third 
World leader, and now increasingly as full-fledged member of the international 
society of states. Part and parcel of this was, as pointed to earlier in this chapter, the 
denunciation of unequal treaties, and the symbolical return of Chinese territory to 
Chinese sovereignty. After the momentous events surrounding the massacre of 
Tiananmen square had clearly demonstrated the extent to which the party leadership 
had failed to retain their legitimacy over large substrata of the populace, the task of 
rebuilding a polity that could defend its claim as the embodiment of an ontologically 
secure state fell eventually on China’s Third leadership generation, spearheaded by 
Jiang Zemin. Internal Party disagreements were quashed in favour of the official line 
of the events as counter-revolutionary riots brought on by Western interference,659 
thus drawing upon the established tropes of the threatening and fundamentally 
different West, including Europe.660 
 
The wounds from the imperial era were there ready to be ripped up by the political 
elite. As Deng angrily reacted to the news of the G7’s post-Tiananmen sanctions 
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against the country: “How many people’s human rights have they harmed around the 
world! Since the beginning of the Opium War, when they started invading China, how 
many Chinese people’s human rights have they violated!”661 In terms of the continued 
salience of the colonial era, the return of Hong Kong to Chinese hands became extra 
important, given the increased importance of a national narrative where suffering at 
the hands of foreigners were given more weight than the former Communist narrative 
that laid equal blame on the traditional Chinese political and social structure.  
 
The return of Hong Kong from British rule, was one of the crowning achievements of 
Deng Xiaoping, and took on all the more significance as this was one of the main focal 
points for the issue of ontological security with regards to Europe. From the outset, as 
Deng met in 1982 with Margaret Thatcher as the end of the British lease to the New 
Territories in 1997 was drawing closer on the horizon, the British PM’s stance on the 
future of Hong Kong was categorically rejected.662 Symbolically enough, when Deng 
declared that on the issue of sovereignty, China was not open to discussion, he quoted 
the historical precedence of Li Hongzhang, who had gained notoriety as the man 
signing the unequal treaty in the first place.663 On any other issue than sovereignty, 
though, Deng was thoroughly pragmatic, as summarized in the title of his suggested 
‘one country, two systems’ policy approach, exemplifying thus how the issue was in 
large parts one of seeking to avoid the ontological security issue of weakening the 
narrative of legitimacy for the CCP.  
 
As the handover was successfully negotiated, Deng explicitly drew on the 
colonialization discourse, in comparing Thatcher to the French President De Gaulle, 
as the latter had brought decolonialization to Africa.664 When the eventual handover 
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came to pass, four months after the death of Deng Xiaoping, the ceremony was 
unequivocally framed in terms of the same revival of the “Chinese People have 
arisen”, as was the declaration of the PRC itself nearly half a century earlier. As 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen described it: “It was raining the whole day of the 
handover ceremonies, but I am sure that all Chinese in the world felt it was a 
refreshing shower, washing away China’s humiliation.” 665  At the eve of the new 
millennium, a new Chinese polity, guided by the Chinese Communist Party, had by 
then symbolically asserted its grasp of the country further, in an event that underlines 





The foundational narratives underpinning Chinese ontological security through the 
two key periods analysed in this chapter, offer valuable background for 
understanding the changes in China’s policies towards Europe in this period. As the 
Chinese Communist narrative was renegotiated and reconstituted, so did Europe’s 
constitutive role change. The dominant discourse of Europe’s role as China’s Other 
saw three main changes through this period: first, the change from a suppressive 
colonial Other, to a battlefield in the midst of an ideological struggle in which China 
solidarized with sections of the continent. Secondly, after Deng Xiaoping’s reforms 
Europe was regarded as less ideologically relevant, but the idea of Europe as partly 
separated from the US remained, which amongst other things opened up for a clear 
support for the European integration project. This idea of a united Europe as a useful 
counterweight not only to Soviet Russia, but also to the USA, thus remained from the 
Mao years. Thirdly, the idea of Europe was still, however, that of an Other, and in 
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particular after the Tiananmen massacre, Europe’s role as an ideological subject 
position for China to define itself against became more dominant. 
 
Thus, there are two traits of the discursive dynamics of this period that carries 
particular salience for the PRC’s relations with Europe. Firstly, the reformulation of 
Europe from being part of the imperialist world, to being in the “second world”, thus 
less different from China and a potential ally against the hegemons. This entailed an 
early change in the Chinese strategy towards the continent, and also made Europe a 
less contentious place to learn from in the early years, before the opening towards the 
US progressed further. Deng’s support for Western-European integration was 
repeatedly asserted, commonly using the phrase of, “We have always wished for a 
united, unified, and strong Europe.”666The role of Europe as a less radical Other in the 
Chinese foundational narrative, also opened a useful policy space that gave Europa a 
particular place in providing two further important factors for the rising Chinese 
power; firstly, economic and technological cooperation; and secondly, contributions 
to ontological security, through certain European countries’ early diplomatic 
recognition of the People’s Republic as the polity representing the Chinese people.  
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Secondly, and even more relevant for the contemporary era, over the long century 
preceding this moment, the Chinese discourse on Europe had never fully solved the 
tension inherent in the old ti/yong divide, between universalism and Sinocentrism. As 
Taiwan, constructed as the last wayward province yet to be reclaimed, opted for 
liberalism and an open society in their ongoing reconstitutions of identity, mainland 
China chose in the same decade to go another route, through emphasizing Sinocentric 
narratives in a new hybrid form of “national-communism” as the basis for the polity’s 
ontological security. The role of Europe in the Chinese foundational narratives had 
during the CCP years been going in the direction of increasingly underlining Europe 
as an Other, compared to, for example. the narratives during the May Fourth 
movement. See fig. 3, for a summary cross-section of Europe’s place in China’s 
foundational narrative through the years covered by this section’s diachronic analysis. 
However, the conceptualization of Europe as a part of the West that was distinct from, 
and less Othered than, the USA was sustained. As such, Europe’s role in this 
foundational narrative was akin to that of being regarded as ‘Useful and Equal’, 
reflecting the old ti/yong dichotomy. Of course with the crucial difference that in the 
late days of the Qing Empire, the court did not recognize the ordering principle of the 
international system, whereas in this era, the Chinese political establishment instead 
sought to be recognized by the leading players of this system as an entity of equal 
status, but separate political values and traditions.  
Useful & Equal 
Europe 
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Overall this section has demonstrated Europe’s role in China’s ontological security 
seeking within yet a new system with a new set of rules. The discursive patterns and 
foundational narratives derived from this century of ontological and political 
upheaval, are still in play and remain amongst the factors guiding the policies of the 
current-day political leadership. Furthermore, the Chinese conceptualization of 
Europe is still related to the Chinese foundational narrative in ways that makes the 
continent a particularly relevant actor for Chinese ontological security seeking. An in-
depth understanding of the discursive developments analysed in this chapter, thus 
allows for a more salient understanding of Beijing’s policies towards Europe over the 
last two decades. In the next constituent part of this thesis, the coming chapters will 
pick up the thread from this longitudinal investigation of the fundamental dynamics 
of China’s narratives of Europe, and undertake a synchronic analysis of how this 
identity factor plays a role in contemporary Chinese policies towards Europe. Going 
more in-depth on a narrower timescale, the synchronic analysis thus engages with the 
role of Chinese ontological security-seeking in current day politics, in the realization 
that the contemporary identity vagaries informing politics today, are deeply rooted in 



















Chapter 7: Synchronic Section Introduction, and Status 




7.1 Synchronic Section Introduction 
 
This thesis contends that the Chinese discourses of Europe, and how they reflect the 
Chinese political projects’ demand for ontological security, is a key aspect for China-
Europe relations that serves to explain a number of contemporary political actions that 
cannot be otherwise explained. The analysis in the preceding diachronic chapters 
demonstrated how the Chinese concept of Europe has been a substantive part of the 
Chinese identity crisis junctures, as well as integral in the reformulations of the 
Chinese ontological sense of self. Working forward from the diachronic section’s 
analysis of the Chinese concepts of Europe, this synchronic section proceeds to 
undertake an exploratory analysis of the role of ontological security in current-day 
relations between Europe and China. For this purpose, this section proceeds to narrow 
the scope in temporal terms, whilst broadening the analytical reach. Hence the 
synchronic investigation will focus mainly on an analysis of the Chinese discourses 
surrounding a number of key policy cases with regards to Europe, exploring the extent 
to which Chinese ontological security concerns played a part in their policy 
formulation and political practice.  
 
The post-89 Chinese foundational narrative of China and Europe as ‘equal and 
separate civilizations’, as referred to in the previous chapter, opened a space for a 
particular identity dynamic to play out in the relationship between these two actors. 
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The concurrent Chinese discourses of Europe based on this narrative framed the 
political and diplomatic field in ways that carried broad political repercussions. In 
addition to its empirical investigation, this synchronic section thus also has a threefold 
theoretical goal, which corresponds to a three-layered analytical approach. First, it 
seeks to trace the foundational narrative forming the base of Chinese ontological 
security, analysing the continued development of this narrative onwards from where 
the diachronic section left off, and establishing how it framed the debates of the 
contemporary era. Second, these chapters strive to detail the more specific main 
discourses of Europe derived from the foundational narrative. Third, it seeks to explore 
the political repercussions of these discourses and how the identity factor served as an 
element in key contemporary political and diplomatic issues of Sino-European 
relations.  
 
In the following sections, then, the Chinese main discourses of the China-Europe 
relationship will be presented, as it relates to the main political and diplomatic issues 
of these key years of the EU-China relationship. At the outset of the 21th Century, the 
European influence was less keenly relevant as a foundational building block for 
Chinese identity and ontological security. Overall, for China, Europe was in most 
cases a secondary relationship, that was of inferior importance compared to the 
dominant role that the USA was given in Chinese official and popular discourse.667 
However, Europe was still of enough relevance to Beijing’s political identity to shape 
Chinese policies towards the European continent in a number of important ways. The 
different foundational narratives of the Chinese polity and how these were constituted 
with regards to Europe, opened up for different discourses based on these 
foundational narratives, and these discourses then constituted a particular political 
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2013; Shen, Dingli 2008; Pomfret 2016; Men and Shen 2014; For literature on Japan’s 
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space for the Chinese actions in their relationship with Europe. Through tracing these 
changing Chinese foundational narratives, and Europe’s role in the identity 
configuration of these, it has become clear the extent to which the variations in these 
narratives shaped the political incentives for China’s Europe policies in quite radically 
different ways over the last century. 
 
In line with this analytical framework, the following chapters 7 to 9 of this synchronic 
section are subdivided into four main parts. The first part provides general context on 
the broader foreign policy rhetoric emanating from Beijing, and key Chinese political 
developments of the relevant period. The second part will identify and trace the 
Chinese foundational narrative, and how Europe is constituted within this. Third, the 
chapters will go in-depth on the main discourses on Europe derived from the 
foundational narrative, identifying and analysing them as expressed in the texts and 
official speeches of these two decades. The fourth part will then investigate the 
concrete political situation through, firstly, providing a specific background of the 
political flashpoint, and then go on to analyse the extent to which the main discourses 
identified earlier did indeed frame the Chinese policymaking. Thus, the impact of 
China’s ontological security seeking on current-day Europe relations will be analysed 
through its foundational identity narrative constitutes the main discourses on Europe, 
and how these discourses then shapes the policies undertaken. 
 
The analysis will be focused on three key cases, each constituting a separate chapter 
of this synchronic section. These cases are selected based on two main criteria, aimed 
at contending the case for respectively the existence, and the political relevance, of the 
ontological security factor in China-Europe relations. Firstly, the selection is informed 
by secondary literature and knowledge of the political context as ‘crucial cases’ for 
probing the existence of an ontological security driven identity factor in China’s 
Europe policies. Secondly, in order to support this research’s claim to political 
relevance, the cases selected are key political events in China-Europe relations over 
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the last 20 years. As such, they are also ‘hard cases’ in the sense that if the identity 
factor is present in the discourses and practices of these key political cases, it should 
indeed hold as an argument for its overall relevance as a factor in China-Europe 
relations. The first case, following in Chapter 7, will trace the end of the ‘honeymoon 
phase’ in China-EU relations, starting with the relationship agreement in 2003, and 
investigate the failed negotiations to bring the EU embargo of arms sales to China to 
an end, as well as the political consequences in the aftermath. The second case, 
Chapter 8, addresses the fallout between China and its European partners following 
a number of incidents in 2007 and 2008, notably the Dalai Lama’s visits to France and 
Germany, that ended with a diplomatic crisis and the cancellation of the 2008 China-
EU Summit. Third, Chapter 9 investigates the Chinese political boycotts towards the 
UK and Norway in the years 2010 to 2016, as well as tracing the discursive changes 
resulting from the change in the Chinese leadership and Xi Jinping’s rise to power. 
This synchronic section overall contends that in all of these key political negotiations, 
identity questions were a considerable factor shaping the Chinese side, and that 
Beijing was ready to undertake actions to preserve their ontological security, that 
would be impossible to understand if employing only economic or rational-political 




7.2 Introduction: The Case of the EU-China Crucible, 2003-2006 
 
As mentioned, the first case study analyses Chinese official material focusing on the 
diplomatic crisis that have been defined as the ‘tipping point’ of the China-EU 
relationship, as the trajectory abruptly changed from its 2003-2005 honeymoon phase 
to a range of political and diplomatic crisis. The renegotiations of the Chinese EU 
relationship in the first decade of the 2000s are centred on three main events; the 2003 
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declaration of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the aborted attempts at 
dropping the EU arms embargo towards China in the years 2003-2005, and the 
controversies related to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, which will be treated in the next 
chapter. 668  In Casarini’s words, the relationship first went through a rapid, and 
unprecedented, development of a “techno-political linkage”, only to see this die off a 
few years later.669 The years from 2003 to 2006 thus demarcated a crucial era in China-
Europe relations, that was most notably marked the failure to end the arms embargo 
in the face of US pressure, in an event that cast long shadows over the Chinese view 
of Europe’s global position for years to come.670 
 
The following sections will proceed in two parts. First, the main Chinese discourses 
on Europe and the EU in this period is presented. The analysis is based on what I 
define as the Chinese foundational narrative, upon which the polity’s sense of 
ontological security is predicated, and Europe’s role within it. It then moves on to 
detailing how this foundational narrative is expressed through the four main Chinese 
discourses on their relations with Europe: China and the EU as co-rising power poles; 
as joint ancient and splendid civilizations; as the largest actor in the developed and 
the developing world with complementing interests; and as partners with equal 
status.  In the second part, this analytical framework is applied to an investigation of 
                                                 
668 For a range of excellent treaties detailing the political and economic processes of 
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the political and diplomatic processes relating to the negotiations over lifting the EU’s 
arms embargo on China.  
 
This section will present the political background of the case, and analyse how it was 
constituted in the contemporary Chinese political discourse. Finally, it will draw upon 
corroborating sources to point to political effects rooted in the policy drivers found in 
these discursive constructs. Overall, it is demonstrated how the Chinese main 
discourses on Europe were part and parcel of the political process that constituted the 
embargo issue as a key matter of European recognition of China’s status and 
ontological security. Thus, alongside the, already thoroughly analysed, geopolitical 
and military balance-of-power explanations for the debacle over the EU’s aborted 
drive to lift their arms embargo to China, this chapter argues that an added and 




7.3 Foundational Narrative: A Story of Two Civilizations 
 
As explored in preceding chapters, the response of the political elite in the aftermath 
of the Tiananmen massacre, had been to further emphasize a foundational narrative 
that to an extent had more in common with the 19th Century self-strengtheners than 
the 20th Century communists. In this readjusted narrative about the rejuvenation of 
China, Europe was no longer an ideal to copy from and reach after, as in the days of 
the early Republic. It was not either a weak link in a capitalist camp that would 
eventually copy China and their revolutionary ways, as in the Mao era. The 
foundational narrative has instead developed through this new set of crises to more 
explicitly embrace the idea of China and Europe as two equal civilizations, although 




This was also related to a reassessment of traditional China, whose place in the 
foundational narrative was radically changed from the Mao era’s slogans to smash the 
old feudal society, to regarding the traditional Sinocentric system as possessing 
timeless Chinese civilizational values. The linkages between the key signifiers here are 
those of China and Europe as separate civilizations, both old and admirable, but 
essentially different to the extent that ‘Westernization’ was no longer a goal, but 
something to be actively defended against. Whilst the CCP’s China should thus open 
up to technological and economic impulses from abroad, the new foundational 
narrative, as proselytized through official discourse, schoolbooks, and museum 
exhibitions, was that while European technology was welcome, European liberal 
political ideas were not. This is reflecting the old ti/yong distinction of seeking to 
embrace the foreigners’ technology, whilst keeping the Chinese proclaimed spiritual 
heritage as the basis, separated from notions of universality by insisting of the 
sovereignty of the Chinese civilization. 
 
The Chinese discourses, as related to Europe, was thus intimately linked with the 
general patterns of China’s view of their place in the world in general. As Hu Jintao 
took over from Jiang Zemin in 2002, it happened at a point when China’s rapid and 
sustained economic growth was already on its way to breaking global historical 
records. Hu Jintao’s 4th generation of CCP leadership sought to phrase their new 
position in the world, where, in line with the existing orthodoxy, Hu’s rhetoric centred 
first on the slogans of peaceful rise/peaceful development and later on the idea of a 
harmonious society/harmonious world.671 However, the slogan of the “harmonious 
world” as  basis for Chinese foreign policy, no matter how innocuous it was designed 
to sound, it marked a departure from the Deng-era public diplomacy where China did 
                                                 




not seek to propagate any international vision on the global stage. 672  Within the 
foundational narrative of a China rising, separate but successful and equal to the rest 
of the world, the CCP sought to secure their ontological security in a situation where 
the link between recognition as a legitimate and non-threatening actor abroad and the 
possibility of continued economic development domestically was becoming clear.  
 
In terms of exemplifying the Chinese view of themselves and Europe in world politics, 
the early days of Hu Jintao’s presidency are a good example of how these discourses, 
and the foundational narrative they were based upon, were overall stable. In a keynote 
speech to the Institut français des relations internationals, during Hu’s important 5-
nation tour to Europe as a vice-President in 2001, he outlined his visions of China’s 
place in global politics at the beginning of the 21st Century. Emphasizing the 
underlying forces of multipolarization, economic globalization, and technological 
development, he went on to expound on three key discursive representations; Firstly, 
he emphasized the international context as one that was too hegemonic and 
unbalanced, the solution for which was the “democratization of international relations” 
(国际关系民主化)”673, utilizing the UN as the main international arena, and with 
interactions based on the Chinese Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with their 
emphasis on state sovereignty.674  
 
Secondly, Europe’s place in this Chinese view of the dominant international trends 
was established:  “China and Europe are two rising powers, politically and 
economically, in international relations, and will inevitably be playing a more and 
more important role in the process of multipolarization.”675 This discourse of the EU 
and China as two rising powers, is a key structure motivating the contemporary 
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Chinese drive for closer relations and Europe-China axis. It is furthermore interesting 
to note that in the prolonging of this idea of a rising role of Europe in world affairs, 
Hu Jintao does only speak directly to French-Chinese relations in brief terms at the 
very end of his talk, having spent most of the talk referring to “Europe” or to the 
“European countries”, even whilst talking at a French arena during an official visit to 
France. Thirdly, although the discourse propagated here depicts China and Europe as 
allies and growing powers that together can contribute to making a fairer and more 
democratic political system, the foundational narrative of Europe and China as equal 
but fundamentally different civilizations still constitutes the key representation:  
Our world is abundant with different colours, it is impossible to 
have only one model. One should agree to recognize the world’s 
diversity, respect each country’s history, culture, system of society, 
and development path. The power behind progress for the 
civilization of mankind, comes from every civilization 
communicating and drawing lessons from each other. Every 
civilization and system of society should not only be able to coexist 
in the long-term, but also by competing, comparing and using 
other’s strength to make up for one’s weak points, and thus develop 
by seeking common ground and casting differences aside676  
 
This keynote speech thus summarizes quiet poignantly the discursive context of the 
Europe policies of the CCP. Having acceded to the post as President of the PRC, Hu 
Jintao held another speech at a conference of Chinese diplomats in 2003. Repeating 
here the same words about the world’s multi-coloured civilizations, he underlined 
how for China and its diplomats a fundamental interest was “multipolarization, 
democratization of international relations, and diversification of development 
models”. 677  This “multicivilizational” discourse was also reasserted from the UN 
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pulpit, during the summit in honour of the organization’s 60 years jubilee.678 This 
discourse is commonly phrased in a manner that explicitly ties it into the Hu-era’s 
broader domestic and international political discourse on, Confucian-derived, 
‘harmony.’679 Notably, the phrase often used to signify the coexistence of different 
civilizations, is that of “harmony in diversity (和而不同),”680 a concept drawn from 
Confucius’ Analects, anchoring the government discourse even closer to the old 
philosophical canon the CCP increasingly sought to draw legitimacy from. 
 
 
7.4 Main Discourses: China’s Views of Europe 
 
Having thus detailed the foundational narrative in which the Chinese leadership 
inscribed their relations with Europe at the beginning of the 21th Century, the 
following sections will analytically move to the next level of the layered discourse. In 
particular, they will go more in detail on what this thesis defines as four of the main 
discourses in the broader Chinese rhetoric on China-EU relations, all of them anchored 
in the common understanding of the basic subject positions of the Chinese Self and 
the European Other that the foundational narrative provides; as fundamentally 
separate civilizations that should each bestow the status as an equal upon the other. 
On the basis of this Chinese foundational narrative, the analysis further identifies four 
main discourses through which the Chinese framed their relationship with Europe at 
the beginning of the 21th Century. For a graphic overview of these, see fig. 4.  
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The first main discourse is that of “Equal Status Recognition”, denoting the reiteration 
of the importance of equal status between these two civilizational nodes, and the 
recognition of Chinese sovereignty. The second is the discourse of the two parties as 
“Two ancient and splendid civilizations”, third is the construction of the two as joint, 
anti-hegemonic “Rising power poles”, fourth is the discourse making a virtue out of 
the differences in their development level, by branding both the EU and China as in 
the same major league by emphasizing that they are respectively the “largest 
developing, and largest developed” economic entity. For an overview of these 
discourses, and how they relate within the three-layered analytical framework, see fig. 
4. These discourses then constituted a political space uonp which was derived certain 
key policy directions. These directions can be defined as a Chinese motivation for 
seeking status confirmation; seeking recognition for a ‘different’ political regime, and 
for territorial sovereignty; seeking Europe’s cooperation as  common partners in 
global multipolarization; and arguing that on this basis there were no fundamental 
problems between the two parties, full overlap in interests, and only differences to be 
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7.4.1 China and the EU as Co-Rising Power Poles 
The discourse representing the EU and China as two jointly rising new powers that 
both favoured a more multipolar world, harks back to the earlier Mao- and Deng-era 
discourses of Europe as a potentially anti-hegemonic ‘second world’, and was thus 
established well before Hu Jintao’s ascension to power.681 In the 4th China-EU Summit, 
of 2001, Hu pointed out how, in the years since their first summit, “China and the EU 
have both equally made great progress”. This in addition to the standard phrases 
about the One China policy and Chinese sovereignty, which is a fixture of these 
declarations.682 In  a later speech,  a section on great power actors counts three of them; 
namely the US, Russia, and the countries of the European Union. France and Germany 
were also specifically mentioned, together with Russia, as forces in favour of 
multipolarization, and that may be counted on to oppose unipolarity, along with 
China.683 Furthermore, whereas the call for cooperation with the US is followed by a 
stark cautionary warning to be on guard for attempts at ‘Westernization’ and 
‘Splittism’ from those quarters, with regards to the EU countries no such warning was 
directly mentioned. Instead there was a call for China and the EU to vigorously 
expand their relationship.684  
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Already in the first sentence of the landmark 2003 Whitepaper on China’s EU policy, 
the concept of multipolarization (多极化) is thus invoked, together with economic 
globalization, as the key global trends that China seeks to harness.685 This in order to 
ensure economic growth in China, as well as a more “democratic and diverse world 
order” 686  This discursive reasoning is linked with the idea of a more democratic 
international system, meant in the sense that China’s political system should be 
regarded as equally valid as the Western liberal democracies, within a “diverse” world 
order. This right of the PRC to differ from the liberal system that was on the ascent 
globally following the fall of the Berlin Wall, thus ensuring the CCP’s power position, 
is a key tenet of the new ontological security narrative of the post-1989 Chinese polity. 
Whereas the idea of multipolarization is a core tenet of the key textual monuments 
defining overall Chinese foreign policy, and its relations to the EU, the term is to a less 
extent prevalent in general Chinese communications with Europe, as seen in fig.5. 
However, the figure illustrating the frequency of terms in over 30 000 Chinese 
diplomatic documents relevant to the EU and European states in the period 2000 to 
2018, does showcase how even in bilateral communications with the EU member 
states, the term EU was referred to in an extraordinarily degree in the early 2000s. This 
corroborates the analysis of China’s foreign policy focus on the EU as a rising power 
and potential partner, and illustrates the later cooling of this discourse following the 
embargo crisis. 
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This relates to the discourse of China and the EU as two rising powers both 
dynamically booming at the same time. Jointly contributing to the wished-for 
multipolarization of the international system, this is a discursive motif that keeps 
being repeated in this period. For instance, during State Councillor Tang’s meeting 
with EU’s High Representative Solana, he emphasizes how both China and the EU are 
standing in front of important historical developments, with the EU expansion, and 
the Chinese push to build a moderately well-off society.687 From this discourse also 
follows a commitment from the part of China to strengthen the EU’s position as s 
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Figure 5: Use of the Terms "Multipolarization" and "EU" in FMPRC Documents on Europe 
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political actor, both regionally and globally. 688  Thus, in line with the discourse from 
the days of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leadership would be continuously repeating 
their support for the EU integration process.689 Of course, their assessment of the 
degree of actual policy integration between the parties would often differ from the 
proposed ideal. As the former Swedish ambassador to China recalls, when then-
Premier Wen Jiabao during a meeting was asked what he expected from the coming 
EU-China summit, he replied. “To be honest I must say that I do not expect much. The 
27 member countries are usually split. But now I was perhaps too honest.” 690 
Nevertheless, throughout this period, one of the main discourses found in the 
empirical analysis, was that of supporting a strong Europe as a Chinese multipolar 
partner. 
 
7.4.2 Splendid and Ancient Civilizations 
The idea of Europe and China as two fraternal old, and splendid civilizations was also 
a main discourse that was continuous throughout the Jiang Zemin era, as in e.g. the 
typical commonly used phrase: “Both China and Europe have long histories and a 
splendid culture (悠久的历史和灿烂的文化), and thus should get along very well.”691 
As the preceding diachronic section illustrated, this discourse also has roots in deeper 
strands of the historical development of the Chinese discourse, and ties into earlier 
conceptions of Europe as a continent from where another civilization had sprung, 
comparable with the Chinese in material splendour even if deficient in spiritual terms. 
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As such, the 2003 Chinese Whitepaper on their European policy emphasizes from the 
very beginning that both China and Europe have long histories and splendid 
civilizations.692 Interestingly in the English version this is officially translated to “both 
China and the EU member states”. This sentence sets the stage for the whitepaper, that 
goes on to repeat that the EU integration process is irreversible, and that the EU will 
play an increasingly strong role in international affairs. Similarly, Hu Jintao was 
invited to give a keynote speech to the French Parliament in 2004, during which he 
was emphasizing again the subject positions of the two partners as representatives of 
two ancient cultures with a long history, that had reached out to each other from 
different ends of the Eurasian continent.693 
 
 
7.4.3 Developed and Developing 
Another of the recurring main discourses through which Europe was constructed in 
the Chinese political rhetoric, emphasizes how the EU is the world’s largest grouping 
of developed countries, whilst China is the world’s largest developing country. This 
discourse—which is another one of the figures of speech present in the speeches of the 
Chinese leadership of this era—thus points to a special position for the EU and China 
as heading the two main groups of countries in the world. 694  Thus, in essence 
providing China with a privileged position, at the same time as underscoring the role 
as a developing country would help abate concerns about China’s rapidly growing 
power stature. An example of this is Wen Jiabao’s speech to the China-EU Business 
Forum in 2004, where he offered to give the public an introduction to the most 
important knowledge about China and, in so doing, drew upon a simple historical 
narrative that emphasized precisely China’s development experience and the success 
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of raising 200 million people from poverty. Another typical fixture of the equality and 
recognition sought in this discourse, is one where China appreciates the EU’s 
development, and the EU on their side proclaims it “understands and supports 
China’s economic and social reforms to date for achieving development.”695  
 
Adding on to this trope, the discourse also includes the repeated assertion that the two 
parties are compatible. “As the largest developing country and the largest bloc of 
developed countries, China and the EU develop trade cooperation on the basis of 
mutual benefit .”696 As the formulaic statement goes, the EU and China thus have 
many overlapping common interests, but no fundamental differences in world 
politics. 697  In his 2004 speech, Wen continued to emphasize the economic 
complementarity between the parties, thus in effect adding to the crucial puzzle of 
how it was possible for such a relationship to collapse so soon afterwards. 
 
7.4.4 Equal Status Recognition 
The fourth main discourse identified in the empirical material is arguably the most 
important in explaining how the negotiations over the arms embargo took on such an 
outsized importance for the Chinese leadership. This main discourse reflects the 
foundational narrative of equal civilizations, in that it emphasizes at almost every 
occasion the importance for the EU to recognize China’s status as an equal. The 
importance of the EU showing respect for the Chinese polity and the national 
narrative of the CCP is a running theme throughout Chinese diplomatic and political 
communications. 698  It is furthermore operationalized in a number of specific 
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requirements that the PRC aims at holding the EU to, such as avoiding state visits to 
Taiwan and the Dalai Lama’s exile government, thus showing adherence to the 
foundational narrative of the PRC. In the same vein, discussions on human rights 
should only be undertaken as part of a dialogue “based on equality and mutual 
respect (愿在平等和相互尊重).” 699  These sentiments are also reflected, as will be 
analysed in more detail in later chapters, in the increasing weight Beijing would give 
to pronunciations of the importance of European countries and the EU to respect 
China’s so-called ‘core interests’ (核心利益 ). As detailed in fig. 6, the Chinese 
diplomatic documents regarding Europe did after the ‘honeymoon phase’ of China-
EU relations in the early 2000s reflect the discursive shift from focusing on economic 
cooperation, to a steadily increasing trend of Beijing instead employing the new tifa of 
core interests as a key framing of the China-Europe relationship. 
 
                                                 




Figure 6: Use of the Terms "Core Interests" and "Economic Cooperation" in FMPRC Documents on 
Europe 
 
The link to the foundational narrative of China as a distinct civilization, along ti/yong 
lines, is clearly prevalent, as the document underlines China’s and the EU’s common 
interests in democratization internationally, and that no one is a threat to the other. 
However, it underlines the difference in history, culture, and political systems, that 
needs to be handled properly and with respect, as was for example the message in the 
joint statement after the Summit with the new EU member Poland700  The 2003 Chinese 
Whitepaper goes on to declare in its key policy statement that China’s main goals for 
their policies towards this new potential European great power is to promote political 
and economic ties based on mutual respect and mutual trust (互尊互信).701 Overall, 
these discourses tie the construction of Chinese ontological security to being 
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recognized, and have its core interests respected. In short, China aims to be given face, 
as an equal partner, with a separate, and equally valid, social model. As such, political 
issues touching upon these identity discourses have a particular potential for 
triggering Chinese ontological security concerns, and thus lead Beijing to undertake 
policies informed by a different logic than the economic one that was considered the 
guiding principle for EU-China relations. 
 
 
7.5 Political Repercussions: The Embargo Issue 
 
These main Chinese discourses of Europe were a constituent part of what was at the 
beginning of the 21st Century a considerable optimism with regards to the growing 
relationship between China and the EU. As a sign of the growing momentum in 
China-EU relations, in 2003 the European Commission launched their updated China 
strategy, in which China was included amongst the EU’s six strategic partners. China 
followed up with their first ever policy paper on a bilateral partnership in that same 
year.702 In 2004, Wen Jiabao repeated the idea, first initiated during talks between Jiang 
Zemin and French President Jacques Chirac, that China and Europe should aim 
towards a comprehensive strategic partnership. The rationale for two growing actors 
that shared the same economic, and increasingly political interests, was an assumption 
that did not only exist amongst the Chinese political circles, but also among European 
politicians, and a number of both Chinese and Western analysts. This is perhaps most 
poignantly reflected in the literature on the “emerging China-EU axis”.703  In the era 
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of the Transatlantic split, following US President G. W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, 
the idea of a growing Sino-European axis was not only a feature in the minds of the 
Chinese Communist Party, but also a fixture of a growing body of both punditry and 
academic literature. As argued by Shambaugh in an oft-cited 2004 article: “Given the 
absence of systemic or strategic conflict of interests—which always lurks in the 
background of Sino-American relations—there is every reason to believe that the 
China-Europe relationship will continue to grow and develop at a steady pace. Over 
time it will become a new axis in world affairs, and will serve as a source of stability 
in a volatile world.”704  
 
So, where did all of this goodwill and drive go? Arguably, the very discourses detailed 
in the preceding sections came to constitute a hindrance to an extent that economic or 
strategic issues fail to fully explain. At this key point in the relationship, a defining 
issue would be the question of the post-89 arms embargo, and the political and 
diplomatic process around the discussions to end this embargo policy. This was an 
issue in which the identity factor and China’s demand to be given the appropriate 
‘face’ and recognition of their own status narrative, were an important factor. This 
identity dynamic will be further explored through the lens of ontological security in 
the following sections. Giving first a short background of the arms embargo issue, and 
why it was a central point of contention in China-EU relations, the following sections 
will then go on to detail how the issue was constructed in Chinese sources, and how 
this construction is related to the foundational narrative and the main discourses 
detailed earlier. 
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7.5.1 Political Background 
In the period from ca October 2003 to March 2005, the discussions over the potential 
lifting of the EU arms embargo towards China developed into a diplomatic impasse 
with wide regional and international repercussions, as the People’s Republic of China 
sought to have the Europeans drop an embargo with little practical effects and few 
potential material gains. The sanctions themselves resulted from the European 
Council deciding in their meeting in Madrid on June 27, 1989, to react to the preceding 
political crackdown in China by imposing a number of political and economic 
sanctions. Although most of these were quite rapidly dropped, one key sanction that 
stayed in force, and does to this day, was the declaration of an  “interruption by the 
member states of the Community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in 
arms with China.”705 In the 2003 Chinese Whitepaper on Europe, the issue is brought 
forth towards the end of the document, as something that should be cancelled as soon 
as possible in order to remove barriers to defence technology and industry 
cooperation.706 As the years moved on this was reframed, as it would be mentioned 
explicitly as an issue that proved an obstacle to cooperation, overall. This European 
arms embargo has ever since been a key thorn in the side of the PRC and its continued 
existence has long been at the very forefront of Chinese relations with the EU and 
European countries.707  
 
In tracing the Chinese discourses of Europe, it is worth to delve in some more detail 
into one of the most obvious political developments that shaped the relations between 
China and the European continent, namely the European integration project that had 
China relate to a complex and evolving regional body, in addition to the established 
bilateral ties with the separate European countries. The European Community had 
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established diplomatic relations with China in May 1975, and as the parties signed 
their first trade agreement in 1978, extended to a Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
in 1985, the economically focused relationship continued to develop in line with 
China’s overall reform and opening up policy under Deng Xiaoping. The main 
political foci for the Chinese European policies, however, were still the European 
nation-states, with the handovers of Hong Kong and Macau from the UK and 
Portugal, respectively, handled bilaterally. As such, whereas the EU/EC level 
dominated in trade questions, the development of the EU into a more unitary foreign 
relations actor, and the Chinese realization of such, came only gradually.708  
 
Nevertheless, as the empirical material in this chapter demonstrates, in the 2000s the 
Chinese discourses of the singular European countries were closely intertwined with 
their view on the EU itself. Simultaneously, bilateral trade multiplied almost forty-
fold, making the EU by 2005 China’s main trading partner, and China the EU’s second 
biggest trade partner. The FDI flow into China from Europe and the number of policy 
platforms and meetings also mushroomed.709 A such, in almost all high-level speeches, 
interviews and official communiques with the Chinese political leadership, and on 
official visits to European countries, there is a section that would explicitly address 
the EU, confirming China’s support for the EUs integration and increased weight in 
international relations, and expressing the hope that the European country in question 
will use its position in the EU for the best.710 
 
The EU level would, however, become the key institution on a few crucial issues, as 
the development in China-EU relations were abruptly shaken by the Tiananmen 
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massacre in 1989. The following arms embargo, and the criticisms over China’s human 
rights situation, was enacted with the EC Commission as the key actor.711  With the 
French and the German governments taking the lead, the EU and China entered in the 
beginning of the 2000s into negotiations about the cancellation of the embargo, which, 
after two years of hectic diplomatic activity, would crash due to opposition from the 
US, as well as consensus issues within the EU member states, exacerbated by China’s 
anti-secession law directed towards Taiwan that same year.712 Being such a defining 
element of China-EU relations, and a constant irritant for Beijing, hot on the heels of 
the declaration of their comprehensive and strategic partnership, the years from 2003 
to 2005 thus saw the rise and fall of a concerted effort at having the EU drop their arms 
embargo.713 As the 2003 Whitepaper marked a symbolic start for the springtime in 
China-EU relations, the Chinese leadership dubbed 2004 their “Year of Europe”, and 
in the midst of a plethora of diplomatic initiatives, the negotiations regarding the 
lifting of the embargo came to occupy centre stage, as China was, arguably, applying 
for a ‘status upgrade’ from the EU to be recognized as a polity of a kind that was more 
in line with its own identity narrative.  
 
7.5.2 The Embargo and the Identity Factor 
The Chinese view of the embargo issue was, as this section will argue, intimately 
linked with the Chinese identity narrative. This was expressed through a political 
drive for the Chinese government to primarily see the embargo issue, neither as a 
matter of money nor a matter of weapons, but as a question of status, face, and 
recognition of the foundational narrative of China as an equal and separate 
civilization. In investigating how the embargo issue was constructed by the Chinese 
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throughout this period, two documents from the early days of the 2004 ‘Year of 
Europe’ are of particular importance. Firstly, the joint communique that came as result 
of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s first ever visit to the EU headquarters in May 2004. 
After Wen and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with their EU counterparts Romano 
Prodi and Javier Solana, the joint communique emphasized the need to strengthen the 
cooperation between two parties, amongst other things by updating the 1985 China-
EU Agreement, as both the EU and China were “at an important stage of their 
development.”714 The latter exemplifies the discourse of China and the EU as co-rising 
power poles. A centrally placed ambition in the communique, was the article 5, about 
the proposed lifting of the arms embargo. “The Chinese leaders […] hopes for the 
European side to reach a decision to lift the prohibition as soon as possible, in order 
to further strengthen mutual trust and cooperation in the political relations between 
China and the EU.” 715  Therefore, in this key document the embargo is thus not 
inscribed in a discourse that regards it as a technical matter of limited practical 
consequence, but rather in a discourse that emphasizes it as a crucial matter of 
“mutual political trust (政治互信)” between the two parties.  
 
Further emphasizing the centrality of equality of status and mutual respect as the 
underlying discourse for the Chinese approach to the relationship with the EU, was 
the next point on the agenda. Written in the context of the transatlantic political rift 
during the George W. Bush presidency, although not explicitly mentioned, there was 
a call that “China and the EU both should cooperate to jointly protect international 
peace, based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, and equality. (互信、
互利、平等)”716 This in addition to recognising China’s call for being recognized as 
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Market Economy Status, and to agree to continue the Human Rights Dialogue, on this 
same basis.717 This, again, typifies the Chinese demands for equal status in terms of 
political and organizational values. In March 2004, French President Jacques Chirac, 
who had been central in pushing EU’s relations with China in general, and the lifting 
of the arms embargo in particular, made a phone call to Hu Jintao and updated him 
on the latest efforts to make progress in the case.718 However, progress increasingly 
stalled, due to opposition from a number of EU members, as well as the US, which 
considered lifting the embargo to a one-party dictatorship a wrong signal to send out, 
in particular in a situation with increased tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese 
leadership was therefore increasingly displeased.  
 
In the second key document of 2004; the joint declaration of the 7th China-EU Summit 
in December, the Chinese side’s statements is very pronouncedly run out of patience; 
“The Chinese side once more emphasized that political discrimination (政治歧视) on 
this issue is unacceptable, and should be immediately eliminated.”719 It is a key point 
to note that in this joint declaration it is, yet again, emphasized the degree to which 
this issue was regarded by the Chinese not so much a matter of military security, but 
as a matter of ontological security; a matter of being not allotted the appropriate 
respect for one’s political foundational narrative.720 In a similar keynote speech at the 
China-EU Business Summit at the end of 2004, Wen Jiabao repeated the same notions, 
whilst also elaborating more on how these discourses are tied to the overall 
foundational narrative on which this leadership generation sought to build 
ontological security for their vision of the Chinese polity. He laid out in clear terms 
the four principles that should be followed as the fundamental rules of the EU-China 
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relationship, the very first one of which is “mutual respect and mutual trust. 
Respecting one’s respective choice of development path (互尊互信。尊重各自选择的
发展道路)”721  
 
In essence, all of these four principles illustrate the fundamental view of non-
interference and the right for China to be different, as one out of two “splendid 
civilizations”, in the EU-China relationship. This all ties in to the earlier analysed 
foundational narrative of China as ‘equal and separate’, where China and the EU seek 
a multipolarization of the international scene. However, the EU emphasized 
multilateralism and the universality of human rights and at the outset regarded the 
Chinese movement towards greater implementation of these as part of a teleological 
process based on universal values. The Chinese discourses, on the other hand, 
regarded this differently, as reflected in the typical formulations exemplified here as 
“respecting the others development path”, and in the formulation that as the 
birthplaces of the worlds civilizations, China and the EU both seek to safeguard the 
variety of world civilization and show each other mutual respect. 722  As the 
negotiations ground to a halt, then, the diplomatic crisis did not result so much from 
any material factors, but rather the fact that the issue was framed by China quite 
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In addressing the question of how the negotiations around a set of policies with little 
practical value, in either economic or military terms, could become one of the defining 
moments in contemporary China-EU relations, this thesis contends that the question 
of Chinese ontological security is a key factor. Given the centrality of the arms 
embargo in the Chinese foreign policies towards Europe, it is notable that the scholarly 
consensus is that the lifting of the embargo would not be likely to significantly impact 
the defence trade between EU countries and China.723 In fact, the EU embargo, being 
neither centralized at the EU level, nor legally binding, gives a lot of leeway to the 
various member states.724 In fact, European defence-related sales to China almost rose 
fourfold, from 55 million to 400 million euros in the period from the embargo’s 
instatement to 2007, compared to Russian arms sales to China doubling from 1.2 to 2.5  
billion. These sales from Europe included helicopters, howitzers, jet engines and 
submarine motors.725 “In sum, the arms embargo is neither the only, nor the principal, 
mechanism governing technological and military related exports to China by EU 
member states.”726  
 
Nevertheless, there were considerable concerns, most notably amongst US political 
and military circles, but also amongst their Asian allies, regarding which new 
potential European weapon export’s regime would come in place of the embargo 
measures, and in particular if this would allow the Chinese easier access to dual-use 
advanced technology and material. 727  The US and Japan saw with increasing 
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scepticism on the EU’s efforts to lift the embargo, as this happened in the broader 
regional context where both countries shared the concern over a rapidly evolving 
Chinese military power posture, and the changing power balance of the Taiwan 
Strait.728 As a result the US House of Representatives went as far as passing a near 
unanimous resolution that strong terms condemned and warned against the EU lifting 
the arms embargo towards the PRC.729 
 
As those Europeans in favour of lifting the embargo pointed out, however, the EU 
Code of Conduct on arms sales and national arms export’s policies would in any case 
still apply, further limiting the tangible effects of lifting the embargo, particularly as 
it in the event of a lifting of the embargo would be further revised and strengthened.730 
It is also significant to note that the European advocates of lifting the arms embargo, 
including most prominently the French President Jacques Chirac, but also the German, 
Italian and Spanish heads of government at the time, similarly emphasized that this 
was mainly a symbolic gesture, and that “the end of the embargo would principally 
serve to show that the EU does not discriminate against Beijing but treats it on par 
with nations such as Russia”731 As pointed out by the EUI’s Pascal Vennesson, “If the 
arms embargo is not legally binding and of only limited effectiveness, why do some 
actors greatly desire to have it lifted[?]”732 It is towards this question that it is argued 
the identity factor contributed in a notable role. 
 
The focal point for this thesis is, however, not on the dynamics of the transatlantic 
alliance, but on the motivations and drivers of the Chinese side in these efforts. As 
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such, this chapter will argue that alongside the other factors already well covered in 
the literature, for the Chinese the issue causing a diplomatic crisis was not only about 
being denied access to weapons, as they in any case would be barred from substantial 
purchases. Rather this was about being denied face, as the EU in effect refused to give 
China a symbolic status upgrade. To quote Gupta’s summary of the issue: “Political 
rather than military concerns play a larger role in the Chinese demand for lifting the 
embargo. The embargo flies in the face of China’s projection of itself as a major global 
player.”733 Chinese officials have, in interviews by Casarini, thus emphasized that the 
only other countries with which the EU has maintained an arms embargo are 
Zimbabwe, Sudan and Myanmar.734  
Lifting the arms embargo would demonstrate that China is, in 
principle, able to buy weapons and have normal military-to-military 
links with EU countries. The fact that the authority that would lift 
the ban is the EU, a part of the West, provides additional credence to 
the signal that China is worthy of equal treatment and not of 
discrimination. Finally, lifting the embargo would help establish the 
country’s “face” in the hierarchy of international power.735  
 
Then-Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing would also on a number of occasions 
declare the embargo to be a form of political discrimination against Beijing.736As Chris 
Patten argues, drawing on his first-hand experience in negotiating the embargo issue 
with the Chinese on behalf of the EU: “China did not want the embargo relaxed in 
order to make in order to make huge new arm purchases; it wanted this so as to end 
a humiliating situation in which it was placed in the same category as Burma and 
Sudan. This was an affront to China’s dignity.”737 This demonstrates how this was 
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indeed not so much an issue about weapons, or the lack of them, but an issue of status, 
recognition, and the building and maintenance of Chinese ontological security.  
 
This construction on behalf of the Chinese leadership, of the embargo issue as a matter 
of identity, may not in itself have been a hinder for the embargo to be lifted. However, 
also for the EU it became increasingly entwined with the European Union’s self-
perception as a humanitarian, civilizing, international entity.738 “There exists a clear 
gap between China’s belief that co-operation should depart from normative diversity 
and joint interest, and Europe’s assumption that differences in interests can be 
resolved by a consensus over universal political rules.”739 Thus, if the issue was only 
one of splitting the difference about technical readjustment of an arms sales regime of 
little practical consequence, this matter could have been solved quite silently and 
speedily. However, the embargo issue came in addition to the military factors also to 
be at the fault line of two parties’ ontological security seeking, as they both sought 
recognition for foundational narratives that were not compatible with regards to this 
issue. Thus, the matter of the EU’s arms sales regime became embroiled into a further 
layer of complexities, something akin to a zero-sum standoff informed by identity 
concerns, making it all the harder to reach a workable compromise, as the actors saw 
their respective polities’ foundational narratives challenged. In addition, the matter of 
regional strategic balancing and the Chinese ability to potentially further their 
diplomatic standing would also have implications for their regional image.740 Overall, 
the ontological security clash between the two parties’ competing identities made this 
issue exceedingly difficult to solve. In the new 2014 Chinese policy whitepaper on the 
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EU, the arms embargo is still mentioned, as a result of the failure of the political 
process, emphasizing that the EU should lift this embargo “as soon as possible”.741 
 
Importantly, the embargo issue did not share the economic impact of the second one 
of the “two jokers” in the China-EU relationship; the other being the question of EU’s 
recognition of China’s Market Economy Status (MES), a decision which would have 
quite direct impact within the WTO regulatory framework.742 The more pronounced 
and more directly tangible material interests the case of the MES held for the Chinese 
authorities, is also the reason why this chapter choses to focus on the issue of the arms 
embargo as the prime case for investigating the role of Chinese ontological security 
seeking in its relations with the EU. However, this does not mean that the identity 
factor is irrelevant in the case of the MES, to the contrary, as Crookes summarizes it: 
“The issue of MES is typically interpreted by China as one of prejudice, inequality and 
a lack of respect by the EU towards China as an equal that engenders memories of 
long-expired but still emotionally charged unequal treaties of past centuries.”743 These 
episodes would thus have a significant impact on the Chinese view of the EU 
contributing to altering the main discourse of the EU as a key partner in 
multipolarisation. In particular with respect to the European Union’s independence 
from the US, as the negotiations developed in a direction that was not in line with the 
Chinese expectations fostered by their own discourse of a common multipolar cause 
with Europe.744 As summarized by Mickhailski and Pan; “it proved to China that the 
EU was less independent vis-à-vis the US than it had anticipated and was unlikely to 
constitute the third pole in the multipolar system that China envisaged.”745  
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Over the preceding sections, this chapter has analysed first, the main Chinese 
discourses of Europe, and how these are predicated on a particular foundational 
narrative upon which the ontological security of the current Chinese polity is based. 
Secondly, the analysis has demonstrated the extent to which these discourses were 
indeed constituting the Chinese understanding of, and communication regarding, the 
political and diplomatic debacle around the key political question of the arms 
embargo. To summarize the argument, this section corroborates the conclusions of the 
discourse analysis of the publicly available Chinese texts, through drawing upon 
primary and secondary sources from negotiations between the representatives of 
China and the EU. On this basis, this chapter concludes that the identity factor was a 
key component of how the Chinese constructed the issue, contributing to both the 
failure of the negotiations, and to the repercussions such a failure would carry for the 
overall relationship. Chinese ontological security seeking entailed a specific set of 
political motivations and policy drivers, chief amongst which were the drive to secure 
‘face’, through seeking status confirmation, and recognition for their foundational 
narrative as a successful, separate, and equal partner to the EU. 
 
In terms of the broader impact of the China-EU relationship, this identity clash 
between them, which is exemplified in the embargo crisis, brings home a broader 
point, namely that in the EU-China relationship one does underestimate the identity 
factor at one’s own peril. This is demonstrated here through the analysis of what has 
been commonly regarded as the crucible of the current-day EU-China relationship, 
namely the rise of the China-EU axis‘ prominence, from the declaration of the 2003 
comprehensive strategic partnership, until the end of this political honeymoon started 
in 2006, after a number of diplomatic issues had brought on an impasse to the 
relationship. This impasse was, as will be treated in Chapter 8, further exprobated, 
before the budding strategic relationship between the parties was suddenly brought 




As detailed earlier in the chapter, there was a substantial optimism on behalf of the 
EU-China relationship in a wide range of the academic literature, predicated mainly 
on the degree to which China and the EU shared massive economic interests, and, 
unlike the US, have almost no direct security conflicts. By discounting the identity 
factor, however, these analyses were rapidly challenged by the sudden falling-out of 
this “new power axis”. This demonstrates how the post-1989 foundational narrative 
of China as an equal and separate civilization, entailed a very distinctive set of identity 
drivers for the current day negotiations with the EU. The identity factor was thus a 
strongly contributing factor to a substantial lapse in a bilateral relationship that was 
at some point predicted to be a major new axis on international politics. Thus, by 
factoring in the identity issue, through an ontological security lens, this chapter shows 
how China sought recognition for their chosen foundational narrative for the Chinese 
polity, in order to ensure their legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. An 
issue of rather limited consequence, materially speaking, thus became the cause of 
very tangible diplomatic strains. This thesis argues that throughout this period, with 
security issues largely non-existent, and with economic ties growing rapidly and 
successfully, one important factor driving the China-EU relationship to go from its 




Chapter 8: Strategic Relationships and Forced 
Recognition - Beijing, Berlin, and Paris (2007-2010) 
 
 
8.1 Introduction: The China-Europe Breakdown, 2007-2010 
 
In the years following 2007, the political relationship between China and Europe 
rapidly declined, to the extent that in an unprecedented move, the 2008 China-EU 
summit was cancelled by the Chinese, right at the onset of the global financial crisis. 
All the while, the economic relationship between the parties continued to burgeon. 
The rapid reversal in the relationship centred instead around a number of key disputes 
coming to the fore in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, most notably the 
decisions of various European countries to continue their traditions of receiving the 
Dalai Lama.746 Although these were actions that were unproblematic in the European 
context, it was of immense concern to the Chinese, as it was regarded as an affront to 
some of their core interests. These were interests of little material importance, but all 
the more relevant for the ontological security seeking of the PRC.  
 
In contributing to the analysis of this key period of China’s relations with Europe, this 
chapter will first explore and detail the changes in the Chinese discourses about 
Europe in these years, and the foundational narrative on which they were based, as 
manifested in key political documents and speeches. Advancing from this basis the 
chapter will then provide a short background of the political context, before analysing 
how these discourses framed the political negotiations in a manner that tied relatively 
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materially insignificant issues to identity questions that were a considerable factor 
shaping Chinese policies towards Europe. 
 
 
8.2 Foundational Narrative: China’s More Assertive Take on Europe 
 
Over the years following the diplomatic crisis of the arms embargo, and leading up to 
the arguably even more acute crisis around the time of the 2008 Olympics, the 
foundational narrative of the CCP remained fairly stable, as illustrated in fig. 7, below. 
A few developments in this period are however worthy of some further detailing, as 
they reflect a certain development in the degree to which China’s status with regards 
to the rest of the world was conceived. In essence, the extent to which the West was 
conceived of as an Other in the Chinese government’s rhetoric did not change 
fundamentally. However, some changes are detectable with regards to the specific 
role the Chinese saw themselves as occupying vis-à-vis the Western countries. In 
particular, in the years after the start of the Financial crisis, China would increasingly 
perceive of themselves as a great power seeking equal recognition from the other great 
powers. The narrative of the Deng era, where the focus was on China developing 
economically, whilst seeking to secure the respect of the international system without 
asserting themselves as a great power, changed in favour of growing Chinese 
assertiveness. A process that provided an extant discourse to build upon for the later 
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The discursive changes with regards to the role of Europe for the ontological security 
of the Chinese state, were of course also linked to a range of wider discursive changes 
on the role of China, the West, and the world in general. The broad historical narrative, 
was still centred on the main theme of the Great Rejuvenation of China, as is well 
exemplified by Hu Jintao’s opening speech on the symbolically important occasion of 
the 30 years jubilee of the 3rd plenum meeting that under Deng’s leadership ushered 
in China’s reform and opening up policies. In summarising the CCP national narrative 
for the polity of the People’s Republic, a clear line is drawn from a glorious past to a 
testing and humiliating start of modernity. Thanks to the Communist Party, that has 
been turned into a rejuvenation of the past glories: 
Comrades! The Chinese nation has a long history of more than 5000 
years (…) [and] created a splendid Chinese civilization. After the 
Opium War, due to the invasion of the Western Great Powers (西方
列强) and the decay of feudal rule, China was  step by step reduced 
to a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society (…) In order to achieve 
the Great Rejuvenation (伟大复兴) of the Chinese nation, countless 
Main Derived Policy Directions: 
Seeking Status Confirmation, Seeking recognition for “different” regime, and 
for territorial sovereignty, Seeking respect as a great power
Foundational Narrative:


























Figure 7: Overview of the three-layered China’s discursive construct of Europe, 2007-2010 
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people of high ideals have vigorously risen up to seek the road to 
save the country, save the people, and to revive China. In the past 
century, our country has seen three great revolutions. (…) The third 
revolution was our Party-lead Reform and Opening Up, setting off 
a new great revolution. It led the Chinese people to embark on the 
wide road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and ushered in 
the bright future of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.748 
 
The two preceding great revolutions were quoted as being Sun Yat-sen’s 1911 
revolution, which overthrew the monarchy, and thus opened up for the second great 
revolution of the CCP’s establishment of the New China after overthrowing 
imperialism, feudalism, and the bureaucratic capitalist ruling regime. This again, then, 
paving the way for Deng’s third revolution. 749 Hence, this foundational narrative, 
constructs, out of over a hundred years of political and economic near-chaos, a simple 
and teleological historical narrative tying future greatness to past greatness, with the 
CCP as the natural, and only possible, conduit between the two.  
 
Furthermore, the last 30 years have been successful through the CCP leading the 
nation through a range of crises and challenges, both domestic and foreign, the latter, 
importantly, relayed as “the rapid changes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and serious domestic political disturbances, or facing Westernization (
西化), splittism, and so-called ‘sanctions’”750 This foundational historical narrative on 
which the PRC’s ontological security was based, was not only for domestic 
consumption, but also repeated internationally, for example in Hu Jintao’s speech at 
Yale University in 2006, where he similarly presented an overview of the CCP’s 
foundational narrative for China, at the heart of which is the struggle of  an old 
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civilization, led to success by the Communist Party, communicating the exact same 
key points as in the speech quoted above:  “57 years ago, after a long period of bloody 
struggle, the Chinese people achieved national independence and people's liberation, 
and established the people as masters of their home in a New China.”751  
 
This foundational narrative, as discussed earlier, is founded upon the idea of China 
and the Chinese polity as being separate. This in the sense that success was only 
achieved when the Chinese under the CCP found their own development road to 
revive their ancient civilization, and that this hard-won right of being separate and 
sovereign has since been threatened by the West. This general narrative of China’s 
relations with the international relations overall, is well exemplified by Hu Jintao on 
the occasion of the UNs 60th Anniversary, declaring that civilizational diversity is at 
the heart of mankind’s society, and that every country should be free to choose their 
social system itself.752 This main discourse, that will be treated in more detail later, was 
formulated in policy terms in 2009 as China’s Three Core Interests, that have since 
become a defining political prism though which to ascertain Chinese political 
priorities,753 namely; “for China, our concern is we must uphold our basic systems, our 
national security; and secondly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity; and thirdly, 
economic and social sustained development.”754As the academic debate on China’s 
perceived “new assertiveness” following the 2008 financial crisis demonstrates,755 the 
global economic crisis, and China’s relative solidity in the face of it, seems to have 
further strengthened the main discourse of CCP’s China as having found a separate 
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road that was successfully propelling them to great power status. As Rozman argues, 
“Whereas earlier identity gaps opened in the shadow of U.S. ascendancy, the new 
environment called that into question as China envisioned itself as an all-around 
challenger able to pose an unprecedented alternative to Western civilization.”756  
 
This gave further impetus to a foundational narrative that underlined Chinese 
distinctiveness, by increasingly linking the People’s Republic with visions of the 
Chinese past, rather than with social models from the West, as the CCP accelerated 
their dramatically fast turnaround to venerating the Confucian past they had actively 
sought to eradicate only a few decades earlier. 757  There were little to no explicit 
mentions of this in the Europe-related speeches; however, these notions are relevant 
for the broader background of the domestic and international context of the 
relationship. Another general discursive trend to keep in mind, as it is directly 
relevant for China’s relations with Europe, is how the strengthened assertion of the 
PRC as not only different, sovereign, and equal with regards to the West, but now also 
very successfully so, is the continuation of, and the added emphasis on, the need for 
the polity to avoid the danger of “Westernization”. As Hu Jintao formulated it in a 
2004 speech to an expanded meeting of the Central Military commission: “Western 
hostile forces have not given up the ambition to subjugate us, intensifying their efforts 
to implement in our country a Westernization (西化) and division (分化) strategy, 
attempting to use their political model and value system to transform us.”758 This 
discourse continued from the earlier eras and was repeated throughout these years, 
as seen in his speech on the ‘harmonious society,’ his trademark policy initiative, 
where he explicitly warned against the same hostile westernization and splittism plots, 
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“especially in guarding against, at home and abroad, hostile forces pushing the 
banners of so-called “democracy”, “freedom”, “rights protection”, to take advantage 
of the people’s internal contradictions, creating disturbances and sabotaging the trend 
of progress, one can never let down one’s guard.”759  
 
It is however of interest to note that in this particular subset of the narrative, the 
subject position towards which radically different values the Chinese need to be wary 
of, are in all of Hu’s published speeches described as The West (西方). Europe or 
European countries are never explicitly identified with these notion of the threatening 
‘West’. This is a distinction that carries interesting echoes from the delineation made 
between Europe and the US, based on Mao’s ‘Three Worlds Theory’, where the US is 
regarded as the most ideologically threatening and politically different Other. This in 
both contrast to, and meaningful continuations from, the leading political theorists of 
the Early Republican era that rather looked to the US as a political same to be emulated, 
as opposed to the old imperial powers of Europe. In contemporary Chinese discourse, 
as the examples illustrate, ‘The West’ has in essence become shorthand for liberal, and 
threatening, political ideas.760 This concept informs the discourse of both the EU and 
the USA, but it also opens up for differentiation between the two actors, in the sense 
that a multipolar world where the transatlantic ties are weaker, this can serve to 
weaken the assertiveness of liberal values in the international order.  “China views 
multipolarity as a way to constrain US hegemony, and recognizing that the EU constitutes 
a pole reflects China’s hedging strategy.”761 Strengthening the EU may then, for China, be 
                                                 
759 J. Hu 2016f, 426 
760 See eg. the important leaked CCP-communiqué stressing the importance fight the 
encroachment of liberal “Western” ideas in all sectors of Chinese society: Central 
Committee of the CCP’s General Office 2013 




a way in which to weaken the impact of ‘The West’, in the sense of liberal values and 
political interventionism. This thus creating an interesting split in the Chinese rhetoric 
where on the one hand ‘The West’ is a threatening and radically different Other, 
whereas on the other hand, Europe can be a partner in the process of helping China 
establish their independence and status internationally through helping to push 
forward the multipolarization and democratization of world politics.762  
 
This discourse of distinctiveness is perhaps most famously formulated in the general, 
often repeated phrase of ‘Chinese characteristics’. As summarised by Yahuda: “Thus 
the Deng Xiaoping concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" suggests that 
China's identity once again is seen as turning on values and principles that differ 
fundamentally from those of the modern (that is Western) world with whose capitalist 
international economy he sought to 
link the Chinese economy.”763 This phrase is, of course, most notable in its presence in 
the key concept of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,’ as exemplified in e.g. Hu 
Jintao’s 2009 conference speech. 764  In comparing this to earlier manifestations of 
treating the countries of the Western hemisphere as Others after the establishment of 
CCP’s New China, the most notable alteration in the narrative, reflecting the Chinese 
domestic political developments on this field, is the absence of the ‘capitalist’ term, 
when describing these actors. The main narrative was thus one of defining Others no 
longer on the basis of political and economic structures, but on the basis of 
geographical signs delineating the divide as cultural and civilizational. 
 
As always, however, there are competing discourses available; one discourse in 
opposition to the foundational narrative of China as fundamentally separate from 
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Western societal structures, was the discourse of China as rather being only 
temporally different, whilst still aspiring to a Western model as the ultimate goal, one 
more in line with what the earlier chapters have identified as more prevalent in earlier 
eras. This is a discourse one can also trace from the days of Deng Xiaoping. The most 
pronounced proponent of this view would be the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who 
formulated this on a number of occasions,765 such as his speech to the Royal Society in 
2011: “The future China will be a country that fully realizes democracy, the rule of 
law, and fairness and justice.” 766  However, given that his more liberal 
pronouncements and visions articulated abroad were famously censored by the 
Chinese press, this alternative narrative was increasingly weakened, and lost out even 
more after the ascension of Xi Jinping.  
 
 
8.3 Main Discourses: Levelling the Playing Field  
 
This adjustment of the foundational narrative is also reflected in the main Chinese 
discourses about Europe. In the texts from this period, the discourse defined in the 
last chapter as “Rising anti-hegemonic power poles” is still recognisable, but there is 
an alteration where there is no longer talk of the EU and China as the rising power 
poles as a short-term goal, but of taking the long term and developing the strategic 
relationship. The discourse of the EU as China’s co-rising power pole weakened. The 
main discourse on the importance of being granted equal status stayed permanent, 
and if anything was given extra weight. This can be seen in the diplomatic conflicts 
regarding the Dalai Lama, as a natural reflection of this more assertive twist to the 
foundational narrative.  
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The ancient and splendid civilizations discourse remained, and took on added value 
as the CCP’s reading of traditional Chinese, Confucian civilization was increasingly 
drawn upon as a legitimising strategy domestically in China, and as part of China’s 
soft power offensive abroad, as seen for instance in the rapidly growing global 
network of Chinese-sponsored Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms. 767 
Adding to this extant discourse, though, was the more often repeated notion of China 
as a great power alongside the UK and France. Finally, the reassertions of China as a 
developing country, and the EU as the world’s largest group of developed countries 
was still there, but increasingly changing to emphasize the success of China’s 
development, as opposed to what was expressed as the economic problems of the EU. 
The foreign policy playing field seemed in the eyes of the Chinese leadership to be 
getting ever more equal, and they demanded a respect that matched it. Thus, these 
changes were opening a discursive field for a broader set of foreign policy incentives 
and resulting policy directions, that opened up for a more assertive posture in seeking 
adequate recognition from the European countries.  
 
8.3.1 Dampening the Rising Power Poles Discourse 
One of the most politically charged amongst China’s main discourses of Europe, was 
also one that saw a certain change over the later years of the first decade of the 2000s. 
As demonstrated in the last chapter, the idea of China and the EU as co-rising power-
poles was a key feature of the PRC leadership’s rhetoric on Europe, and co-
constitutive of a policy that regarded Sino-EU ties as a potential central axis of 
international politics. Following the crises detailed earlier in the thesis, though, there 
is a notable adjustment of this main discourse, towards a discourse, towards one that 
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increasingly emphasizes China’s role as a more independent rising power-broker 
internationally, reflected in a rhetoric that describes the EU in more long-term 
strategic terms, and less like an immediate partner in pushing for a rebalanced world 
order.  
 
The underlying discourse of multipolarization and globalization as the key trends of 
the world, were still stable elements of the discourse, as illustrated by Hu Jintao in the 
UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit speech. 768  The discourse rather developed with 
regards to China and the EU’s respective positions within this world of power 
transfers. Illustrating in a longitudinal manner the changes in this discourse as it was 
presented for a European public, it should be noted how the EU-China summit 
declarations changed their wording of the relationship’s global potential during the 
years covered in this chapter. In both the 8th and the 9th Summit Declaration, of 2005 
and 2006 respectively, a repeated phrase emphasized that the strengthening of China-
EU relations was of key importance for Europe-Asia cooperation, and for world peace 
and development.769 In 2007, this phrase was removed in favour of one that pointed 
out explicitly how the two actors have had an effect on a number of international 
hotspots, including Myanmar and Iran, and how they will continue to work together 
to promote democratization of international relations. 770  At the 11th summit 
declaration, these formulations about the common struggle for democratization in 
international politics were gone. Instead, in the 2009 11th Summit declaration a new 
phrase denoted how the EU-China relationship increasingly had an effect ‘past the 
bilateral and actually being important for the world stage’, which was also repeated 
in the 12th summit declaration later the same year.771 The lofty goals of common effort 
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at democratising international relations were thus gone from the summit declarations 
of the following years.772 Relatedly, in Hu’s 2006 Work report to the Central Foreign 
Affairs work group, he listed the prioritized bilateral relationships according to 
importance, as first the one between China and the US, second the relationship with 
Russia, and third, to expand the contact with the great powers (大国) and other 
countries of the European Union.773  
 
The effect of the 2008 financial crisis, and the following debt crisis in the eurozone, did 
of course also have an effect on the Chinese understandings of the international 
situation, their own role in it, and the role of Europe with regards to themselves. As 
the decade following was summarized by Christiansen, Kirchner, and Wissenbach, 
EU-China relations “reached a critical juncture at the end of the 2010s (…)China has 
expanded its institutional role in global governance and its economic and political 
relations with the rest of the world based on its national interests, while Europe’s role 
in all these areas has remained fairly stagnant or in some cases has diminished”774 The 
global financial crisis is, as expected, a recurring topic of Chinese official speeches in 
the years after 2008. 775  With regards to how this event informed the developing 
Chinese discourse on international relations, an informative demonstration can be 
found in Hu Jintao’s speech to the 11th meeting of the Chinese diplomatic envoys in 
Beijing in 2009. Referring to the financial crisis at the very beginning of the speech, he 
goes on to say that “Our country’s overall strategic environment has improved, but 
with the Western countries the strategic contradictions have become even more 
complex.”776 Also following the crisis, a clamour for Chinese investment capital from 
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the crisis-struck states at the EUs periphery, further created the impression of radical 
change in the relative power position.777 
 
If a reminder was necessary in the following up of the first attempt at ending the EU 
arms embargo, leaked cables to the US State Department revealed a Spanish 
suggestion for a renewed effort at ending the EU embargo in 2010, that was again 
rapidly shot down due to US pressure. The Chinese ambassador was quoted 
commenting on this in terms that can serve to illustrate the Chinese disappointment 
with what was regarded as the EUs subservience to the US: "The EU and China are 
now strategic partners and it doesn't make any sense to maintain the embargo (...) I 
also think it is pitiful and pathetic that Europe can't make decisions on its own, 
without being influenced by other powers.”778 As detailed in the next chapter, this set 
the stage for the increasing emphasis on China as a great power, under the leadership 
of Xi Jinping.  
 
8.3.2 Equal Status Recognition 
The main discourse of underlining in unequivocal terms the importance for China of 
receiving the respect of the European countries as equal partners, continued to be one 
of the most dominating discourses throughout these years of political and diplomatic 
tensions. Hu Jintao’s visit to Sweden in 2007 as the first Chinese head of state in history, 
provides an archetypical example of the broader, and constantly repeated discourse. 
In his public remarks following the bilateral talks, he followed the typical Chinese 
pattern by firstly, putting emphasis on when, in the Swedish case quite early, the 
Swedes recognized China. Then he proceeded on to underline just how important it 
is that the relationship with China is undertaken on the basic of recognition of equality 
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in status, and diversity in political values, “Since establishing relations 57 years ago, 
both countries have based on the principles of mutual respect, equal benefits, and 
mutual non-interference in internal affairs (相互尊重、平等互利、互不干涉内政等原
则 ), actively developed the bilateral ties and achieved gratifying results” 779  This 
discourse is in this thesis’ model identified as a main discourse on the background of 
its ubiquitous presence as structuring China’s political narrative on all levels, 
including with the other European countries, and with the European Union as a 
whole.780  
 
As mentioned, this is the fulcrum of a number of the Sino-European disagreements, 
that increasingly often would lead to diplomatic crises. China and the EU both claimed 
to seek a multipolarization of the international scene. However, the EU emphasized 
multilateralism and the universality of human rights, and at the outset regarded the 
Chinese movement towards greater implementation of these as part of a teleological 
process based on universal values.781 The Chinese discourse, on the other hand, was 
instead founded on the premise of civilizational divergence rather than convergence. 
As the quantitative analysis illustrated in fig. 8 corroborates, this shift in rhetorical 
orientation was reflected in a notable and quite substantial shift reflected across all 
Chinese open diplomatic communications with the EU and European countries, 
namely the increasing prevalence of mentioning “Chinese characteristics”, a tifa 
denoting the separateness of China’s political and economic system.  
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Figure 8: Use of the Terms "Chinese Characteristics" and "Human Rights" in FMPRC Documents on 
Europe 
 
After 2008, so even before the added emphasis on China as a great power, there is a 
very notable rise in the use of this phrase. This increased use does also, importantly 
correspond to a decreased frequency of referring to human rights in Chinese 
documents and speeches relevant to the EU and European countries. As the content 
analysis of Chinese foreign policy documents of this period corroborates (see fig. 8), 
declarations underlining China’s distinctiveness would only become more important 
to the Chinese foreign policy rhetoric through the years, whereas the key issue of 
human rights would increasingly disappear in the political documents, as the CCP 
gradually succeeded in pushing it further away from the diplomatic agenda. The 
crossing trendlines of these two terms in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
corroborate an increasing Chinese assertiveness about the distinctiveness of their 
political and economic model. This was, as demonstrated here, at the heart of the 
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CCP’s ontological security based on the fundamental national narrative of equal and 
separate civilizations. 
 
8.3.3 Ancient, Splendid (and Increasingly Confucian) Civilizations 
The main discourse of insistence on equality as a distinct civilization, was closely 
intertwined with the proclaimed Chinese idea of Europe and China as two separate, 
ancient and glorious civilizations. Exemplified by Premier Wen Jiabao’s words from a 
2009 meeting with EU officials, as quoted by Yang Jiechi, he pointed to the shared 
interests between China and the EU as respectively the largest developing country 
and the largest group of developed countries, and the common fact that both of them 
are two grand old civilizations.782 This main discourse saw little change; if anything, 
the emphasis on the past as 5000 years of unbroken and distinctly Chinese history 
strengthened further, and eclipsed any remains of the old Marxist narrative of 
“smashing old culture.”783 In Hu Jintao’s keynote speech on China’s peaceful rise,784 
the way in which the Chinese polity of which he stood at the helm was presented 
mainly as the embodiment of 5000 years of civilization. This exemplifies the extent to 
which the emphasis of the governing class had shifted since the days of Mao, from 
condemning the old and seek legitimacy in the new, to an amalgamation that sees the 
CCP as the embodiment of the ancient Chinese civilization in its most current form.  
 
This, as mentioned earlier, marks in particular a paradigm shift in the Chinese 
Communist Party’s view of Confucius, who during the last three decades went from 
being regarded in party propaganda as another old suppressive philosopher in 
support of slavery, to becoming increasingly utilized in the official discourses as a 
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centre piece of a new discourse tying CCP’s legitimacy to an essentialized Chinese 
cultural heritage.785  As Meissner points out in this regard, “In most post-Leninist 
countries, we can observe a renaissance of traditionalist thought that is frequently 
linked to nationalistic and ethnic or even racist tendencies.”786This development can 
also be traced quantitatively. As fig. 9 demonstrates, based on the analysis of over 
30 000 Chinese documents and speeches relating to Europe, there is a very substantial 
and correlated change in the Chinese rhetoric’s use of the word “civilization”, and 
“Confucius” in their Europe-related discourses. During the Hu era this term was 
introduced into the diplomatic discourse as a novelty that quickly became prevalent, 
a growth that was particularly pronounced, again, from 2008 onwards. 
 
 
Figure 9: Use of the Terms "Confucius" and "Civilization" in FMPRC Documents on Europe 
Thus, the emphasis is even more pronounced on a rather Huntingtonian view of the 
world as subdivided into distinct civilizations, although with a focus less on the clash 
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of these than on plural co-existence between these essentialized political units. In Hu’s 
words, ”Civilizational diversity is the objective reality of mankind’s society (…)  We 
should actively maintain the world’s diversity, promote dialogue and mixing among 
different civilizations, learn from each other’s experiences rather than mutually 
excluding each other, thus making humanity more harmonious and happy, and 
making the world more richly colourful.”787  
 
8.3.4 Largest Developed and Developing / Successful Self-Strengtheners 
Finally, amongst the identified main discourses structuring the Chinese view of their 
relations with Europe, is the notable change in the discourse of China as the world’s 
largest developing country seeking cooperation with the world’s largest bloc of 
developed countries. Reflecting the changes along the other main discourses, in this 
area also an increased Chinese self-confidence is related to a more pronounced 
emphasis on the Chinese economic success as opposed to the discourse of China as a 
still underdeveloped country. The assertion that although China still is developing 
and has a long way to go, as Wen expressed it in a 2010 press conference after meeting 
with EU Commissioner Barroso, explicitly points out how China’s comprehensive 
power, and its status in the world had grown, after the reform and opening up period: 
“China’s Reform and Opening Up have obtained immense achievements. The 
country’s comprehensive power and international position has obtained a remarkable 
upgrade.” 788  Given the importance of economic success for the performance 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, this factor plays a considerable role in the 
narrative in which the regime’s, and by correlation also the Chinese polity’s 
ontological security is based. 
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Of course, in the years following the international financial crisis and the eurozone 
debt crisis, economic matters would increasingly be important in declarations and 
speeches relating to Europe and European countries, and increasingly building upon 
a discourse of a more level playing field for the two partners EU and China.789  The 
changing discourse was reflected in, for example, the 14th Summit declaration, that 
included a point on how China and the EU would each “actively look at and support 
each other’s development.” 790  In point two of the Summit Declaration, then, the 
discursive field explicitly shifted from being that of the largest developing countries 
together with the largest bloc of developed countries unto being more a matter of two 
co-developing parties, as Europe at that point in many areas was craving Chinese 
investments.791 The same change is present in the 15th Summit statement in late 2012, 
emphasizing how China and the EU should actively look to and help each other’s 
development. This thus demonstrates a shift in the discourse, that is all the more 
important as a key raison d’etre of Chinese political projects since the beginning of the 
20th Century has been the ambition to economically catch up with the developed world, 
at this point however, the help has started to go both ways. 
 
Thus, as the leadership of the CCP will increasingly accentuate over the next decade, 
as analysed in the next chapter, the political elite of China would increasingly draw 
upon a discourse of themselves as being the ones that after more than a century of 
attempts and false starts, had finally managed to bring China to the brink of its 
rejuvenation. The change in this main discourse to implying the ongoing success of 
these efforts thus has outsized consequences for the ontological security of the Chinese 
governing class. As will be detailed later, this particular link between economic 
performance and ontological security would serve as an explanation for the key role 
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the explicit, public recognition of Chinese development success were to play in solving 
diplomatic conflicts between China and European countries. The CCP wanted, in 
effect, to be recognized as the successful Self-Strengtheners that earlier Chinese 
political regimes failed to be. 
 
 
8.4 Political Repercussions: The 2008 Boycott and Cancellation Issues 
 
8.4.1 Political Background 
As a symbolically important marker of the trend of the relationship, the EU and China 
decided at their 9th Summit in 2007, following the earlier failures in their talks on the 
arms embargo, to turn a new leaf on the relationship by launching negotiations on a 
Partnership and Co-Operation Agreement. 792  The expectations of a successful 
negotiation, was at the outset quite high, but already in 2009, the hope for such a treaty 
had dissipated, and as of today it is still not finalized.793 In the intervening years, the 
series of issues and incidents in the build-up to the Beijing Olympics, including 
meetings between the Dalai Lama and the Prime Ministers of Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark, had led to a breakdown in the relations, to such an extent 
that China  cancelled the 11th China-EU Summit planned for December 2008.794 This 
period of a ‘long half-decade’ thus saw the convergence of a number of key economic, 
political, and strategic issues in the EU-China partnership, and an abrupt turnaround 
in the Chinese view of the role of the European continent. Thus, as Wu Baiyi has 
pointed out, the years 2005-2008 represented an inflection point with regards to the 
Chinese views of the EU, as three major events mutually reinforced the perception of 
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the EU not as a multipolar player representing a successful modern paradigm, but as 
a struggling, and slightly chaotic entity whose very existence was challenged by its 
own failings: the failure of the 2005 EU Constitution process, the failure to end the 
arms embargo in the face of US pressure, and most importantly the 2008 financial 
crisis and following eurozone double-dip. 795  While this inflection point in the 
relationship came as the result of a number of political decisions, negotiations, and 
failures, this thesis will demonstrate that another key factor in this sudden and 
dramatic turnaround in the relationship was the role played by Chinese ontological 
security concerns. 
 
Setting the stage at the eve of years of diplomatic challenges, Jacques Chirac’s high-
profile state visit to China in October 2006, seeking to shore up and strengthen the 
relationship with China after the failed attempts at cancelling the arms embargo, was 
a diplomatic parade of celebrating the achievements made by the two countries. Hu 
Jintao expressed how Sino-French relations at that point were a model for the world 
of how two countries of different cultural backgrounds and development levels 
should interact. Whilst hailing France’s support for the EU to end the arms embargo 
and supporting the recognition of the PRC as a market economy, Hu also proclaimed 
that “no matter the changes in the international situation, we persist in the Sino-French 
comprehensive friendship. ” 796  The same year, Wen Jiabao would declare his full 
confidence in the future of Sino-German relations, when meeting with the German 
president. 797  
 
However, barely more than a year later, this relationship was turned into a complete 
standstill, as Chinese officials and politicians implemented a boycott of the bilateral 
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relationship, that even extended to the full-scale cancellation of the 11th EU-China 
Summit of 2008, thus reverberating to the level of the entire European continent. What 
was the chain of events leading to this breakdown in Europe-China relations? On the 
European side, a change in the leadership of key European countries and concerns 
regarding the increasing trade deficit with China had led to an increased emphasis on 
human rights issues and a more strained economic relationship.798 This thus hardened 
the main cause of diversion between China and Europe, whilst weakening the main 
interest bonding them together. In September 2007 this tension came to a head as 
Angela Merkel, fresh home from a state visit to China, became the first Chancellor to 
receive the Dalai Lama in an official capacity.799 This act led to strong reactions from 
the Chinese, suspending a number of exchanges until diplomatic negotiations 
managed to smooth out the issue. 800 Soon after, however, large-scale protests in Tibet, 
and the heavy-handed Chinese crackdown of these in the spring of 2008, lead to 
widespread European condemnations.801 The Tibetan issue was further accentuated 
by being linked to the symbolically loaded 2008 Beijing Olympics, as both the French 
President Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Merkel decided to boycott the 
Olympics Opening Ceremony, and as the Chinese Olympic torch relay was met with 
public protests in many European capitals, in Paris in particular.  
 
Both official and grassroot nationalism in China converged to cause a popular boycott 
of the French chain Carrefour, as  a counter to the perception that Europe, and France 
in particular did not respect Chinese sovereignty.802 When French President Sarkozy 
in late 2008 declared his intention to receive the Dalai Lama officially, the Chinese 
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responded by cancelling the 11th EU-China Summit scheduled in Lyon. Furthermore, 
when Wen Jiabao went on a trip of European capitals in early 2009 to seek to shore up 
some of the fallout from the crisis, he intentionally avoided France, whilst 
admonishing the French to correct their behaviour and stop insulting the Chinese 
people.803 When Denmark’s Prime Minister later received the Dalai Lama, they saw a 
similar boycott enacted. This further prolonged a period of deep diplomatic crisis, 
only slowly solved through diplomatic means through the 2009 and 2010 as the 
leaders scrambled through an extended number of meetings and summits in order to 
seek to address the fallout. 804 Thus, two leading European powers came to be the focal 
point for a more systematic European challenge to the Chinese self-narrative, 
highlighting a set of issues that would keep reappearing as a structural feature of the 
Europe-China relationship. This feature, deeply emmeshed in diverging ideas of 
values, universality, sovereignty and the political foundations of the regime, were all 
deeply related to the ontological aspect of Chinese security seeking. 
 
8.4.2 The Identity Factor in China’s Europe Boycott 
In analysing the Chinese governments rhetoric through these years of escalating 
diplomatic conflict, the main discourses identified earlier are present throughout. 
These basic structures of meaning entailed a set of policy impetuses for the CCP, 
aimed at ensuring the ontological security of their regime’s political project through, 
essentially, policing the European countries’ recognition of their foundational 
narrative. This is reflected in their insistence on the role of recognising sovereign 
equality, avoiding any critique of their domestic and territorial politics, and seeking 
to harness the European parties acceptance for providing status and face to the 
Chinese leadership. Thus bestowing upon them officially the status of stewards of a 
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separate and high status civilization. The Chinese discourses framing these political 
issues in the China-Europe relationship would even, unwittingly, draw upon the 
personal psychological basis on which the IR theory of ontological security was drawn 
upon, through branding an action like receiving the Dalai Lama as something that 
“hurts the feelings of the Chinese people”. In other words, a key political driving force 
in Chinese foreign policies identified by the CCP itself as Chinese feelings, in the 
context of the Europeans not providing them their vaunted status position. 
 
When meeting with the EU Commission President Barroso and the Portuguese Prime 
Minister in November 2007, Hu Jintao was perfectly clear in his framing of the 
gathering clouds on the diplomatic horizon: “both parties must, based on the spirit of 
mutual respect and equal consultations, appropriately handle the new problems 
arising from the new situation of the development of the bilateral relationship.”805 The 
formulations utilized here also demonstrates that the Chinese discourse used to 
describe the relations with the EU in normal times, was also the key prism in times of 
diplomatic crises. In February 2008 in a phone call with Merkel, Wen Jiabao 
underlined again how important it is that Germany and China work on their 
relationship based on a fundament of equal status and respect.806 Throughout March 
and April of 2008, then, the Chinese logs of the leadership’s phone conferences with 
the German leadership, show how the Chinese government underlined on three 
different occasions their stance on the Dalai Lama’s splittist activities. This trope ties 
directly into the fear of Western-led splittism directed towards China, which as 
detailed earlier was a recurring feature of China’s general foreign policy discourse.807 
In terms of the role played by face and status, it is also important to note that for China, 
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a country of such a stature, on a rapid ascent in world affairs, the top priority was 
declared by Foreign Minister Yang to be cooperating to ensure a successful hosting of 
the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, and he specifically appreciated the EU’s decision not to 
boycott the opening ceremony.808  
 
When Barroso met Hu Jintao again in April 2008, however, the tone was notably 
changed, and a far more careful and conflict-focused discourse has emerged, as Hu 
was underlining the importance of the EU and China upholding their contact, and 
“properly handle and solve significant bilateral concerns and divergences, to ensure 
the long-term health, stability, and development of the comprehensive strategic 
partnership relations between China and the EU.”809 Over the following year, these 
significant bilateral divergences would only intensify in nature. This was not so much 
due to economic or security factors, as to the underlying gap between the parties in 
their search for ontological security and status recognition on the international scene. 
After the tussle with Germany over the Dalai Lama visit, it was again France that 
would become the main focal point of China-Europe tensions, due to a number of 
actions of high symbolic value to the Chinese. As tensions rose between China and 
France in early 2008, a substantial diplomatic operation to defuse the crisis saw a 
number of high-level meetings take place in Beijing. Wen Jiabao emphasized to the 
French delegation the Chinese view of the situation in Tibet.810 As Hu Jintao met with 
the French Senate President Ponchelet, he emphasized in a straightforward manner 
how the Chinese leadership regarded the demonstrations and actions against the torch 
relay through Paris as a matter of genuine concern for the Chinese party state. He 
utilised a turn of speech that would become a signature phrase for the CCP in cases 
where they felt they had lost face abroad, by claiming that it hurt the feelings of the 
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Chinese people: “Recently in France, a series of events have taken place that are 
unfriendly to the Chinese people, most of all the Beijing Olympics torch relay was in 
Paris met with disturbances and attacks, hurting the Chinese people’s feelings (伤害
了中国人民的感情), this is something we do not want to see.” 811 The same was also 
expressed by other high-ranking officials.812 
 
Following up on the previous chapter’s focus on how a crisis in Sino-EU relations was 
exacerbated through ontological security-related issues, the events of this chapter also 
showcase these dynamics. It is thus interesting to note how such a similar crisis of 
identity was to a large extent solved by the two European powers in question 
increasingly buying into and declaring their support for the Chinese ontological 
narrative. As the Chinese authorities communicated that the key for solving the issues 
was in subscribing to their version of mutual respect and equal recognition.813As the 
result of the negotiations aimed at defusing the tensions with France, then, State 
Councillor Dai Bingguo and French diplomat Levitte reached an important consensus 
in order to solve the situation, where the two countries agreed to five points. 
Essentially, these involved France repeating and restating their support for the 
Chinese government’s narrative on key issues such as that of Tibet and Taiwan. And 
the joint statement specifically addresses in point 3, which again goes to show the 
symbolic importance with which the Chinese government imbued the Olympics, that: 
“The Olympics is a sporting and friendly event for all the world’s peoples, and politics 
has no relation with it, the French side wishes and supports for the Beijing Olympics 
to obtain complete success.”814  This declaration of the non-political nature of the 
Olympics in a high profile document of diplomatic negotiations between two of the 
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Security Council’s permanent member countries, of course directly demonstrates just 
how politically charged the Olympics was for the CCP. As treated in further literature, 
it is also symptomatic of the extent to which Chinese identity and ontological security 
had been emmeshed with the status-increasing move that was the 2008 Olympics.815  
As Callahan summarised the role of these events for the Chinese identity projection: 
To introduce China to the world as a major power, Beijing recently 
choreographed three mega-events: the 2008 Beijing Olympics 
presented China as a soft superpower, the National Day military 
parade in 2009 confirmed that China also has hard power, and the 
Shanghai World Expo (…) All three were designed to show “The 
Real China” as a rejuvenated and unified nation that was returning 
to its rightful place at the center of world affairs: remember that 
“One World, One Dream” was the slogan for the Olympics.816 
 
 
Thus, when Hu Jintao met with Sarkozy a few months later, Hu was unusually 
straight forward in defining the diplomatic spat as the responsibility of France, that 
France now had taken the step to rectify: “Recently the French side has taken great 
efforts and adopted some measures to improve Sino-French relations, we have 
positively evaluated these efforts, hoping for the bilateral relations to turn over the 
page on this”817 However, shortly afterwards, as Sarkozy was preparing to meet again 
with the Dalai Lama, diplomatic crisis rose all over again, and the repairing of this 
latest rift entailed an even clearer statement from France on their respect for the 
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Chinese government and people. In the meeting between Wen and the French Premier 
Raffarin, Wen Jiabao summarized this as follows; 
The current Sino-French relations are meeting difficulties and the 
responsibility is not on the Chinese side. The French side should 
carry out concrete actions, making an energetic and positive 
response to the grave core concerns of the Chinese side. Our 
persistence in standing by the fundamental principles of mutual 
respect, equal benefits, and mutual non-interference in domestic 
affairs will not change.818  
 
Correspondingly, in Hu Jintao’s meeting with Sarkozy on April 2nd 2009, as the 
relations between the countries were being patched up, again, he summarized the 
problematic months by pointing out that Sino-French relations had earlier seen serious 
difficulties. However, the French side had since reiterated their adherence to the one-
China policy, and that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, opposing any 
independence efforts on their behalf, and as such, " The Chinese side appreciates this 
and feels happy that Sino-French relations have been restored.”819 In May 2009, Wen 
was sounding the end to the problematic era of the relationship in what was already 
the second visit that year, after a European roundtrip, including Brussels and Davos 
in January, and in the process got the EU-China diplomatic relationship back on track.  
 
As such, speaking at the conclusion of the long delayed 11th China-EU Summit in 
Prague, considerable expectations awaited his speech during the common press 
conference with EU President Krauss and EU Commission President Barroso. Laying 
out three important points for the public, Wen Jiabao was pointing out both how 
multipolarization was still binding China and the EU together, and that China did not 
want to seek any G2-like cooperation with the US. Furthermore, he underlined that 
China had been making great progress economically, but still had a long way to go. 
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Most importantly, though, he emphasized again that “Firstly, Sino-Europe relations’ 
foundation is mutual respect and treating each other equally, both in the past, in the 
present and in the future”820 Underlining for a second time in the same speech the 
discursive construction of China’s ontological security being linked with the EU 
recognizing Beijing’s ontological narrative, Wen went on to call for the end of the arms 
embargo and the recognition of MES status.821 This thus linked these two issues ever 
more closely to being an issue of status, recognition and fairness, as viewed from 
Beijing. It is, furthermore, interesting to note how the reassurance that China would 
not abandon the EU for a duumvirate with the USA speaks volumes about how the 
Chinese economic and political position had changed over the last years, as well as 
how the Chinese perception of themselves had changed. Nevertheless, their insistence 
on being treated, and granted status as a separate civilization with a separate system, 
had strengthened further, as the discourses created policy impetuses to more 





In tracing the Chinese official discourses throughout a period of profound crisis in the 
EU-China relationship, the persistence of the foundational Chinese narrative was clear. 
However, the main discourses predicated on this narrative demonstrated certain 
changes, as they constituted a range of political and economic development trends in 
a manner that served to emphasise the successfulness of the Chinese model, and by 
more clearly asserting a Chinese ‘status upgrade’ in their role in international relations. 
In analysing the Chinese discourses of their economic success throughout the years 
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preceding and following the financial crisis, most notably, the discourse did not centre 
around alternative focal points, such as the importance of being integrated into the 
Western, capitalist system of global free-trade at a fortunate moment, but rather by 
emphasizing the Chinese model as uniquely successful. In analysing how these 
discourses permeated the Chinese positions throughout the turn-point era of 2007-
2010, the policy impetuses of these discourses seem to have furthered a few notable 
effects on how, and how assertively, the Chinese side sought to have their ontological 
security confirmed by the European side.  
 
Although economic concerns formed an important backdrop for the nadir in the 
relationship, this thesis argues that a main point of discontent was also in the realm of 
ontological security discrepancies between the two parties. Most notably, a key 
impetus for the rapid descent of this once and future bilateral ‘global axis’ is arguably 
found in how the Chinese sense of self grew more assertive as they sought recognition 
for the status upgrade they themselves felt they deserved. This, then, more openly 
challenged the universalism-based ontological security of the European powers 
France and Germany. Some key point of interest in this regard are worthy of further 
detailing, namely the increased political salience for China when relating to official 
visits by the Dalai Lama to European capitals, the increasing importance of seeking to 
have European parties publicly and officially recognize key parts of the Chinese main 
discourses on sovereignty and separateness as a precondition of ending the diplomatic 
crises, and how this effected an important negotiation regarding the China-EU 
partnership treaty. 
 
As Xi Jinping, then vice-president, formulated it in a key visit to the European 
Commission in Brussels at the eve of the diplomatic normalization in late 2009: 
 
We must from the beginning to end persist in the principle of 
equality and mutual trust. The historical experience of the 
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development of China-EU relations proves that as long as the two 
sides persist in the principle of "mutual respect and mutual trust, 
equality-based consultations, and seeking common ground while 
holding back differences", all along from the general situation of 
Sino-Europe relations onwards earnestly respect each other’s’ great 
concerns, Sino-Europe relations will certainly rule out all kinds of 
disturbances and move the development forward.822  
 
Emphasizing even more the central role of the difference of Europe as an Other of 
China, he thus reasserted that the respect of equality extends to the recognition of 
China’s key concerns, and that this is s a precondition of a good relationship. This 
stronger emphasis on respecting China’s concerns can be seen precisely in how the 
CCP chose to confront European countries more aggressively on the issue of Dalai 
Lama visits from these years onwards, given that the Dalai Lama had been visiting 
European countries throughout the last 30-odd years. The Dalai Lama had during the 
Hu era become an increasingly contentious guest, as Beijing more assertively sought 
to police his reception abroad. This through both diplomatic reactions and punitive 
economic measures, regarding the Dalai lama’s travels as tantamount to working 
against that declared core interest of the PRC that is territorial unity.823  These reactions 
should also be seen in the context of the economic crisis, because given that these were 
economically very fraught times, there were no material incentives for China to cause 
such substantial upheavals with its relations to some of its biggest trade partners. In 
particular, there were no economic incentives to escalate the issue up on the EU level, 
as it was done when they cancelled the EU-China summit that the French were about 
to chair. The decision to temporarily sever normal relations with the world’s largest 
economic bloc, in the aftershocks of the world’s largest economic crisis since the Great 
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Depression, can be said to have little possible material rationale, and all the more 
connection to reasons of ontological security seeking. 
 
The manner in which the European countries succeeded in diffusing the crises, then, 
was in essence through recognising the Chinese discourse of the situation. Thus 
recognising, even though diplomatically forced to do so, the CCP’s foundational 
narrative. As Men dryly notes of the situation:  
The meetings between European leaders and the Dalai Lama, in the 
view of Beijing, amounted to European interference in China’s 
domestic affairs. (…). Interestingly enough, after the meeting with 
the Dalai Lama, Mr Sarkozy stated, ‘I am free as the French president 
and the EU president, I have values and convictions. Let’s not make 
things tense, the world doesn’t need it and it doesn’t correspond to 
reality’. In other words, Mr Sarkozy was criticizing the fact that 
China had intervened with his decision-making power as both the 
French president and the EU president.824  
 
The Sino-French declaration solving the situation thus reads that the two parties had 
agreed to “work with a strategic and long-term perspective and on the basis of 
respecting each other and taking into account of each other's fundamental interests to 
strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. China and France reiterated their 
adherence to the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.” 825 
Clearly Sarkozy’s earlier view did not win out. As two China-EU Summits followed 
in the same year, seeking to catch up on lost time, the long awaited 11th Summit 
produced a paragraph that explicitly underlines the equality between the parties. 
Notably, the paragraph also includes an integrated sentence where the EU leaders 
very explicitly bestows legitimacy on the political system of China, as well as on the 
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basic ontological security narrative of the Chinese, by stating their support for China’s 
development and continued ‘Peaceful Rise.’826 This thesis’ findings thus supports the 
assertion made by Crookes, who points to a number of fundamental 
misunderstandings from the European side creating tensions in the relationship, the 
first of which is that, “there has been a misjudgement by the EU of China's position in 
the world as a re-emerged power, which has undermined the whole basis of 
constructive engagement based on equality, which China values highly at an 
emotional and semiotic level.”827 As this research has demonstrated, the entire process 
surrounding these crises are clearly indicative of exactly such a misread identity factor 
shaping the dynamics of the political and diplomatic impasses. 
 
A further example of the kind of discourse that Chinese are sought to encourage from 
their diplomatic partners is exemplified in the meeting between the EU Parliament 
Speaker Borelli and Hu Jintao in 2006, with the former emphasizing that the people of 
Europe are happy to see that China has found a development path that suits its own 
national conditions and that China has made great achievements in economic and 
social development. 828  This overall exemplifies the link to the equal and separate 
civilizations-narrative, that had become pivotal to the regime security of the CCP, and 
their basis for establishing the state’s ontological security. In essence, China is special, 
and good at it. The ti/yong distinction of keeping the essence of a separate civilization 
whilst building on modern technology is the guiding principle. It is of primary 
importance to underline that this time it actually works with great success, as it is 
intimately tied to the CCP’s performance legitimacy amongst the Chinese population. 
Overall, the European influence was less keenly relevant as a building block for 
Chinese identity in this period, but was still of enough relevance to shape Chinese 
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policies towards the European continent in a number of important ways. Mickhailski 
and Pan summarize the relationship between the parties as follows: “In the initial 
phase of the relationship the EU strove to socialize China into the prevailing order. 
However, once China learnt the rules of engagement it has endeavoured to diffuse its 
norms and worldviews upon the EU.”829 This Chinese view is summarized in a typical 
statement by Wen Jiabao, reasserting the China and the EU have no fundamental 
disagreements, and that they both agree on multipolarization and civilizational 
diversity.830 However, this point of civilizational diversity, directly counters the EU’s 
foundational narrative about universal rights being, precisely, universal.831 From the 
Chinese side, the solution to this impasse was simple, in that it would merely need 
European recognition of ti/yong civilizational diversity, in line with the foundational 
narrative the CCP had based their government upon. In effect this was not just any 
diplomatic spat, but a fundamental disagreement that although of little practical, 
political, or economic importance, carried immense importance for the ontological 
narrative of each of these two polities.  
 
As such, in spite of the diplomatic thaw between the countries, this split founded upon 
deep incompatibilities between the two polities’ ontological narratives was still not 
going to go away easily. Following up on the drive to formalise the declarations of a 
comprehensive strategic partnership further, the 9th EU-China summit was a key 
moment where the negotiation for a new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA) was launched, meant to be a capstone of the new relationship.832 In order to 
follow up on the rhetoric defining the bilateral relationship as a core one in the new 
age of multipolarity, the fact that the China-EU relationship was still mainly 
institutionalized in the old 1985 Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, was 
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increasingly problematic as the relationship evolved rapidly, and as such a new 
negotiated treaty was the logic next step. However, the simple act of formalising the 
relationship has not only proved difficult, but elusive. The PCA negotiations were 
mentioned as a key aspect in the subsequent summit declarations, but after 2009 this 
reference has disappeared, as the negotiations have been bogged down by a number 
of issues, most notably European insistence on including a human rights clause, and 
has de facto been stalled since 2011. 833 This serves to highlight again the importance 
of identity as a factor in EU-China relations, and the influence of divergences in rather 
symbolic issues of political values and attitudes to sovereignty and universal rights 
that are important for both parties’ ontological security. As such, to discount these 
identity concerns from an analysis of China – EU relations entails overlooking one of 
the most important factors of the political dynamic. 
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Chapter 9: Europe’s Conflicted Place in a New Era - 
Beijing, London, and Oslo (2010-2016) 
 
 
9.1 Introduction: European Problems and Solutions, 2010-2016 
 
The political context of China-Europe relations in the years from 2010 to 2016 has been 
described as a half-decade of a maturing partnership, following on from the 
tumultuous divisions that cut short the earlier honeymoon phase. 834  In this 
‘normalization’ of the relationship was, however, included the continuation of key 
tensions over issues of identity and universal values that would still be a key factor 
shaping China’s relationship with the European continent. Concurrent with Xi 
Jinping’s consolidation of power within the Chinese political system and the 
continued growth of Chinese economic and military capabilities in the world, the 
Chinese main discourses relating to Europe developed in a more pronounced fashion 
along a trajectory where a successful Chinese model of development was increasingly 
contrasted to that of the West, and where a revived version of the Chinese past 
increasingly was placed as the imagined future of the CCP’s national narrative. The 
empirical material thus demonstrates an increasing readiness by the Chinese 
government to exert political and economic capital in pursuit of European states’ 
acquiescence to these discourses. As, in essence, the CCP sought to preserve face by 
more strictly policing European countries’ adherence to recognising the Chinese great 
power-discourse. 
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These developments effected both the cause of, and the solution to, two recent 
examples of Sino-European political and diplomatic crises, namely those related to the 
UK government’s decision to meet with the Dalai Lama, and China’s 6 years boycott 
of Norway in the aftermath of the Nobel Committee awarding the Peace Prize to 
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. These two cases are well suited to demonstrate how a 
range of political and economic ties can be adversely affected by demonstrations of 
ontological security-seeking, as Beijing’s leadership increasingly regarded China as a 
great power demanding respect for their separate model of government. As Xi Jinping 
declared a ‘new era’ for the People’s Republic, these cases thus demonstrate the 
continuities with key narratives of bygone eras, as well as detailing how the shifts in 
the related discourses opened up for a more assertive range of policies. The 6-year 
diplomatic, and partly economic, boycott of Norway is a good case in point, as Chinese 
boycotts of European countries were already an established pattern, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, but never on such a scale or of such a long duration. This change in 
Chinese policies, and their willingness to escalate the issue is arguably representative 
of a distinct discursive change. In this, the EU was no longer a rising power, on which 
companionship China could reach their goal of a more multipolar world order, but 
rather a weakening entity with issues that meant it was easier for China to serve their 
goal of legitimacy by coercing European countries, in order to force its will through 
on political disagreements that were central ontological issues for the CCP.  
 
This chapter will first trace this development of the Chinese leadership’s discourses 
on Europe, and how these reflected the changes in the Chinese foundational narrative. 
In the second section the political ramifications of these changes are explored, through 
the analysis of the two cases of Chinese political boycotts towards the UK and Norway. 
In sum, the chapter will trace these changes in the Chinese leadership’s discourses, 
analysing how they spoke about themselves, Europe, and the world in a different 
manner, and as such reacting and acting differently in their policies towards the 





9.2 Foundational Narrative: Xi and China’s Great Power Narrative 
 
The developments in China’s discourses regarding Europe were intimately linked to 
a number of broader changes in the Chinese perceptions of themselves and their place 
in the international system, that took place during this period. As such, the following 
section will give a brief overview of changes in the Chinese foundational narrative, 
and related general foreign policy discourse, before linking these developments to the 
specific discourses regarding the People’s Republic’s relations with Europe. The 
delineation of this chapter to the years 2010 to 2016 implies that the sources analysed 
derive from both the late years of Hu Jintao’s presidency and the early period of Xi 
Jinping’s ascendancy as the most dominant Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping. The 
timeframe was chosen because not only it is in concurrence with the Chinese 
government’s freeze of their relations with Norway, but more importantly because 
straddling the momentous change in power from Hu to Xi allows for a more succinct 
analysis of continuities and ruptures with regards to the Chinese main discourses, in 
the midst of pronounced changes to the country’s domestic and foreign policy 
profiles.  
 
With Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2012/2013, he started off his leadership period 
through a very symbolically loaded public statement emphasizing a resurgent 
Chinese narrative, when he brought the entire Politburo’s Standing Committee with 
him to the Chinese National Museum’s exhibition on the “Chinese Road to 
Rejuvenation”, during which he gave a speech emphasizing his lessons from the visit: 
“Through more than 170 years of persistent struggle after the Opium War, the Great 
Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation was the bright prospect on the horizon. Now, the 
goal of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is closer than ever before in our 
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history.”835  Exemplifying one of the key strains of the foundational narrative of the 
CCP’s political project, he explicitly restated it as a clearly temporally defined 
narrative arc. In essence, the temporal narrative’s aspirations is that of achieving the 
China Dream through completing the Two Centenary Goals, that traces the future 
narrative of the Chinese Rise until the 100 years jubilee of the PRC in 2049, at which 
point China is meant to be a fully developed country.836 In the speech, of course, the 
continued relevance of the role of Europe in Chinese political identity narration is put 
on full display, tying into the broader ontological security rationale of the CCP as the 
guardian of the deliverance from the years of humiliation. Simultaneously it proves a 
good reference point for the constantly referred to Centennial Goals that showcases 
how material achievements are a key part of the ontological basis of the current 
Chinese political project.837 
 
It should be noted that this discursive realignment did not involve the abandonment 
of the peaceful development slogan as a marker of government policies, as this 
continued to be used by Xi as a key trope in speeches on foreign policy; rather, it was 
increasingly taking the back stage in favour of Xi’s own more assertive policy agendas 
and slogans. 838  As Xi Jinping pointed out in a 2013 Politburo study session, that 
peaceful development should never come at the expense of core national interests.839 
This is also demonstrated through the content analysis in fig. 10. The centrality of Xi’s 
main international policy project, the ‘One Belt, One Road’, in diplomatic 
communications with Europe is essentially off the charts, as compared to other well-
used tifa’s, something that both reflects the massive diplomatic offensive undertaken 
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in drumming up international support in favour of the initiative, and also reflects how 
European countries eventually became regarded as a key constituent of the project. 
Whereas the foundational narrative only changed to an extent over the period of time 
analysed here, the main discourses saw considerable shifts. 
 
 
Figure 10: Use of the Terms "One Belt, One Road" and "Peaceful Development" in FMPRC 
Documents on Europe 
 
The new policy initiatives Xi sought to implement, entered into a domestic political 
situation hallmarked by both a meteoric rise in international stature, but also in a 
situation where domestic economic, political and ecologic strains were getting ever 
more visible. 840  Xi also struggled successfully against oppositional narratives 
emphasizing constitutionalism over centralized party leadership as a future vision of 
China.841 The slogan of the China Dream, was embraced by Xi in his inaugural speech 
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at the 12th NPC, in which he emphasized how the China Dream was part and parcel 
of the Great Rejuvenation narrative, of China rising to its former heights as a society 
and an international actor.842 Thus it illustrates well how the China Dream was meant 
as a more assertive rhetorical tool, but that is still based on the extant foundational 
narrative of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and tied to the existing Two 
Centennial Goals of the CCP, whereby at the 100 year anniversary of the PRC in 2049, 
China would be a strong, prosperous developed country that has successfully 
achieved its revival, through, as Xi Jinping repeatedly has emphasized, adhering to 
the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.843   
 
This new range of foreign policy slogans and initiatives, does also ring true with one 
of Xi Jinping’s insights, namely that in order to strengthen China internationally, it is 
important to strengthen the country’s soft and discursive power, through seeking to 
ensure that “the Chinese story is well told”.844 On this basis, Xi would later also outline 
two new foreign policy initiatives,845 namely that of the ‘New Type of Great Power 
Relations’ and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative later renamed to the ‘Belt and Road 
Initiative,’ as a bold restatement of China’s place in the world.846 These initiatives are 
focused on the rejuvenation of China, through increasing the centrality of China as the 
hub of both its near abroad, and the Eurasian continent more widely. As such, the 
utilization of the old Silk Road moniker is emblematic both of the aim at re-centring 
China in the international trade patterns, and the drive to re-embed the glories of old.  
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One primary thing to note from the European perspective, however, when analysing 
Xi’s initiatives to turn China from a rules-taker to more of a rules-shaper, is the extent 
to which Europe and the EU was a marginal concern in both the initiatives’ 
formulation and implementation. As Zeng’s comprehensive analysis demonstrated, 
the new type of great power relations, originally coined by Jiang Zemin as a goal for 
all of Beijing’s relations with larger countries, including Europe, was instead under Xi 
rebranded into an exercise focusing on US-China relations. This outlook on the global 
political scene thus left little room for the EU. The OBOR also was firstly meant as a 
Chinese neighbourhood initiative, to the extent that the programme was not even 
mentioned in the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, of 2013, and only 
became a part of the initiative at around the same time as Africa was also included in 
the planning the year after, in 2014.847 In his congratulatory note celebrating 40 years 
of diplomatic ties with the EU, Xi would still describe their relationship as one of the 
globe’s most important.848 Nevertheless, the analysis of Chinese academic discourse 
from 1998 to 2014 by Zeng and Breslin concludes, that in scholarly works on the new 
type of great power relationship, the EU is very rarely mentioned, and singular 
European countries even less so. The overwhelming definition of a great power is the 
USA, and increasingly also China itself.849  
 
This, then, forms a constituent part of the Chinese foundational narrative structured 
around the idea of China as an equal and separate civilization-turned-polity. However, 
the texts from these years demonstrate a readjustment of this foundational narrative, 
towards a further emphasis on how China’s successful and separate social model 
makes it deserve the rights and privileges of a great power. One of the arenas where 
this readjusted narrative would play out was in Europe, where in the midst of growing 
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economic ties there were dispersed serious diplomatic crises tied to this Chinese 
identity factor. As such, the foundational narrative with regards to Europe was fairly 
similar to the narrative traced throughout the previous chapters, but with a substantial 
increase in the emphasis of China going from being a separate civilization seeking 
equality and redress, to a civilization not only separate but successfully so. This 
narrative  was embedded in the general developments of China’s view of itself and its 
place in the world, and also with regards to Europe.850 This alteration of the PRC’s 
foundational narrative further shaped the main Chinese official discourses with 
regards to Europe. Both in the case of the UK, as a former empire with particular 
historical and current ties to China, and Norway, as a small state actor on Europe’s 
northern periphery, these general developments in China’s Europe discourses, would 
bring ontological security into play in the relationship with China in particular ways. 
The discursive changes that shaped the political landscape for the two countries’ 
coming diplomatic crises with Beijing, were arguably also part and parcel of the 
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9.3 Main Discourses: Great Power China Reassesses Europe 
 
Based on the foundational Chinese narrative explored above, the four main derived 
discourses of relevance for the China-Europe relationship framed the developing 
relationship in a manner demonstrating both continuities and some subtle, but 
consequential, shifts. (See fig. 11) The first main discourse draws upon the co-rising 
power poles discourse identified in earlier chapters, but whose main subject position 
has changed to reassess the relative power positions of China and the EU. To a larger 
extent it implies China now demanding recognition as a great power in its own right, 
rather than as a co-developing new power pole in the international multipolar 
landscape. Second, this is closely related to an increased emphasis on the importance 
of external recognition of China’s status. The third main discourse emphasizes Europe 
and China as key civilizations of the East and West, but with an increasingly added 
focus on how the Chinese Eastern civilization is now on the brink of its great 
renaissance. Fourth, the discourse branding China and the EU as the largest 
developing country and the largest developed, respectively, on different stages of an 
overall similar development trajectory, did increasingly recede in favour of an 
emphasis on the uniqueness of China’s socialist model with Chinese characteristics. 
The idea of China as politically separate and exceptional thus gave rise to a discourse 
echoing the ti/yong discourse of the ancient self-strengtheners only with the exception 
of this time being successful in the endeavour. This trend is also captured 
quantitatively, as figure 12 demonstrates the increasing prevalence of mentions of 
socialist ideology in the diplomatic documents during the Xi era. Simultaneously, the 
key term of the ‘Great Rejuvenation’ is an important example of how key discursive 
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trends that started under Hu, increased immensely in discursive importance and 
frequency during Xi’s leadership. 
 
 
Figure 12: Use of the Terms "Great Rejuvenation" and "Socialism" in FMPRC Documents on Europe 
 
These changing main discourses opened for a number of consequential changes in the 
derived policy directions. These manifested themselves mainly as an increased drive 
for securing recognition of China’s improved status from its European partners, and 
increasingly assertive demands for recognition of China’s perceived rightful global 
role, and respect for their social, political and economic model. This assertiveness was 
thus no longer moderated by the idea of securing European support as an emerging 
axis of a new multipolar world, but by securing their recognition for the CCP’s new 




9.3.1 Respecting a Great Power’s Status 
One of the key developments in the Chinese discursive context for its Europe policies 
for this period, is thus the gradual reassessment of both their own and the European 
continent’s place in the international system. As mentioned, the simultaneous accrual 
of economic and political power for the PRC, coupled with repeated European issues 
along both economic and political lines, is reflected in an increasing Chinese focus on 
having European countries recognising China’s great power interests. This discourse 
marks a substantial change from earlier language emphasizing the EU as a co-rising 
power pole and potential alliance partner. The earlier alliance-partner discourse 
would increasingly disappear out of use in the key rhetoric, in line with the increased 
focus on both the fundamental civilizational difference, and the perceived subtraction 
of the relative power gap between the parties.   
 
A case in point with regards to Europe’s diminished role, is illustrated through how 
Xi Jinping would list to a UN summit in Geneva, his ambition to create, respectively, 
a new type of great power relationship with the US, a comprehensive strategic 
partnership with Russia, a civilizational partnership with Europe, and stand in 
solidarity with the BRICS.851 Comparing this with the PRC rhetoric on a potential 
China-EU axis from a decade earlier, demonstrates the change in quite plain terms. 
The 2014 Chinese EU Policy Paper thus frames the relationship by emphasizing how 
the world, China, and the EU has changed during these last 10 years, and that the 
world has indeed been both more globalized and multipolar. On this background, the 
preamble emphasizes two main developments, firstly, that fact that “China’s 
comprehensive national power has been substantially elevated, now playing a critical 
role in effecting major international and regional issues. But China is still a developing 
                                                 




country, with existing prominent question regarding a development that is uneven, 
uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”852  
 
The second relevant main point in the preamble is that the section on the EU starts out 
by emphasizing that “The EU because of the influence from the international financial 
crisis, has encountered its most sever challenge since the Cold War, and need to 
urgently address a number of deeply rooted structural and  systematic issues”853  The 
economic aspect of the discursive change can be exemplified by Wen’s 2010 speech to 
the EU-China Business Summit in Brussels, where he heralded the Chinese support 
for a struggling European economy:  
In the cold winter in January 2009, I visited Europe and brought with 
me not only the confidence needed to overcome the financial crisis, 
but also a procurement delegation to place orders to the European 
countries. The EU is a strategic partner to China, and China did not 
look on unconcerned when some eurozone countries were in trouble. 
(…) We will continue to render assistance and tide some countries 
over their difficulties. China is a friend indeed854  
 
This discourse of China increasingly demanding to be treated as a great power, with 
all the status and interest recognition that entails, is further emphasized in the 2014 
Chinese Whitepaper on their EU policies. And as fig. 6 of Chapter 7 demonstrated, the 
focus on Chinese core interests is increasingly prevalent in Beijing’s international 
diplomatic communications with Europe. The language on human rights is, following 
from the implied logic of this restatement of civilizational difference, toned down. The 
additional points thus underline that the EU should in its dialogues, based on mutual 
respect and non-interference, be paying equal weight to all types of human rights, 
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including the citizens, economic, and cultural privileges, and that the EU should 
furthermore refrain from using single cases to interfere in China’s legal sovereignty 
and internal politics.855  
 
This, is in essence, marks a step further away from the idea of Europe as a lodestar 
with regards to political values. Instead, Beijing engages with Europe as an entity with 
one particular view on human rights, that is different from an equally valid Chinese 
view of what constitutes human rights. China is thus to a lesser extent willing to 
remain a norms-taker, implementing the international norms to a large extent defined 
by the Western powers in the period after the Second World War. This was clearly 
formulated in the key decision communicated from the 4th Plenum of the 18th CCP 
Central Committee in 2014, to ensure that China would “vigorously participate in the 
formulation of international rules and regulations (国际规则), promote the handling 
of foreign-related economic and social affairs according to the law, strengthen our 
country’s discourse power (话语权) and influence in international legal affairs."856 The 
Chinese leadership’s main discourse on its relations to Europe was thus increasingly 
based on the conception of regarding itself as a great power, increasingly confident of 
an alternative mode of governance. Thus, as a matter of seeking ontological security 
for this great power status, the Chinese government was increasingly demanding the 
respect they felt belong to a great power in the world. 
 
9.3.2 Equality and Recognition 
Secondly, although the discourse propagated through the speeches, policy 
declarations and communiques analysed here depicts China and Europe as partners 
and growing powers that together can contribute to making a fairer and more 
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democratic political system, the discourse of Europe and China as equal but 
fundamentally different civilizations is still a key representation. As articulated in a 
typical manner by Hu Jintao; “All countries, no matter if they are large or small, poor 
or rich, are equal members of the international society. (…) Our world is abundant 
with different colours, it is impossible to have only one model. One should agree to 
recognize the world’s diversity, respect each country’s history, culture, system of 
society, and development path.”857 This depiction of civilizational equality was further 
deepened by Xi Jinping, who during his keynote speech in Bruges would extend the 
equality between Europe and China further through stating that they were both 
essentially at similar stages of facing socioeconomic challenges. Thus, he exemplified 
again the discursive change from the earlier emphasis on Europe and China as a 
developed continent and a developing country, respectively. “China and Europe are 
both in a crucial period of their development, both are facing unprecedented 
opportunities and challenges (…) China is the world’s largest developing country. 
China’s development has acquired historical progress, the economy has in total 
already leapt to the second largest in the world.”858 
 
For a further restatement  of same Chinese assessment of global trends, Xi’s speech to 
the UN in Geneva, was a further underlining of the Chinese emphasis on equality and 
recognition as a great power within the sovereignty doctrine.859 In his speech Xi very 
explicitly drew upon the European heritage of this doctrine at the Peace of Westphalia, 
and linking this directly to the Chinese ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,’ as 
part of a coherent historical arch in international relations, of which the Chinese 
discourse now portrayed China as a main protector of the principles fleshed out by 
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the European great powers centuries ago, and which the European countries had 
increasingly turned their back to: “Throughout the history of modern times, the 
establishment of a fair and reasonable international order is the goal that mankind is 
striving for.”860 
 
9.3.3 A Great Civilization, Rejuvenated 
Another main discourse predicated on the foundational narrative of the PRC as the 
representative of a distinct and separate civilization, is the increased focus on the 
rejuvenation and rebirth of the great Chinese civilization. This altered discourse 
increasingly emphasizes China not only as a civilization with long historical roots, but 
one that has in its essence been preserved unadulterated for thousands of years, and 
is now about to flourish back to its rightful position after being weakened though a 
century of Western influences. The Chinese civilization that has stayed unique to the 
nation for so long, is also closer than ever to being fully rejuvenated after the 100 years 
of shame. This main discourse was held out by Xi Jinping as one of the key reasons 
why China needs a new foreign policy, in order to better reflect its new position in the 
world.861 
 
In a 2014 speech at the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris Xi Jinping explicated further 
on this basic view of the world as divided into separate and distinct civilizations with 
deep roots. Drawing on the old discursive construct of the Chinese as a civilizational 
essence (ti) as opposed to the applied technology (yong) of the West, this distinction is 
also symptomatic of a broader trend amongst non-Western states embracing 
civilizational identities.862 In the Chinese case this extends to a scholarly fascination 
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for Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, although in line with the political 
speeches quoted here, one of the main debates revolves around the degree to which 
different civilizations predicates a clash, or peaceful co-existence. 863  As Gries 
summarizes the political repercussions of this civilizational narrative: “Many Chinese 
nationalists fear that modernization will lead to ‘peaceful evolution’: cultural 
convergence or Westernization. By reifying cultural differences, Huntington creates 
space for a non-Western but modern China.”864 This latter point, again, ties into the 
same dilemma of technology and values as the ti/yong dilemma the early Chinese 
reformers were struggling with. 
 
Hence, Xi goes on for a long while detailing the various foreign influences on Chinese 
culture, from painting styles to Buddhism, but emphasizing how even Buddhism 
ended up as Buddhism “with Chinese Characteristics”, whilst the Chinese civilization 
still had staid stable an solid throughout 5000 years. Thus, “blindly copying other 
civilizations is like chopping off ones toes to fit into another man’s shoes.”865 This main 
discourse also stayed central with regards to the Chinese view of Europe, as 
communicated through Xi Jinping’s leadership till date:  
China is the Eastern civilization’s important representative, whilst 
Europe is the Western civilization’s birthplace. (…) China advocates 
"harmony without uniformity", and the EU people emphasizes 
"unity of diversity". Let China and Europe work hard together, to 
promote all of mankind’s civilizations’ flowers to compete and 
blossom.866 
 
                                                 
863 Jisi Wang 2009; Wang Jisi 1995; Callahan 2005a; Callahan 2006a, 12–14 
864 Gries 2004, 41 
865 Xi 2014d 




As the 2014 Whitepaper on the EU summarizes it, China hopes that together with 
Europe they can bring together the two great civilizations of East and West, 
“establishing in common a prosperous model for different civilizations harmoniously 
staying different, through pluralism, mutual reflection, and mutual learning.”867 As Xi 
Jinping would later explicate further, in poetic terms, illustrating the incompatibility 
between the world’s social systems as based on fundamental civilizations differences:  
China cannot copy wholesale the other countries’ government 
systems and development models, not only would it not fit us but it 
could bring catastrophic consequences. Over 2000 years ago the 
Chinese people had already come to understand this principle: 
‘Tangerine trees grown in the South yield tangerines, whereas 
grown in the North it yields [sour] trifoliate oranges, even though 
the leaves look similar the taste is not the same. How come? Because 
the water and soil is different.’868 
 
This stronger emphasis on the polity of the PRC as the political embodiment of the 
Chinese civilization, writ large, is a momentous continuation and intensification of the 
extant discourses from decades earlier, where this aspect was downplayed in favour 
of a focus on economic cooperation and convergence.869 As such, Coker has termed 
China as a prime example of the advent in contemporary international relations of the 
‘civilizational state’, due to the PRC’s increased insistence on embodying an 
essentially unchanging and self-contained axiomatic cultural essence.870 
 
9.3.4 Successful Marxist-Confucian Self-Strengtheners 
Intimately tied to the idea of the rebirth of the unique Chinese civilization in its 
rightful place internationally, is the increasingly vocal assertion that links this 
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civilizational distinction to the Communist Party as the only appropriate vehicle for 
this thousand-year-old civilization. The Communist and Confucian strands are thus 
increasingly brought together to explain the successful Chinese model. One can trace 
the echoes of the former Self-Strengthening that sought to modernise China without 
changing the country’s old authoritarian model. Only this time, as the main discourse 
goes, the CCP actually managed this feat with great success. As formulated by Xi 
Jinping at the College of Europe in Bruges: 
The Chinese people painfully sought for a road that fit China’s 
national conditions. exploring long and hard for a path that would 
suit China's national conditions. They experimented with 
constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, 
multi-party system and presidential government, yet the result was 
that they all did not work. Finally, China chose the road of socialism 
(…) The unique traditional culture, the unique historical fate, the 
unique national spirit, preordained that China would inevitably 
only follow a development road that suits its own national 
characteristics. We embarked on such a road, and achieved 
success.871  
 
There is thus under Xi Jinping a new emphasis on China’s development model as 
being able to successfully modernise and provide itself with a great power status and 
material welfare, whilst retaining its position as a separate political and ethical system. 
This narrative thus seeks to smooth out the storytelling of the Chinese nation, as being 
unbroken and beholden to same set of traditional values, despite all the tumults, 
political experimentations and radical changes of China’s modern history. It is, of 
course, easy to spot the inherent tensions in this construct, but creatively rewriting or 
overlooking these tensions are part of the political struggle over any narrative. The 
welding of the Chinese civilization to the Chinese Communist Party, was increasingly 
taking a more dominant role in the public discourse, even to the extent of supplanting 
                                                 




Marxist elements.872 This is, however, only up to a point. As such, arguably one of the 
more interesting new elements of the main discourses upon which the CCP seeks to 
shore up their ontological security and popular legitimacy, is precisely by seeking to 
transcend what for a century was considered to be the direct conflict between 
communism and traditional Chinese culture and philosophy, into a CCP-defined 
amalgam of the Chinese civilization. As Xi Jinping repeatedly has emphasized, “only 
socialism can save China, only Socialism with Chinese characteristics can develop 
China”873 Westernization, on the other hand, had according to Xi only lead to chaos in 
the developing countries that were forced to undertake it after the Cold War.874 This 
more forceful ideological turn against Westernization, is part and parcel of the 
accelerating offensive against universal values throughout the party system, as 
exemplified in the leaked “Document no. 9” circulated to the CCP cadres warning of 
the need to redouble efforts at withstanding the threats of Western democracy and 
universal values.875 The aim of combining into one both the, very much Western-
derived, socialist values, and the traditional values that the CCP until recently was 
vehemently against, is well summarized by Xi to a Politburo study session in 2014: 
“Cultivating and promoting Socialism’s core values must be based on China’s 
splendid traditional culture’s solid core values” 876  This welding of the somewhat 
awkward fit between Marxist dialectics combined with a Party-approved version of 
Confucius, is further exemplified by the large-scale spread of Confucius institutes as 
the spearhead of Chinese soft-power efforts, or notably when Xi Jinping became the 
first CCP leader to attend the yearly celebrations marking Confucius’ death.877  
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9.4 Political Repercussions: New European Challenges to the Narrative 
 
9.4.1 Political Background 
As demonstrated in the sections above, the main discourses relevant to China’s 
policies towards Europe showcased certain significant changes. In essence, the 
Chinese leadership propagated a set of discourses centred on the idea that China had 
taken a substantial leap on the narrative trajectory that had long been the fundament 
for the CCP’s legitimacy and was now seeking recognition from Europe on a different 
level than in earlier decades. The ascendance of Xi Jinping as the most dominant 
Chinese leader since, at least, Deng Xiaoping, dovetailed with this increasingly 
assertive set of discourses. These discourses would then feed into a derived set of 
policy directions that sought to bring the relations with the European countries more 
in line with the recognition sought for China’s self-perceived new status in the world. 
The Chinese IR scholar Yan Xuetong has summarized the shift from the Deng era’s 
policy of keeping a low profile, to what he terms as Xi’s policy of ‘Striving for 
Achievement’, where the goal of the former was economic gains, while the focus of 
the latter is on strengthening political support and recognition from abroad. 878 
Arguably, the more assertive identity recognition drive following from these 
discursive changes was an important contributing factor to two crises in the 
relationship between China and European countries, namely the boycott and later 
embrace of the relationship with the UK, and the 6-year freeze in China’s relations 
with Norway. The following section will briefly present each of these events, before 
going on to explore how these political imbroglios were shaped by a particularly 
Chinese mode of ontological security seeking. 
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Overall, the years from 2010 to 2016 witnessed an increasing realization amongst 
European leaders of the limits of their power to ‘Europeanise’ China through their 
multi-pronged engagement with the country. 879  In economic terms, the decade 
following the financial crises saw one of the fastest periods of development in China-
EU trade and investment ties, even though this continued rapid deepening of the 
economic relationship happened on the background of unparalleled economic and 
political stress for the European Union, and would eventually lay some of the 
groundwork for later tensions to arise in Europe with regards to both the trade flows 
and the influx of Chinese FDI.880 In many ways, these two developments can be said 
to be interrelated, as the waning European influence after the Great Recession, both 
emphasized the increasing realignment of the two parties relative power and status. 
Importantly, the Euro-crisis and the deep-rooted economic and political challenges 
within the Union that the crisis laid bare, caused a re-evaluation of the EU that 
reverberated beyond elite policy circles in China, also to the general populace.881 As 
summarized by Michael Cox; “The global image of Europe could not be more 
different. Thus, whereas China seems to be (and in many respects is) on ‘the up’, 
Europe looks to be ‘on the way down’.” 882  In line with this realignment, the 
increasingly assertive civilizational-centric character of the Chinese regime’s basis of 
ontological security, was co-constituted with Beijing’s view of their European 
partners. 
 
Thus, the diplomatic conflict between the UK and China was, yet again, an example 
of the Chinese government seeking to impose their view on something constituting a 
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threat to their ontological security and geographical sovereignty. The 14th Dalai Lama 
was planning to a trip to the UK in May, where he was to receive the Templeton Prize 
for his spiritual work.883 When then-UK Prime Minister David Cameron signalled that 
he found it reasonable to meet with the Dalai Lama during his trip to the UK, the 
Chinese immediately issued stark warnings against such a meeting to find place.  As 
it became known to the public some weeks later, the Chinese government even 
decided to signal their displeasure through cancelling the planned trip of State 
Councillor Dai Bingguo.884 
 
Despite these warnings, David Cameron decided to meet with the Dalai Lama in May 
2012. In keeping with former Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s then quite successful 
strategy of avoiding to antagonise the Chinese, he met with the Dalai Lama not in the 
PM’s official residence, but instead in the St. Paul’s Cathedral. Thus emphasizing the 
intention to meet with the Dalai Lama in his function as a religious figure, and not a 
political leader.885 However, this time around this diplomatic signalling was met with 
massive Chinese condemnation. The Chinese government ceased all ministerial-level 
contact, and later forced David Cameron to cancel a planned visit to Beijing, as no 
Chinese official was ostensibly available to meeting with him.886 Immediately after the 
meeting, Chinese called the UK ambassador on the carpet and warned that what had 
transpired constituted a “grave interference in Chinese internal affairs, harmed 
China’s core interests, and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”.887  
 
All throughout this period of intense volatility in the UK-China relationship, Norway 
was going through a similarly testing time after having been judged by Beijing to 
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transgress against these same Chinese core interests and important concerns. Unlike 
the usually year-long Chinese boycotts treated earlier in this thesis, the Chinese 
diplomatic freeze towards Norway lasted for a total of more than 6 years, from 2010 
to 2016. The duration of a Chinese political boycott stretching for more than half a 
decade, is quite unprecedented in the contemporary history of China-Europe relations, 
and makes the case of China-Norway ties another salient testing case for the role of 
ontological security in Chinese policies towards European countries.  
 
The boycott of Norway came about as a result of Norwegian Nobel Committee 
deciding in October 2010, in spite of intense Chinese lobbying,888  to award the Nobel 
Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo for his “long and non-violent struggle for 
fundamental human rights in China.”889 With Liu Xiaobo still imprisoned in Chinese 
jail, where he would later pass away in 2017, the prize was given in absentia. Chinese 
authorities reacted with fury to Liu Xiaobo’s award, and the Norwegian government’s 
customary endorsement of the Nobel Committee’s choice. The charge was in line with 
the one raised towards the UK, arguing the award constituted serious interference in 
China’s political and legal affairs. 890  Beijing submitted protests to Norwegian 
representatives both in Beijing and Oslo, and sought to pressure other countries not 
to send representatives to the award ceremony.891  Former Norwegian ambassador 
Holvik said in an interview, he had heard there were high-level discussions in Beijing 
on whether the Norwegian ambassador should be expelled, but this was decided 
against, probably because it would serve to worsen an already strained relationship 
with Western countries.892 In Chinese state media the Dalai Lama’s Peace Prize was 
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given renewed emphasis as a proof of the Nobel Committee’s continuing intention to 
westernize, split and weaken China.893 
 
Accordingly, a Chinese political boycott towards Norway was enacted. For more than 
six years after Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, there was no bilateral 
political contact between Norway and China on the governmental level.894 Although 
there continued to be contacts between the countries in multilateral settings, the extent 
and duration of the political boycott was of a rather singular nature, and reflected the 
determination of Chinese authorities to discourage outside interference, especially 
from other European governments, in affairs deemed sensitive for the survival of the 
party system. Like in the UK, the economic repercussions were less severe than often 
feared.895 The factor of the Nobel Committee’s official independence from Norwegian 
political authorities, unlike what is sometimes asserted the Nobel Peace Prize is not 
awarded by the Norwegian Parliament, 896 also made the government’s process of 
appeasing the Chinese demands extra difficult. 
 
9.4.2 The Boycotts and the Identity Factor 
The same main Chinese discourses on their relations with Europe permeated Beijing’s 
relations with both the UK and Norway throughout this period. This main discourse 
of recognition as an equal was clearly on display in both cases. As the joint statement 
between China and the UK in 2014, a keystone in the normalization of the relationship 
after the Chinese boycott, stated as one of the many points;  
The two sides are willing to deepen their understanding of each 
other's development path and enhance political mutual trust. The 
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two sides emphasize the significance of promoting and protecting 
human rights and the rule of law, and are willing to strengthen 
human rights dialogue on the basis of equality and mutual 
respect. As a long-term policy of the British side, the UK recognizes 
that Tibet is part of the People's Republic of China and does not 
support ‘Tibet independence’.897  
 
This example illustrates the balance point, again, between the permissible with 
regards to the respective actors’ ontological security. Human rights are explicitly 
mentioned in the text, but the universalist notions of human rights are demarcated 
within the discourse of civilizational equality and coexistence of different social 
systems. This thus provides a firewall that in essence entails the message that no other 
country is in a position to tell China what to do. On a press conference in 2011 after 
David Cameron had expressed publicly his view on the importance of human rights, 
Wen Jiabao responded in pointed, and illustrative, fashion: “On human rights, China 
and the UK should respect each other, respect the facts, treat each other as equals, 
engage in more cooperation than finger-pointing and resolve our differences through 
dialogue”.898 
 
The increased Chinese focus on having their new great power status recognized, 
further accentuated the importance of this issue. It deserves to be noted that Chinese 
officials keep up the practice of referring to the large European countries, such as the 
UK, as great powers. However, a key thing to note is the increasing use of defining 
China as another one of these great powers, as for example Li Keqiang expressed to 
David Cameron, in emphasizing that the two countries should treat each other as 
equals, and respect each other’s core interests, given that “both China and the UK are 
great powers with worldwide influence (中英都是世界上有影响的大国).899 Arguably, 
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the status upgrade that China sought recognition of can be seen as manifested in the 
change of the Chinese approach to the Dalai Lama visit that triggered the crisis 
detailed in this chapter. As noted earlier, the Dalai Lama’s travels to visit various 
European countries and their heads of states and governments, is not at all a new 
phenomenon, but has rather been a staple of the exiled Tibetan leader’s travel plans 
for decades. In fact, only 4 years earlier, then British PM Gordon Brown had met with 
the Dalai Lama in similar circumstances in 2008. As summarized by Brown and 
Crossick:  
Surprisingly the UK, which in Chinese eyes has been the least 
favourite European country at least during the long years of 
negotiations over the hand-back of Hong Kong, avoided similar 
repercussions when Prime Minister Gordon Brown met the Dalai 
Lama. This was due to Downing Street’s recognition of the sensitive 
nature of the meeting by hosting it at Lambeth Palace, the home of 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, and meeting the Dalai Lama solely as 
a religious leader.900 
 
However, when David Cameron, and his deputy Nick Clegg sought to apply the very 
same recipe through meeting the Dalai Lama in the St. Paul’s Cathedral, they were to 
find that over the last few years the Chinese position had changed fundamentally, 
thus throwing the bilateral relationship into another serious crisis.901  
 
This was not only due to an increased Chinese sensitivity over the issue in the 
aftermath of the 2008 protests in Tibet,902 but also because as a general trend in the 
Chinese world view was opening for a range of policy directions that opened for a far 
more assertive pursuit of acquiescence of the Chinese foundational narrative from its 
European counterparts. The Chinese demand for symbolic recognition of their self-
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perceived new standing in the world, is also brought into light by the symbolically 
significant act of the in 2014, when in the planning of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s 
visit meant as an important event to demarcate the full normalization of the ties, the 
Chinese reportedly threatened to cancel the entire trip, unless Li was granted a 
reception with Queen Elizabeth II. 903  That the Chinese would seek this kind of 
symbolic recognition, which was out of the ordinary according to the UK diplomatic 
protocol, since the Queen usually only receives Heads of State and not Heads of 
Government, and that they would insist on forcing the matter through threatening to 
cancel this important official visit altogether, speaks volumes of the role of ontological 
security-seeking in Beijing’s relations with European countries. Premier Li did indeed 
get to meet the Queen at Windsor Castle,904 and the UK government would later enact 
a large-scale charm offensive towards the Chinese government, including an 
extremely lavish spectacle for Chinese President Xi Jinping on his visit in 2015. 905 
 
During a year of Chinese boycott of ministerial contact, including the absence of 
Chinese senior officials at the 2012 London Olympics, the Chinese repeatedly insisted 
that the onus was on the British to take the first step to repair the relations they had 
transgressed against, similar to the rhetoric applied towards Norway in the same time 
period. At the end of July 2012 Dai Bingguo finally arrived in the UK to attend the 
Olympics Opening Ceremony in place of more senior political figures, and proclaimed 
the will to move forward, and that it was necessary to overcome the current difficulties 
in the relationship. 906  In 2013 David Cameron did bow to the pressure, partly 
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motivated by a need to increase FDI in the UK, and declared to the Parliament, in the 
same vein as the French declaration some years earlier, that the UK respected China’s 
sovereignty, and did not support Tibetan independence.907 Cameron’s comments to 
the British Parliament then led to a phone conversation shortly after, between the UK 
Foreign Secretary Hague, and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi.908 
 
The phone call between Wang Yi and Hague laid out the terms of the reestablishment 
of normal relations, with Hague making sure to say all the right things. As the Chinese 
transcript of the conversation details, Hague expressed recognition of key strands of 
the Chinese foundational narrative, by expressing that “the UK welcomes China’s 
strength, prosperity and success (…) respects China’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, recognizes that Tibet is a part of China, does not support ‘Tibetan 
independence’, fully recognized the sensitivity of Tibet issues, and is willing to 
properly handle it on the basis of respecting China's deep concerns.”909 As in the case 
of France some years earlier, this statement of recognition and the implied changes in 
political practices lead to a normalization of the relationship, that was later to be 
followed by a rapid accelerating in Sino-UK ties. The cabinet of David Cameron thus 
made relations with China in to one of the centrepieces of their foreign policies.910 
Thus, in September of the same year, Wang Yi said that after a lot of hard work, the 
Sino-UK relationship had overcome the hardship, and entered a new phase. However, 
he was soon to emphasise the implicit conditions of this new phase in the relationship, 
namely that “both sides should earnestly respect each other’s core interests and 
important concerns (双方应切实尊重彼此的核心利益和重大关切)”911 
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The case of Norwegian political and diplomatic efforts at manoeuvring the bilateral 
relationship with China towards normalization, also clearly displays how the issue 
was framed by the Chinese through the same main discursive structures. 
Furthermore, in demarcating how the solution, similar to the case of the UK, involved 
substantial and official Norwegian acquiescence to recognize, legitimise, and give face 
to the Chinese Communist Party’s key discourses. This pattern was also recognized 
by the Norwegian government, who thus sought to model their solutions after the 
statement that had normalized the Danish-Chinese relationship after their recent 
diplomatic spat following a reception of the Dalai Lama.912 After a number of false 
starts, and later leaked negotiation efforts, one of which reportedly stranded based 
essentially on the then-Norwegian Prime Minister’s assessment that the deal being 
proposed, would be too starkly at odds with the tenets of the Norwegian self-image, 
and as such pose a challenge to the Norwegian ontological security, a solution was 
found after six years. 913  Notably, part of that process entailed Norway’s Prime 
Minister breaking custom by not meeting with the Dalai Lama during his 2014 visit to 
Oslo, an action she described as a “necessary sacrifice to prove to China that being in 
dialogue with them is important.”914 The painstakingly negotiated agreement that 
came to the fore as Norwegian-Chinese relations were normalized in late December 
2016, 915  was the “Statement of China and Norway on normalization of bilateral 
relations”.916 From the Chinese side the reaction to the statement was focused on how 
“Norway has had the chance to deeply reflect on its mistakes,”917 emphasizing the 
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international signal effect of having subjected a European country to six years of 
disgrace for interfering with internal Chinese affairs. 
 
The official English language text, with syntax and the key tifa vocabulary showing 
the Chinese language influence, starts out by praising Norway for being one of the 
first countries to recognize China, and pointing to long and friendly relations between 
the two countries prior to the Peace Prize of 2010, when “due to the Nobel Peace Prize 
award and events connected to the Prize, China-Norway relations have 
deteriorated.” 918  It then goes on to declare, illustrating again the Chinese 
preoccupation with being recognized, that “both sides will develop friendly relations 
on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.” Point no. 3 on the list 
entails certain core messages that also resonates with the solutions to diplomatic crises 
that other European countries have had with China, as covered in this and earlier 
chapters; namely the explicit recognition of the separateness and the success of the 
Chinese political model, and explicit praise for the Chinese governments development 
efforts. 919 In addition to this, it also stated the intention of not interfering in Chinese 
core interests or major concerns again:  
 
The Norwegian Government fully respects China's development 
path and social system, and highly commends its historic and 
unparalleled development that has taken place. The Norwegian 
Government reiterates its commitment to the one-China policy, fully 
respects China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, attaches high 
importance to China's core interests and major concerns, will not 
support actions that undermine them, and will do its best to avoid 
any future damage to the bilateral relations.920  
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The first sentence, does in itself mark a pronounced change in the discourse of the 
Norwegian political establishment over the 6 years of freeze. This general trend is well 
exemplified by comparing two instances of the Minister of Foreign Affairs' yearly 
keynote address to the Norwegian Parliament; in 2011, China was admonished to 
respect human rights and freedom of speech, two years later this phrase was 
supplanted by the formulation that Norway respects China's right to choose its own 
development path. 921  Norwegian politicians originally thought it enough to keep 
repeating that the Nobel Committee was separate from the government, and that the 
congratulatory remarks and the symbolic ties between the official Norway and the 
Peace Prize in display though the ceremonial setup, was merely the standard 
procedure. This approach was in essence the same as what had been applied earlier, 
when the Dalai Lama received the Peace Prize in 1989, or during later visits. However, 
this time around it would relatively soon become clear that for a more self-assertive 
China, this approach was no longer enough. In confirming one of the general points 
argued for here, the Chinese rhetoric applied towards Norway in the 1989 case of the 
Dalai Lama’s Peace Prize, and the rhetoric in the case of Liu Xiaobo 20 years later was 
not substantially different in terms of its foundational narrative. 922  However, the 
Chinese discursive changes in the intervening years provided political drivers in the 
direction of far more assertive efforts at pushing European actors to recognize the 
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This chapter argues that our understanding of the Chinese punitive reactions towards 
the two European countries in question can be better understood through including 
the identity aspect of a rising power seeking to shore up its ontological security, and 
whose main narrative had increasingly changed to accentuate the demand for respect 
and recognition from its international peer group. European recognition of the Dalai 
Lama and Liu Xiaobo as political operators, promoted an image of the PRC that is not 
in line with that of the CCP, and thus challenged the Communist Party’s legitimacy to 
power amongst an international public. This new willingness to escalate this issue, is 
in part representative of key discursive changes, where the EU was no longer a rising 
power on which companionship China could reach their goal of a more multipolar 
world order, but rather a weakening entity. Thus, the derived policy direction entailed 
that it was easier for China to serve their goal of legitimacy by policing European 
nations on what was regarded as key ontological issues for the CCP, such as the Dalai 
Lama or the recognition of political dissidents. As seen in the preceding chapters, the 
role of the European continent in the foreign policy debate in China had already 
changed. The Chinese emphasis on their relationship with the US over that of Europe 
was further demonstrated through a number of symbolical matters. As Godement and 
Vasselier summarize it: “When did China ever cancel a state visit to the United States, 
as it did with the EU in 2008 over a disagreement about the Dalai Lama? The US-China 
high level strategic and economic dialogue has never missed a beat. The “Annual” 
EU-China high level economic and trade dialogue did not happen in 2011, 2012, and 
2014.”923  
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The case of Norway and the case of the UK, share two further key common 
denominators of interest to this thesis’ research question. First, both of the cases 
involved China spending substantial amounts of political, diplomatic and economic 
capital on policing transgressions of the CCP’s national narratives tightly linked to 
their ontological security. This even though the tight Chinese grip of domestic news 
meant that the effect of the Dalai Lama visit and the Peace Prize, respectively, would 
have been negligible as far as the domestic political scene goes. As Chinese Vice MFA 
Fu Ying admitted to the secretary of the Nobel Committee, in a meeting arranged in 
order to dissuade any future Prize going to a Chinese dissident, when he underlined 
that the Chinese people would hardly understand the point of such a Prize anyway, 
and the CCP’s grip of the media would ensure limited coverage.924 However, the 
Chinese government still went to extremes hardly seen by any country in the history 
of the Peace Prize since the Second World War. The cases’ effects were also deeply 
counterproductive for the Chinese soft power efforts, towards which substantial 
resources had been spent by the CCP, Luttwak thus summarizes the case of China’s 
boycott towards Norway as, “Aside from its particular, almost comical, aspects, this 
episode is not atypical of China’s recent international conduct in being both highly 
energetic and definitely counterproductive.”925 Second, both of these cases involved 
the Chinese government spending even more resources and enacting even harsher 
punitive reactions against the UK and Norway, than they had done for comparable 
cases involving the same countries only years earlier. During this half-decade, then, 
the Chinese understanding of themselves, and their rightful place in the world, saw 
substantial continuities of the foundational narrative on which basis they sought 
ontological security and recognition in the world. 
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These large-scale, and economically unsound, boycotts were enacted by the Chinese 
government at occasions where they perceived their European partners, the UK and 
Norway, did not sufficiently recognize the ontological narrative of the Chinese polity. 
Hence the solution also closely integrated with ontological security-seeking measures, 
essentially asking for recognition of Chinese status, and confirming the Chinese 
narrative as separate, successful, and worthy of great power-deference. This goes 
down again to issues of identity being factors still referred and related to by even 
members of the Chinese diplomacy.  In the case of the UK, the symbolically important 
story of Li Keqiang demanding, counter to protocol, audience with the Queen as a key 
Chinese precondition for the normalization of the relationship, as very illustrative of 
the degree to which symbolic recognition of China’s status, and granting them face in 
both the international and domestic social context, took precedence over economic 
logic in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy towards a key European country.  
 
Arguably, this line of symbolic recognition was followed upon by the UK government 
a few years later, when Xi Jinping received a no-pomp-spared official visit to the UK, 
including golden carts and military parades through London to Buckingham Palace. 
“President Xi considers the so-called golden era of UK-China relations are one of his 
major diplomatic triumphs since he came to power. The Chinese state media have 
meticulously reported how the UK rolled out the reddest of the red carpets to welcome 
President Xi together with other exuberant royal treatments during the state visit”926 
In the case of Norway, after a number of tribulations, the final communique 
symbolically included a sentence explicitly expressing Norway’s respect for the 
Chinese political system and praising the CCP’s ability to lift people out of poverty. 
This Norwegian recognition demarcated a sharp break with Norwegian foreign policy 
tradition. As Neumann has pointed out, this was the first time a Norwegian MFA 
                                                 




explicitly recognized the virtue of an authoritarian regime, since the important post-
war Kråkerøy-speech of 1948 defined Norway’s doctrine of belonging to the liberal-
democratic international camp.927 
 
Overall then, the tension between these two discursive constructs of China’s new role 
in the world, at the same time strong and fragile, having moved up to the top tier of 
global powers whilst simultaneously fearing Western influence, this tension created a 
situation that was very conducive of the forms of extremely strong measures taken in 
order to safeguard the Chinese foundational narrative abroad. "However, symbolic 
infringements on reciprocal respect may ironically cause its disproportionate 
retaliation. (…) China's retaliation is often resolute but symbolic, in order for the 
bilateral talk to resume.”928 China was, in effect, insecure enough about its ontological 
security to strike down on misrecognition of it from abroad, whilst powerful enough 
to strongarm these European countries’ China policies. As such, large amounts of 
economic and political capital were spent by the Chinese in order to, in essence, have 
these European countries kowtowing to the CCP’s narrative of China. This should 
serve to accentuate the argument that such behaviour can be difficultly be explained 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 
10.1 Summary: The China-Europe Identity Nexus 
 
In addressing the research question of ‘how does Europe matter for Chinese identity, 
and how does identity matter for China’s current-day policies towards Europe?’, this 
thesis concludes that key political events in the China-Europe relationship indeed 
cannot be fully accounted for without bringing Chinese identity issues into the 
equation. Overall, the results of this research project demonstrate that Chinese 
perceptions of their own identity, and Europe’s role in the wider network of meaning 
sustaining this identity, has not only been strongly conceptually intertwined 
throughout history, but is also an important factor in current day political relations 
between China and the EU, as well as with singular European countries. The case of 
China-Europe relations thus joins a growing body of literature analysing how identity 
concerns often rooted in the history of the relevant polities have led them to embrace 
a particular range of foreign policies, even when other available and viable political 
choices would have entailed larger economic or diplomatic benefits.  
 
This thesis thus contends, in essence, that until now the analyses of China-Europe 
relations have been suffering from exactly the predicament that has been outlined by 
Wang Zheng and Callahan, amongst others; namely being too singularly focused on 
a narrow subset of factors, in particular on the economic dimension. 929  This thus 
entails missing out on considerable insights that comes from adding identity issues 
into the account. Some of the key political developments in the relationship between 
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China and Europe over the last decades can hardly be fully explained through 
rationalist analysis, focused on economic factors and power dynamics. Instead, such 
developments were compatible with the applied analytical framework of ontological 
security, focusing on the importance of identity processes in international relations. 
The divergences in rather symbolic issues of political values that are important for 
both parties’ ontological security, have proved to be key factors shaping the dynamics 
of the China-Europe relationship. As such, to discount these identity concerns from 
an analysis of China’s foreign policies towards Europe entails overlooking one of the 
most salient variables of the political dynamic. This conclusion on the explanatory 
power of the China-Europe identity nexus, is found in the sum of conclusions 
stemming from this thesis’ analyses of over a century’s worth of texts and political 
acts relevant to Chinese Europe policies.  
 
The two-pronged research design of this thesis has explored the issue on two 
analytical levels, through the diachronic and the synchronic section, respectively. The 
results of these investigations are deeply interrelated, but varies in temporal relevance 
and level of analysis. The main empirical findings of these two sections are thus 
summarized according to this bifurcated structure. The diachronic section has, in 
Chapters 4 to 6, undertaken a historical reading of the Chinese narratives of Europe, 
and how it has related to Chinese ontological security seeking as political 
entrepreneurs sought to re-establish foundational narratives for the various iterations 
of a new Chinese polity after the fall of the Qing dynasty. The analysis identified the 
intimate connection between the various political projects of China in the late-Qing, 
the post-Imperial, and the post-War eras, and how the image of Europe was situated 
in the construction of novel national narratives. In mapping these representations, this 
thesis identified a number of foundational narratives that has structured the role of 
Europe in the Chinese discourse, and as such Europe’s relevance to the Chinese 
political projects of ontological security seeking in the modern era. These foundational 
narratives were identified and classified based on two main structuring features; 
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firstly, the extent and modality to which Europe and the European countries are 
regarded as an Other, as related to the particular Self of the relevant Chinese political 
project. Secondly, how Europe as a political, technological and ethical concept is 
regarded as tied to China in terms of the narrative’s temporal aspect. As figure 13 
illustrates, these foundational narratives changed profoundly over a, historically 
speaking, relatively short time period, as China went through a century of both great 
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Figure 13: Overview of Chinese Foundational Narratives of Europe 
 
Through the analysis of political and ideological textual monuments from these 
relevant political eras, a number of ideational developments of broader relevance 
became clear. As the historical background in Chapter 4 demonstrated, the Chinese 
idea of Europe was at the outset a distant one, reflecting the relative isolation between 
these two civilizational centres throughout most of history. At the threshold of the 
colonial era, this entailed that the repeated defeats at the hands of the European 
powers dealt a body blow to the Chinese cosmology, and the ontological security of 
traditional Chinese identity. This challenge to the ontological security of the 
traditional Chinese world order, and the Chinese polity itself, would give rise to 
repeated political and philosophical convulsions over the coming century, in which 
Europe would emerge as a nodal point for the various Chinese attempts at re-
establishing an ontological security narrative for a reformed Chinese polity. In 
Chapter 5 the role of the Chinese idea of Europe in these fundamental political and 
329 
 
ideological upheavals was analysed through the two key cases of the Self-
Strengthening Movement of the late Qing dynasty; and secondly, the years giving 
birth to the early Republican era. In this 50-year period, a dynastic imperial system 
lasting for millennia was reshaped through a number of revolutions, rebellions, wars 
and world wars. These two key eras thus showcased two distinctly dissimilar 
dominant narratives of Europe. The Self-Strengthening Movement of the late Qing 
dynasty, essentially sought to readjust from traditional Sinocentrism to establishing 
ontological security through implementing, European technologies, but insisting on 
Chinese political and moral superiority. This was famously summarized as the 
principle of ti/yong; taking the Chinese culture as the essence, whilst utilising 
European technology for Chinese ends.  
 
As the contradictions inherent to this distinction between the socio-economic basis of 
an industrial society and the technology resulting from it became ever harder to 
transverse, a more radical reform movement sought to instead implement also socio-
economic and political reforms, building from a new ideational foundation of how 
human societies, China included, all are evolving based on the same “universal laws” 
(公理). Thus, in the case of the Early Republic, a second distinct narrative became 
dominant. This foundational narrative sought rather to establish a Chinese polity 
whose ontological security was based on emulating not only the technology but also 
the political and philosophical structures of Europe, and seeking confirmation for this 
new identity now also outside the borders of the Chinese polity itself. Overall, the 
development of the Chinese discourse through this period clearly demonstrated how 
Chinese ontological security seeking, and the resultant political processes, was 
intimately entwined with the Chinese narratives of Europe. This entailed a wholesale 
reformulation of the ontological essence of a Chinese polity, decentring it from that of 
a singular universal empire of ‘All under Heaven,’ to that of being only one nation-
state amongst many, seeking approval and a seat amongst the others in the European-




This Republican foundational narrative then gave way, as analysed in Chapter 6, to 
yet another fundamental renegotiation of the discursive basis for the Chinese polity, 
as the Chinese Communist Party came to power after the Second World War. The 
global political and ideological landscape of the Cold War meant that the role of the 
former colonial powers of Western Europe would play a substantially smaller role as 
a constituent factor of this new Chinese foundational narrative. However, the related 
narratives of Europe saw distinct and important changes through this period. This 
was demonstrated through the analysis of the two key historical periods of the 
chapter; the first case being that of the early days of CCP’s New China, as the 
communist party-state was built and articulated with Mao at the helm, and the second 
case covering the time of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, that saw yet another 
transformation of the ideological basis of the Chinese polity. In the early era of the 
CCP’s New China, the main discursive change was the how the predominant 
narrative of Europe was changed from a colonial Other of the imperialist world, to 
being in the “second world”, a battlefield in the midst of an ideological struggle in 
which China solidarized with sections of the continent, thus less of an Other than was 
the US. This narrative prepared the ground for an early change in the Chinese strategy 
towards the Europe, and made Europe a less contentious place to learn from in the 
early years, before the opening towards the US progressed further. During Deng 
Xiaoping’s years of reform, Europe was regarded as less ideologically relevant, 
reflecting the ideological changes in China towards pragmatism. However, the idea 
of Europe as partly separated from the US continued to open a discursive space for a 
clear support for the European integration project.  
 
As regards more current-day relevant arguments based on this research, this thesis 
argues that the post-1989 Chinese fundamental narrative of China and Europe as 
‘equal but separate civilizations,’ opened a space for a particular identity dynamic to 
play out in the relationship between these two actors. In this latest significant change 
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in the Chinese narrative of the continent, Europe’s role as an ideological subject 
position for China to define itself against increased its relevance. The concurrent 
Chinese discourses of Europe based on this narrative framed the political and 
diplomatic field in ways that carried broad political repercussions. The much 
advertised ‘new assertiveness’ under the leadership of Xi Jinping, is a reality, but is 
far more representative of continuities in the Chinese foreign policy discourses than 
what is often recognized. In a sense, the extant discourses of the Hu Jintao era already 
contained the same subject positions, Xi Jinping’s rhetoric is thus arguably different 
as a matter of degree, rather than a matter of kind. The foundational narrative of the 
‘Chinese Characteristics’ in opposition to the idea of universal values, is thus likely to 
only continue to create tensions in the Chinse relationship with Europe, and even 
more to the extent that the spread of Chinese economic and political interests entails 
it may confront European interests in various sectors and a wider range of 
geographical locations on the globe than before. Africa is one prime test case for how 
these two powers may manage to transcend such differences in third-party locales.930 
 
In the synchronic section, the investigation proceeded from the historical analysis, to 
investigate the degree to which Chinese identity concerns were a factor in 
contemporary political relations between China and Europe. This change to a different 
level of analysis, entailed tracing in more detail how the foundational narratives co-
constituted a set of discourses on China’s relations with Europe, that in effect 
structured the Chinese policy responses in three cases of key conflictual events over 
the last two decades. These cases then served as ‘crucial cases’ for probing the 
existence of an ontological security driven ‘identity factor’ in China’s Europe policies. 
Additionally, these were ‘hard cases,’ in the sense that the presence of an ‘identity 
factor’ in the discourses and practices of these key political cases, proves its overall 
relevance as a factor in China-Europe relations. The investigation combined three 
                                                 
930 See e.g. discussions in Carrozza 2018 
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main analytical moves, as illustrated in figure 14, below: First, it traced the 
foundational narrative forming the base of Chinese ontological security, establishing 
how it framed the debates of the era. Second, it analysed the main discourses derived 
from the foundational narrative, at the level of the concrete contemporary political 
and diplomatic issues of the time. Third, it explored the political repercussions of these 
discourses and how the identity factor served as a salient element in the key political 
















The case of the diplomatic processes surrounding the proposed lifting of the EU’s 
arms embargo, as detailed in Chapter 7, confirmed how identity questions were a 
considerable factor shaping the crisis that demarcated a ‘tipping point’ in China-EU 
relations. As the analysed empirical material showed, the post-1989 foundational 
narrative formed the basis for a second layer of Chinese main discourses of Europe, 
through which the Chinese framed their relationship. Key amongst them were the 
discourses about being co-rising power poles, representing distinct political models, 
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Figure 14: Overview of the three-layered Chinese discursive construct of Europe, 2016 
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but of equal value. Arguably, these discourses opened a policy space where a number 
of issues became particularly important political drivers in terms of securing 
recognition of the ontological status of the Chinese identity. These included; seeking 
recognition for a ‘different’ political regime, and for territorial sovereignty, and 
seeking Europe’s cooperation as common partners in global multipolarization. As the 
chapter’s analysis demonstrated, for Beijing the issue causing a diplomatic crisis was 
not so much about being denied access to European arms. Rather this was about being 
denied ‘face’, as the EU in effect refused to give China a symbolic status upgrade. As 
this issue led to a stop in the discussion of a Brussels-Beijing axis in international 
relations, this showcased how Beijing was ready to undertake actions to preserve their 
ontological security, that is difficultly understandable if employing only rationalist 
economic or political logic to the case.  
 
Chapter 8 further traced the development of contemporary China-Europe relations, 
by focusing on yet another key conflictual inflexion point of the relationship; the 
breakdown in relations happening in the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics, as the 2008 
EU-China summit for the first time got cancelled by the Chinese. This was due to a 
number of diplomatic rows, in particularly including the French and German political 
leaders’ decisions to meet with the Dalai Lama. The analysis found the foundational 
Chinese narrative of Europe to be unaltered, but traced notable changes in the derived 
main discourses, mainly that the discourse of the EU as China’s co-rising power pole 
weakened as Chinese official discourses increasingly emphasized the success of their 
economic model after the financial crisis. The main discourse on being granted equal 
but distinct status stayed permanent, and if anything was reflecting a more aggressive 
twist as seen in the diplomatic conflicts regarding the Dalai Lama, related to a more 
assertive range of foreign policy repercussions. Thus, although economic concerns 
formed a notable backdrop to the nadir in China-Europe relations, this thesis argued 
the main point of discontent was in the realm of ontological security discrepancies 
between the two parties. As the Chinese sense of self grew more assertive they 
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increasingly sought recognition for their foundational narrative as a great power 
founded on differing values, and thus more openly challenged the universalism-based 
ontological security of the European powers France and Germany. From the Chinese 
side, the solution to the crises was thus simply for the Europeans to recognize the 
principle of ti/yong civilizational diversity. As demonstrated, this form of identity 
recognition was indeed how the impasse was resolved, as Germany and France both 
officially communicated recognition, even though diplomatically strong-armed to do 
so, of the CCP’s foundational narrative. In effect this was not just any diplomatic spat, 
but a fundamental disagreement that although of bereft of much practical political or 
economic importance, carried immense importance for the ontological narrative of 
each of these two polities. 
 
As analysed in Chapter 9, this key tension did not subside even as the overall China-
Europe relationship was normalized. The rise of Xi Jinping as the most dominant 
Chinese leader since Deng, dovetailed with an increasingly assertive set of main 
discourses on Europe, that fed into a set of policy directions that drove the identity 
factor’s impact on the diplomatic crises in China-UK and China-Norway relations in 
the years 2010-2016. The Chinese foundational narrative with regards to Europe 
showed through this period a further shift to increase in the emphasis of China as a 
civilization not only separate, but successfully so. Concurrently, the Chinese main 
discourses relating to Europe developed in a more pronounced fashion along a 
trajectory where a successful Chinese model of development was increasingly 
contrasted to that of the West, and where a revived version of the Chinese past 
increasingly was placed as an idealized future of the CCP’s national narrative. The 
derived policy directions thus entailed an increasing readiness by the Chinese 
government to spend political and economic capital in pursuit of European states’ 
acquiescence. Hence the solution was again closely related to what is described as an 
ontological security-seeking measure, essentially pushing for the European countries’ 
recognition of Chinese status, and confirming the Chinese narrative as separate, 
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successful, and worthy of great power-deference. Contributing to a broader debate in 
the literature,931 over the extent to which Xi Jinping’s foreign policies is based on 
radically different conceptions over China’s place in the international society than 
those of his immediate predecessor. Chapter 9 concluded through the lens of the 
foundational narrative of China with regards to Europe, that the high-profile and eye-
catching number of foreign policy initiatives and new discursive actions from Xi 
Jinping rather reflects an intensification of already extant discourses, rather than a 
radical break.  
 
In sum, the Chinese discourses of themselves with regards to Europe, based on a 
foundational narrative reflecting cultural and political dilemmas with long roots in 
Chinese modern history, was a constituent part in shaping current Chinese 
conceptions of their political goals. This identity effect was also demonstrated by two 
common denominators of the two most recent cases analysed, namely how they both 
involved Beijing spending substantial amounts of political, diplomatic, and economic 
capital on policing against transgressions of the CCP’s national narratives, even 
though CCP censorship entailed that both of these stories would have limited impact 
domestically. Furthermore, both of these cases involved the Chinese government 
spending even more resources and enacting even harsher punitive reactions against 
the UK and Norway, than they had done for comparable cases involving the same 
countries only years earlier. Overall, the empirical material researched throughout the 
synchronic section of the thesis thus demonstrated the changing Chinese discursive 
field regarding Europe, and corroborated, how this entailed identity questions being 
a considerable factor shaping the Chinese side’s policies towards their European 
counterparts. This China-European identity nexus has thus been demonstrated to 
matter today, as it did in the past. 
 
                                                 




10.2 Final Remarks: Contributions and Implications 
 
Contemporary China-Europe relations have been through a number of vagaries over 
the last two decades. In the span of few years the relationship has gone from highs of 
speculations about a new great power axis, to lows of political boycotts and punitive 
economic measures. This volatile dynamic in China’s policies towards Europe is 
increasingly difficult to explain through the political economy lens that has commonly 
been applied. When Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s insistence on being invited to see 
the Queen becomes a key foreign policy flashpoint following 18 months of Chinese 
diplomatic boycott of the UK, it should become clear that there are other factors at 
play in the relationship between two of the world’s most important powers besides 
merely economic or geopolitical rationality. As even the realist Kissinger formulated 
it with regards to the future of China-US relations: “This is the key problem of our 
time. Each of us is strong enough to create situations around the world in which it can 
impose its preferences, but the importance of the relationship will be whether each 
side can believe that they have achieved enough to be compatible with their 
convictions and with their histories.”932 This thesis thus argues that the importance of 
analysing the identity these convictions are predicated upon, and the history on which 
it is based, is no less of an issue for China’s relations with Europe; a continent with 
which it has an even longer and more fraught history than with the US. However, a 
major drawback of the current literature is that it has explored this Chinese identity 
factor’s relevance in all of China’s most important foreign policy dyads, but somehow 
the case of China’s relations with Europe has been overlooked. This omission is all the 
more consequential in light of the fact that Europe has been perhaps the single most 
central foreign actor in the re-negotiations of Chinese social and political identity from 
                                                 
932 Kissinger 2018 
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the colonial era’s violent introduction to modernity. As China continues to grow more 
consequential for both Europe and the global order in general, this thesis guiding 
rationale has been to address this key gap in the analysis of relations between two of 
the world’s foremost power centres. 
 
Addressing this gap through this thesis’ theoretical approach, has thus entailed 
making a contribution to the literature at the intersection of the four related issues 
introduced earlier. First, by contributing to the field of China-Europe relations; 
secondly, through making this contribution through investigating the role of identity, 
a factor that has been strangely absent from the already too limited range of literature 
on one of the world’s key relationships. In addition to these empirical contributions, 
in theoretical terms the thesis has added to, thirdly; the scholarship on identity 
dynamics in Chinese foreign policy in general, by further introducing the analytical 
prism of ontological security theory, and fourthly; by utilising this case of China’s 
Europe policies to contribute to ontological security theory building. Starting out with 
the first of these four scholarly contributions, the case for further expanding the 
literature on Europe-China relations, and in particular EU-China relations should not 
need too much explication. In a world that has rapidly moved past the post-Cold War 
unipolar moment, the tendency of the international relations literature to gravitate 
around a body of hub-and-spokes style works focusing on American interaction with 
other foreign actors, should be further supplemented by literature focusing on 
bilateral relations between the other poles in the international system. This thesis has 
thus contributed to the growing literature between the two most influential non-
American poles in the international system, that of China and the EU. 
 
As to the second empirical point, this addition to the China-Europe literature has 
contributed through focusing on an aspect of this relationship that has long been 
underexplored, namely the role of identity. This thesis has thus sought to ascertain 
whether Europe played a role in the Chinese ontological security dilemmas since the 
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fall of Qing dynasty. Furthermore, it has on this basis probed further whether the 
identity factor also plays a role in the current era, through investigating key 
contemporary political crises in China-Europe relations. The resulting analysis did 
establish that the empirical material supports both the assumptions related to the 
crucial case, and the hard case aspects of the research question. In other words, the 
empirical analysis supports the proposition that identity factors were prevalent 
drivers in these key political and diplomatic cases. Ontological security seeking 
constituted an important consideration as the Chinese formulated and implemented 
their policies towards Europe in this period. The different foundational narratives of 
the Chinese polity and how these were constituted with regards to Europe, opened 
up for different discourses based on these foundational narratives, and these 
discourses then constituted a particular political space for the Chinese actions in their 
relationship with Europe. Through tracing these changing Chinese discourses, and 
Europe’s role in the identity configuration of these, it has become clear the extent to 
which the variations in these discourses shaped the political incentives for China’s 
Europe policies in quite radically different ways over the last century. In other words, 
the identity factor turned out to be a crucial one in the China-Europe relationship, and 
Beijing was proved ready to undertake actions to preserve their ontological security, 
that goes beyond what would be expected if employing only economic or rational-
political logic to the analysis of Chinese Europe policies.  
 
With regards to the two theoretical motivations of this thesis, the first was aimed at 
addressing the fact that the growing theoretical field of ontological security studies 
has only rarely been applied to Chinese cases. However, the argument was that this 
approach could contribute saliently to analyses of China’s politics of identity. By 
providing a clear analytical framework able to integrate investigations of current-day 
political relevance with analysis of the narrative-driven dynamics of identity-
construction, the ontological security approach indeed demonstrated its salience. 
Moreover, the theoretical framework proved itself particularly suited for the Chinese 
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case, given how the framework consciously avoids the reification of the nation-state. 
The Chinese historical experience entails that identity analysis of China should avoid 
the more teleologically nation-state based approaches often prevalent in other 
theoretical frameworks based even more predominantly on the European experiences. 
As we have seen, this history of having a millennia-old cosmology and related political 
structure suddenly and fundamentally challenged, resulted in attempts at 
reconstituting the ontological basis of the polity through a number of widely varying 
ideologies, political organisation models, and the related foundational narratives; 
from denial to Europeanising republicanism, and from constitutional monarchy to 
various brands of communism,  
 
Concurrently, the second theoretical issue motivating this thesis, was the argument 
that in the same way as the ontological security approach can contribute to the 
analysis of China, so analyses of the Chinese case can contribute to the development 
of the ontological security theory. Given the novelty of these theoretical contributions, 
I will detail them briefly below, whilst also indicating some implications for these 
concepts in terms of further research. This thesis’ undertaking of a broad study of 
China, from the mid-19th Century till today, has thus contributed to widening the 
conceptual universe of ontological security studies though the inclusion of a case that 
is both temporally, geographically, and culturally dissimilar from the main body of 
works. In the process, this thesis has proved a salient arena for further exploring two 
extant but undercovered concepts in ontological security theory, as well as 
implementing and testing three Chinese-derived expansions of the conceptual 
framework. With regards to what the case of China has been able to contribute with 
in terms of conceptual exploration, the two distinct avenues explored where those of 
the role of ontological security seeking and narrative entrepreneurs, and secondly; the 




As such, this investigation concludes that the use of the concept of ontological security 
seeking as a key analytical tool, is a particularly important prism for investigating the 
underexplored issue of states seeking to fundamentally change their regularized 
relationships with other actors, and adapt the foundational narratives of the polity, in 
order to achieve legitimacy. Not the least this includes the role of narrative 
entrepreneurs as political actors negotiating new foundational narrative frameworks 
for a polity. Secondly, this thesis also forms a contribution to the growing literature 
on how identity processes plays out through different modalities in polities that 
entered modernity through externally imposed social processes rather than as the 
result of organic development. Such historical backgrounds reverberate through the 
institutionalized memories of a society, as it provides a particular background for the 
temporally based narratives seeking to draw a coherently emplotted arc from this past 
to the future. The analysis of the historical and contemporary texts demonstrates how 
China shares the traits of other non-Western empire with memories of colonial 
trauma. This, in that they are more concerned with their identity narratives being 
intersubjectively acknowledged by foreign actors, and more conscious about their 
status recognision, a dynamic that arguably has proved integral to Chinese Europe 
policies over the last decades. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis also concludes that three Chinese-derived concepts have 
contributed saliently to the ontological security framework throughout this 
investigation of Chinese identity dynamics, and that these can also be of wider 
relevance to other polities in the region, as well as globally. These three conceptual 
developments are, firstly; to recognize more explicitly the importance of external 
status recognition and the importance of face dynamics. Relating to Buzan’s call to 
better include face as a concept into international relations theories, 933  this thesis 
suggests that within the ontological security framework it is salient to recognize it as 
                                                 
933 Buzan 2018 
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a particular mode of external recognition seeking. There are two distinct features of 
Chinese foreign policy for which the utilization of face as an analytical concept is 
particularly salient. As the empirical sections of this thesis has demonstrated, these 
are firstly, the dominant presence of apology diplomacy as an onus of Chinese foreign 
relations, and secondly, the role of ritualized recognition. This also relates further to 
the second conceptual expansion, namely the role of guanxi, or the extent to which the 
analysis has traced a pronounced Chinese focus on ritualized ontological security 
through particularist bilateral role relations rather than universal rules. This 
operationalization reflects the aforementioned definition of face as the reciprocated 
recognition of relational hierarchy, and utilizes this as an analytical framework for 
investigating particular modes of Chinese ontological security seeking, as empirically 
observed at multiple key points in contemporary Europe-China relations. Thus, this 
thesis argues for the operationalization of the difference between polities whose 
ontological security is founded with a more pronounced focus on seeking recognition 
from others based on a universalist view of the polity’s fundamental values, versus a 
polity that seeks ontological status recognition based on parochial, bilateral, 
relationality. In such a model, modern China is defined as the latter type.  
 
The third conceptual expansion concerns the extent to which materiality informs the 
ontological security status by engaging with the concept of material success, and 
political and economic functionality as one possible mode of ontological security 
seeking. This dynamic is intimately related to the Chinese conceptualization of ti/yong 
as conceptual framework to address the inherent tensions of externally driven 
modernity as it relates to the traditional cosmology of non-Western actors in the 
international system. This concept should thus be relevant not only for China, but for 
a wider range of emerging powers in the international system. Furthermore, the 
broader Chinese relevance of the old ti/yong dilemma is striking, as the Chinese 
leadership argues in favour of separate civilizational rights whilst seeking to straddle 
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the homogeneous drive of modern economic and technological modes of 
organization. As Neumann has summarized the dilemma in his treatise on Russia:  
Russian thinking about the country’s place in the world starts from 
a contradiction. On the one hand, given its self-perception as great, 
Russia should do its own thing. On the other hand, given that the 
states system is a self-help system where units have to relate to the 
most effective models available for how to organise or suffer the 
consequences, backward Russia has to own up to cutting-edge 
models -- European or otherwise -- or suffer marginalisation.934 
 
A similar dilemma has been at the core of the Chinese ontological security crisis of the 
late Qing dynasty. However, the ti/yong discourse has played the role of serving as a 
solution to this seemingly intractable dilemma, by constructing a discourse that opens 
for the approach of copying a number of more efficient technologies, whilst sheltering 
this process from more general identity issues, this then making the process more 
politically viable. This also ties intimately into the ‘tacit social compact’ of the current 
political regime, whose domestic legitimacy has been founded precisely on its abilities 
to deliver rapid economic gains to the populace. Furthermore, in line with the stated 
goals of the Chinese Communist Party, the ti/yong dilemma that has for a long time 
been a key fault line in the Chinese foundational narratives, may turn out to meet with 
a change of axial proportions, if the CCP manages to achieve lasting material success 
based on a competing political paradigm from that of the West.935  
 
Drawing upon these conceptualisations, and the role they have been demonstrated to 
play in China-Europe relations, there are certain implications of wider relevance for 
                                                 
934 I. B. Neumann 2016, 6 
935 On this note, a particularly interesting debate revolves around the overlap of two 
of the current age’s most important megatrends, namely the rise of China, and the 
advent of Big Data-driven AI capabilities, and how these two may combine to create 
a new form of “Digital Leninism”. See e.g. Browne 2017; N. Wright 2018; K.-F. Lee 
2018; Millward 2018 
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the further study of Chinese foreign policy that will be briefly sketched out. With 
reference to the ongoing discourse about whether the current Sino-US competition 
equals a ‘new cold war’, it is important to note the stark contrast of China’s current 
relational, particularist vision as compared to the Soviet Communist international 
universalist proselytising. However, given the rules-based foundation of the 
established world order, such a differing approach is no less of a fundamental 
challenge. This predisposition is at the core of the concerns raised in Western capitals 
about the growing role of China in international politics. “Westerners preferred to 
mediate international relationships through a ‘de-personalized, formal, rationalized 
caucus of international law’ (…) [China] seems to want ‘special civilizational rights’, 
either in the absence of an agreed rewrite of the rules or as a way of challenging 
them.”936. The degree to which China in the future chooses to define its identity in 
particularistic and civilizational terms, is thus one of the main avenues through which 
Chinese ontological security seeking will shape the future of the international order. 
Overall, these conceptual additions to ontological security theory underpins this 
thesis’ argument for a circumscribed de-universalization of ontological security 
theory. Ontological security is a concept that when defined at the higher level of 
generality, is a universal drive for polities to seek stable self-identities, the modalities 
through which this process is sought achieved differ to an extent that the Western-
centric development of the theory so far has insufficiently reflected. These conceptual 
developments thus contribute to a better understanding of the specificities of the role 
of Chinese ontological security seeking in the country’s foreign policies in general. 
Hence, they also contribute to our understanding of these processes for other rising 
powers of the global South, at a moment when understanding these actors’ 
motivations on the international arena is becoming ever more important. 
 
                                                 




As a final remark, then, this thesis contends that current megatrends of global 
integration and convergence are likely to increase the salience of the ontological 
security approach. 937  When, in the age of globalization and immigrations flows, 
political participation has seen a pivot away from economically based class-voting, to 
one were identity is becoming a prime yardstick, 938  exploring the underlying 
dynamics of mass identity formation is ever more important. 939   The theoretical 
vantage point of ontological security is a particularly good lens through which to 
analyse the deep-rooted issues of identity and insecurity that is based on the 
foundations of identity politics; namely who are ‘we’ and who are the ‘other’? 
Importantly, populism and identity grievances are not exclusive to the Western world, 
although the majority of the ink spilt is on this.940 This myopia is both academically 
and politically unsustainable, and will be increasingly so.  
 
As globalization and the spread of industrialization makes the world’s economic and 
political power centres increasingly ‘non-Western,’ it is all the more reason to analyse 
how these effects play out in the rising power centres of the world. 941  Most 
significantly, the interplay between these two developments is in itself consequential, 
as centuries-old conceptions of political and economic dominance are being 
challenged, and the demographic, political and economic realities of the globe are 
being fundamentally reshaped. The identities of the world’s rising powers are being 
                                                 
937 For a brief overview of globalization’s challenges for extant political structures see 
e.g. Giddens 1991; Barber 2010; Kinnvall and Jönsson 2002; Calhoun 2007; Kinnvall, 
Manners, and Mitzen 2018 
938A key tenet of the research on identities is the fact that humans live and interact 
through a number of different identities, amongst them attachments to different 
territories with separate or interlinked narratives, as such one may have nested 
identities as both a Münchener, Bavarian, German, and European.  Lebow 2016, 130 
939 Giddens 1991; Kinnvall 2004a; Barber 2010; Kinnvall and Jönsson 2002; Calhoun 
2007 
940 Müller 2014; Applebaum 2016; Müller 2016; Krastev 2007; Judis 2016; Wiarda 2013 
941 Zakaria 2016; Müller 2016; Judis 2016 
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reshaped at the same moment as these new powers are reshaping global politics. As 
such, even more scholarly attention should be allotted to understanding this 
interlinked dynamic by a deeper exploration of the identity factors driving these rising 
non-Western powers’ foreign policies. By analysing the role of ontological security in 
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